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Overview: 
An Empirical Analysis in Three Chapters 
 
Development aid is political. The establishment of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
is often perceived as an instrument for some countries to achieve influence over others (e.g., 
Buira 2005, Bird and Rowlands 2006). The control pursued may be political, commercial, or 
over the strategies to achieve development. Furthermore, some authors claim that the ability 
to influence IFIs’ lending decisions is essential to guaranteeing the engagement of powerful 
countries in international cooperation and therefore the survival of these institutions (Dreher 
et al. 2009b, Copelovitch 2010). Not surprisingly, the development aid literature recognizes 
that major stakeholders’ particular interests in borrowing countries are a key driver of 
resources allocated by IFIs. Empirical studies reveal that political allies of the US are more 
likely to participate in International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs (Thacker 1999, Dreher 
et al. 2009a), receive more favorable loan terms (Oatley and Yackee 2004, Dreher and Jensen 
2007) and be subjected to lighter penalties for noncompliance with conditions from this same 
institution (Stone 2004, Dreher et al. 2015). Preferences of the G5 countries have likewise 
been identified as a key determinant of variation in IMF loan size and conditionality 
(Copelovitch 2010). Similarly, World Bank lending has been linked to US commercial- 
(Fleck and Kilby 2006, Bresslein and Schmaljohann 2013) and geopolitical-interests 
(Andersen et al. 2006, Dreher et al. 2009b, Kilby 2013). Regional Development Banks 
(RDBs) have also been shown to lend strategically. For example, loan disbursements by the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) more often follow the self-interests of its two major donors, 
namely Japan and the US, than borrowers’ needs (Kilby 2006, 2011b, Lim and Vreeland 
2013). 
Politically driven aid is problematic because it is more likely to be ineffective. Three 
arguments supporting this idea are the following: First, it can favor projects with with lower 
expected payoffs in strategic countries at the expense of promising ones in other countries 
(Dreher et al. 2013). Second, it guarantees project execution continuity regardless of success. 
Projects are still pursued even when insufficient time and resources are dedicated to their 
preparation (Kilby 2011b). And third, it allows borrowers to not comply with policy reforms 
that encourage project success or economic growth (Dreher et al. 2013). Several studies for 
the IMF and the World Bank suggest that political favoritism weakens the ability of recipient 
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countries to implement policy reforms requested through loan conditionality (Stone 2008, 
Kilby 2009, Nooruddin and Vreeland 2010). It has been shown that human rights violations 
are practically sanctioned with the suspension of aid to countries without donor political ties, 
while not to those with them (Nielsen 2013). In fact, Dreher et al. (2014) find that the effect 
of aid on growth is significantly lower when aid has been granted for political reasons, and 
concludes that short term political favoritism reduces growth.  
This dissertation studies the role of politics in the conformation of IFIs. Each of its 
three chapters explores the rootedness of politics in every key component of IFIs: mission, 
structure, and policy. Chapter 1 takes the mission of the IFI as a starting point to understand 
the diffusion of political favoritism in its lending decisions. The foundation of IFIs often 
responds to the desire of the main sponsor to spread its area of influence and this is reflected 
in the mission. Here, the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) is taken as an example. The 
IsDB is an RDB initiated with the support of King Faisal Bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia and 
restricted to countries with significant Muslim populations. The analysis explores to what 
extent IsDB lending follows the interests of Saudi Arabia in the Islamic world based on 
religious affinity. Chapter 2 focuses on the structure of IFIs as facilitators of political favors. 
The number of voting shares is generally assigned to each member according to their capital 
contributions and it is the most important feature in the structure of IFIs because it provides 
institutional control to large stakeholders. This chapter considers the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) to identify the effect of the preference heterogeneity of influential 
members on the ease of approving politically motivated loans. And lastly, chapter 3 observes 
how IFIs adjust their policies to cope with the conflicting interests of other actors. Credit 
conditionality is the main policy instrument of IFIs to improve aid effectiveness but it can 
also serve to maintain an area of influence. Donors can engage in a “race to the bottom" 
through credit conditionality to reach borrowers and achieve influence over them. This 
chapter investigates the extent to which World Bank conditionality responds to the rising 
presence of “new” donors in Africa.1 The three chapters provide evidence on the three core 
arguments supporting the claim that IFIs are failing to promote growth. Namely, they are in 
the first place not necessarily founded to promote growth, their structures are designed to 
allow their main donors to control them, and their policies are inconsistent and can be 
designed to protect their self-interests. The dissertation also suggests what to expect from IFIs 
                                                        
1 “New” donors is a term generally employed in the aid literature to refer to donors outside the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).    
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in the near future and highlights the key areas that need to be reformed to hinder politically 
motivated lending. 
Together with coauthor Krishna Vadlamannati, we study in Chapter 1 the advantages 
for Saudi Arabia in sponsoring the IsDB to gain leadership in the Arab region and its 
periphery without the interference of the G7 countries. The empirical analysis is based on 
panel data techniques applied to a dataset of loan commitments by the IsDB to its 56 
members over the 1970 to 2007 period. Results suggest that IsDB lending closely follows the 
political interests of Saudi Arabia based on religion. Sunni regime countries receive favorable 
treatment in terms of loan allocation, as well as Shia majority populated countries in 
exceptional occasions with other religious minority groups, while non-Muslim countries are 
the least favored. There is also evidence that World Bank lending to the same group of 
countries and over the same time frame does not respond to the political stance of Saudi 
Arabia founded on religion. The findings reveal the advantage that Saudi Arabia gains by 
assuming the leadership of an RDB in contrast to coordinating common strategies in a global 
IFI with other large shareholders for whom religion might not be essential for political 
alliances. Saudi Arabia most likely took the decision to initiate the IsDB to maintain its 
position as a regional power in the Islamic world.  
Chapter 2 offers an explanation as to why the US exerts limited control over the IDB 
despite being its largest shareholder. The structure of the IDB is atypical to that of 
comparable IFIs and it might protect IDB lending against US political and commercial 
interests in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region. Unlike in other RDBs, borrowers 
in the IDB hold the majority of the voting share and its three largest borrowing members, 
namely Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, have been granted altogether with as much voting 
weight as the US. Results presented are based on the analysis of IDB loan commitments to its 
26 borrowing members over the 1970 to 2007 period. They suggest that interest heterogeneity 
between the US and the previously mentioned borrowing members leads to distributional 
conflicts and thereby creates the opportunity for greater institutional autonomy. The better 
representation of non-borrowing members in the IDB translates into more independent 
lending practices. An inclusive structure can therefore limit the exposure of development 
resources to the interests of the major stakeholder.  
The dissertation finalizes in chapter 3 by discussing the decision of the World Bank to 
reduce its credit conditionality in contrast to its own recommendation of diverting aid to good 
policy environments. Both positions are conflicting since the World Bank delivers conditions 
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to actually improve the effectiveness of aid. Nevertheless, World Bank conditionality has 
been recognized as being inconsistent and as reflecting the interests of its major stakeholders. 
The easing off of the conditionality of World Bank loans is likely due to the increasing global 
presence of new donors in aid-related activities. The examination of the determinants of 
World Bank conditions delivered to 54 African countries over the 1980 to 2013 period 
suggests that this is the case. The World Bank provides fewer conditions attached to their 
loans to African countries that are also assisted by China. A similar pattern is observed in 
middle-income borrowers that receive financial assistance from Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates, but this effect vanishes after the turn of the new millennium. This reaction reveals 
that the World Bank is engaged in a race to the bottom with China as it did with Kuwait and 
the United Arab Emirates in the past. The World Bank seems to be moderating its policy 
advice to protect its interests in Africa.   
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An Empirical Analysis of Aid Allocation by the Islamic 
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I.1. Introduction 
 
Regional powers approach Regional Development Banks (RDBs) to exert influence over their 
geographical proximity (Kilby 2006, Lim and Vreeland 2013). Saudi Arabia is not an 
exception and has taken the initiative to found and assume the chief sponsorship of several 
RDBs, possibly to gain leadership in the Arab region and its periphery without the 
interference of the G7 countries.2 Unlike the G7, religious affiliation is particularly important 
for Saudi Arabia to draw political alliances in the Islamic world, making the building of 
common strategies for this region between both sides a difficult task (Neumayer 2004, 
Andersen et al. 2006, Clark 2012). For this reason, it is rather challenging for Saudi Arabia to 
position its interest through the Bretton Woods Institutions, despite its significant 
participation in them (Blanchard and Prados 2007, Copelovitch 2010, Bremmer 2013).3 In this 
chapter we analyze the lending decisions of the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), by far the 
largest Saudi-led RDB and Arab development agency, and observe to what extent these are 
driven by Saudi Arabia’s political interests based on religious affiliation.4 We further perform 
a similar assessment of the World Bank for the same group of countries and over the same 
time frame, and observe the relative advantage Saudi Arabia might gain by taking on the 
directorship of an RDB to pursue its own interests.   
The limited number of studies on aid allocation by Arab donors agree that 
predominantly Muslim countries are their main beneficiaries (Simmons 1981, Hunter 1984, 
Neumayer 2003, 2004). This finding can also be extended to the IsDB, as it was set up in 
1975 with the very purpose of providing development assistance only to countries affiliated to 
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and to facilitate their access to Sharia 
                                                        
2 Saudi Arabia is the largest shareholder of the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and 
Development, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the Arab Fund for Economic and 
Social Development, the Arab Gulf Program for the United Nations Development Organizations, the 
Arab Monetary Fund, the Islamic Development Bank, and the OPEC Fund for International 
Development (AAAID 2012, BADEA 2012, AFESD 1968, AGFUND 2011, AMF 2012, IsDB 2010, 
OFID 2012). None of the G7 countries is a member of any of these RDBs. 
3 Saudia Arabia is the eighth, tenth and sixth largest capital subscriber in the IMF, IBRD and IDA 
respectively (IMF 2013, World Bank 2013a, World Bank 2013b).  
4 Statistics in OFID (2004) suggest that the IsDB is the largest Saudi led and Arab development 
agency with cumulative loan commitments until 2003 of US$ 34,224 million. Figures for the 
following major Arab development agencies are US$ 15,492 million for the Arab Fund for Economic 
and Social Development, US$ 12,400 for the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, US$ 
6,896 million for the OPEC Fund for International Development, US$ 6,474 million for the Saudi 
Fund for Economic Development, US$ 3,384 million for the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, US$ 
2,196 million for the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, and US$ 238 million for the 
Arab Gulf Program for United Nations Development Organizations. 
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compliant monetary resources (Warde 2000, Villanger 2007). Though Islamic solidarity is 
expected to play a dominant role in IsDB lending decisions, Muslim communities are not 
homogeneous and recognizing a grasp of countries’ affiliation to specific Islamic 
denominations is crucial to understanding politics in the region. Saudi Arabia, as largest donor 
of the Bank, pays special attention to the different Islamic denominations in forging political 
alliances in the Islamic world and therefore we expect this to be reflected in IsDB lending 
patterns (Clark 2012, Abdo 2013). 
Of particular relevance to comprehending Saudi Arabian interests is the relationship 
between Sunnis and Shias, which are the first and second largest Islamic denominations and 
constitute around 95 percent of the total Muslim population (Pew Research Center 2009a, 
2009b). Sunni-Shia relations have been marked by violent conflict, and tensions between 
them are a common phenomenon across the Arab region and its periphery (Luomi 2008, 
Blanchard and Prados 2007). This has resulted in the polarization of Islamic societies based 
on affiliations to these two denominations, and international political support among equal 
Islamic denominations is the norm (Clark 2012, Keath 2013). As for communities affiliated 
with smaller Islamic branches, cooperation is usually sustained on the acceptance of one or 
the other’s religious fundamentals (Luomi 2008, Clark 2012). The Sunni-Shia divide, 
however, seems to play a less relevant role in the presence of strong social frictions with non-
Islamic communities. Sunnis and Shias tend to collaborate with one another during periods of 
conflict with populations of other faiths in multi-religious countries, arguably to join together 
against a common enemy (Abdo 2013, Hunter 2013).  
Using panel data on IsDB loan commitments allocated across its 56 member countries 
during the 1976-2007 period, we find that Sunni-affiliated member countries receive 
significantly larger resources from the Bank relative to non-Muslim affiliated members. In 
addition, members with large Shia populations witness significantly larger loans relative to 
those with large non-Muslim populations, but this is conditional on the presence of conflicts 
with other religious groups (Christians or Hindus, for example). These lending patterns 
closely mirror the political stance of Saudi Arabia in the Islamic world. A comparable 
analysis employing World Bank loan commitments suggests that Saudi interests do not 
influence lending from this institution to the Arab region and its periphery. These findings 
confirm the advantage for Saudi Arabia to position its interests by assuming the leadership of 
a RDB.  
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows: section I.2 introduces the IsDB, 
section I.3 presents our argument with anecdotal evidence on the polarization of the Islamic 
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world and how it might affect lending decisions at the IsDB. Section I.4 introduces our data 
and estimation strategy, while section I.5 presents the discussion of our main results, and 
section I.6 concludes the study.  
 
I.2. The Islamic Development Bank 
 
The founding of the IsDB was in response to the interest of the OIC in providing its member 
states with access to Sharia compliant financial resources. The idea was encouraged by King 
Faisal Bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia and first discussed during the Second Islamic Finance 
Ministers’ Conference held in Jeddah in 1974 (Warde 2000). Headquartered in this same city, 
the Bank started its operations in 1975 with its 22 founding members, which are largely found 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Since then, membership has been 
extended to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, and 
Latin America, with a total of 56 members to date, all of which are eligible to receive loans.5 
Affiliation with the OIC is a basic condition for membership in the Bank (IsDB 2013a). 
 The mission of the IsDB is to promote human development focusing on the alleviation 
of poverty, improvement of health and education standards, and assurance of good 
governance practices in accordance with the principles of the Sharia law (IsDB 1974). The 
IsDB was to become the cornerstone of Sharia compliant banking. Financial services 
delivered within this banking scheme follow three core principles: prohibition of interest rates 
on loans, share of financial risk between provider and customer, and investing solely in 
businesses that provide goods and services in accordance with Islamic values (Gafoor 1995, 
Warde 2000). The IsDB exclusively offers financial instruments that are consistent with 
Sharia law, the most common being interest-free loans, instalment sales, leasings, and 
financial services referred as istisnaa.6 Interest-free loans are extended to governments to 
provide long-term financing for development projects in basic infrastructure and agriculture. 
They are free of interest rate charges, however, they do bear a service fee to cover 
administrative related expenses incurred by the Bank, which must not exceed 2.5 percent per 
annum. Softer terms may be provided for certain types of projects in the least developed 
members, in which the administrative fee ceiling is set at 0.75 percent yearly. Even though 
service fees might resemble interest rates, these cannot be affected by time horizons of 
                                                        
5 A complete list of the current members of the IsDB is given in Appendix 1.  
6 According to the IsDB’s Financial Statement for the year 2012, these financial instruments represent 
the vast majority of the assets of the Ordinary Capital Resources (OCR) of the Bank (IsDB 2013b).    
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repayments and therefore, in case of default for example, no additional charges can be 
incurred (Warde 2000). Throughout instalment sales the Bank purchases the machinery or 
equipment needed for a certain project and then resells it to the beneficiary adding a mark-up 
mutually agreed upon by both parties, which must not exceed 5.1 percent yearly. The 
ownership of the asset is transferred to the beneficiary upon delivery. By opting for a lease, 
often denoted as ijarah, the Bank procures an asset needed for the production of a good or 
service, such as factories or power generation plants, and rents them to the beneficiary for a 
specific period of time. The assets procured remain property of the Bank during the lease 
financing period and the profit margin ceiling is 5.1 percent yearly. Lastly, istisnaa is a 
financial instrument in which the Bank produces a specific good to be manufactured from 
materials available to it, according to certain agreed specifications, to be distributed to the 
beneficiary at a determined price. Conditions regarding the rate of return and ceilings are the 
same as for instalment sales. 
The IsDB’s capital comes from the contributions paid by its members. At the time of 
the foundation of the Bank, the Board of Governors determined the number of shares each 
member is entitled to subscribe to the ordinary capital. The Board of Governors must also 
make the decision concerning reestablishment of the new distribution of shares in cases where 
it has admitted an additional country to membership, authorized a general capital stock 
increase, or accepted a request to raise an existing member’s subscriptions. Currently, the 
largest shareholder of the Bank is Saudi Arabia with 23.6 percent of the total capital 
subscriptions. The next largest shareholders in order from largest to smallest are Libya, Iran, 
Nigeria, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, Turkey and Kuwait, each of them holding 
between 9 and 6 percent of the Bank’s capital subscriptions. Each of the 56 members appoints 
a governor and an alternate governor to the Board of Governors, which is the highest policy 
making body in the Bank. Governors usually hold key ministerial positions in their countries 
of origin and represent the interests of their home governments in the Bank. The voting power 
of each governor is linked to the country’s contribution to the Bank’s capital stock, with each 
having 500 votes plus one additional vote for every share subscribed. The Board of Governors 
elects the officials of the Board of Executive Directors and the president of the Bank. It 
delegates the management of the activities of the Bank to the Board of Executive Directors, 
including budget approvals and other decisions concerning the business of the Bank. The 
Board of Executive Directors is composed of 9 permanent officials from the abovementioned 
9 member countries and 9 additional elected officials from the remaining 47 member 
countries. The president of the Bank is appointed for a 5 year term and may be reelected.  
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The approval of any decision met in the Board of Governors and the Board of 
Executive Directors requires a simple majority. This gives Saudi Arabia an enormous 
advantage in every decision making process, as it owns almost half of the voting power 
required for a resolution to be accepted. Essentially, it needs the support of only three or four 
other large member countries to pass any favored proposal. Even though Saudi Arabia does 
not retain a formal veto power, it is very difficult to approve any project it is opposed to. Its 
formal influence in the governance of the IsDB is reflected by the fact that the president has 
always been a Saudi national. In fact, Ahman Mohamed Ali Al-Madani has held the 
presidency from the foundation of the Bank to the present day (except for the 1993-1995 
period in which he served the Muslim World League as Secretary General), implying that he 
has been reelected seven times by the Board of Governors. The president is the chief 
executive of the Bank and acts as chairman of the Board of Executive Directors. In addition, 
he nominates the vice presidents to be elected by the previously mentioned body and is 
responsible for the appointment and dismissal of the officers and staff of the Bank. Such 
organizational structure allows the government of Saudi Arabia to substantially control the 
IsDB. 
The core business of the IsDB involves two different lines of credit financed by the 
Ordinary Capital Resources (OCR) of the Bank and the Waqf Fund respectively. Compulsory 
fees, provided by the 56 members of the Bank, form its OCR and support development 
projects in the territories of these countries. On a smaller scale, other voluntary contributions 
are delivered to the Waqf Fund to sponsor Muslim communities in non-member countries. 
These resources represent less than one fifth of the Bank’s total assets, with more than 60 
percent of the total being donated by Saudi Arabia (IsDB 2013b).7 On average, the IsDB 
committed US$ 400 million every year to its members during the 1976-2007 period (refer to 
Figure I.1). Relatively generous allocations during the early years of the Bank resumed after 
the price of oil (the largest donors’ main export commodity and source of government 
revenue) returned to its historical average during the early 1980s. Low oil prices and 
production throughout most of this same decade, as well as instability in the region caused by 
the Gulf War in the early 1990s, limited the availability of resources of the Bank until the 
mid-1990s (Shushan and Marcoux 2011). Funding has since then been on the rise and 
commitments reached US$800 million in 2007. These figures place the IsDB as the largest 
                                                        
7 Further information on other contributors of the Waqf Fund can be found at the IsDB’s website, 
following the menu on “About IDB,” “Specialized Funds,” and “AWQAF Properties Investments 
Funds” (www.isdb.org last accessed: 01.06.2015). 
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Arab development agency and donor (OFID 2004, IsDB 2010). The largest beneficiaries of 
the IsDB have been Bangladesh, which received US$ 580 million during the 1976-2007 
period, followed by Morocco and Senegal with around US$ 500 million each (refer to Figure 
I.2). Brunei, Suriname and Libya have received the lowest contributions, with a total of less 
than US$ 10 million between them during the same time frame. Electricity generation and 
transmission and transportation infrastructure have been the main priority sectors of the Bank: 
they account for 41 percent and 35 percent respectively of all resources delivered since the 
Bank’s founding (IsDB 2013b). In fact, one of the two largest loans approved by the IsDB, 
worth more than US$ 70 million, was granted to Mali in 2007 to finance the expansion of its 
power generation network. The other loan, and the largest ever granted by the IsDB, was 
delivered to Pakistan in 2006, with a value of more than US$ 80 million, for the 
reconstruction of a community affected by an earthquake. The smallest IsDB loan registered 
in the 1976-2007 period supported the organization of a symposium on pollution control held 
in Jordan in 2004, and the second smallest a training program in the field of energy generation 
in Turkey in 2004. The amount of each of these loans was less than US$ 15.000.  
 
I.3. The Argument 
 
Political and commercial interests of donors have often been recognized as a key driver of 
resources delivered though International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Regional powers may 
have the opportunity to gain influence in countries in their vicinity through their control over 
strategic RDB, as these might be advantageous in terms of participation, scope and coverage 
(Kilby 2006, Lim and Vreeland 2013). Saudi Arabia took the initiative to found and 
financially lead the IsDB, the first and largest Arab development agency in terms of monetary 
resources and geographical coverage, most likely seeking to position itself in the Arab region 
and its periphery. Achieving such an outcome through the Bretton Woods Institutions would 
be difficult despite Saudi Arabia being a major shareholder as these are virtually dominated 
by the G7 countries (Copelovitch 2010). Fulfilling and maintaining its role as a leader in 
Islamic societies is a foreign policy priority for Saudi Arabia and it perceives itself as the 
principal responsible for the development, cooperation, and support of the region (Al-Yahya 
and Fustier 2011). As highlighted in the previous section, its substantial contribution in the 
establishment of the Bank allowed Saudi Arabia to structure it in a way that development 
projects it strongly opposes are rather difficult to be approved. Therefore, we expect the 
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allocation of aid by the IsDB to closely mirror the political stance of Saudi Arabia in the 
Islamic world. 
 Saudi interests in the Arab region and its periphery are strongly linked with religious 
beliefs. This is a consequence attributed to the polarization of Islamic societies based on 
Islamic affiliation in which international political support among equal Islamic denominations 
is the norm (Clark 2012, Keath 2013). A vast majority of the Muslim population, comprising 
95 percent of its total, is affiliated to either the Sunni or Shia branches of Islam, resulting in a 
fairly clear two-sided division of the Islamic world (Pew Research Center 2009a, 2009b). The 
Sunni-Shia split can be traced back to the succession dispute to designate the leader of the 
Muslim community after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD (Clark 2012). The 
appointed nominees were never fully recognized by all of the Prophet’s disciples, instigating a 
division within Muslims according to who was accepted as their legitimate leader. These 
different groups would evolve into the Sunnis, who fully recognize the appointed nominees, 
the Shiites, who partially recognized the appointed nominees, and the other minor braches of 
the Islam (Clark 2012). The foundation and expansion of the different caliphates throughout 
history have molded the configuration of the Islamic world along its different denominations 
until the present. Usually, Sunnis have held the power and Shiites have emerged as their 
opposition (Clark 2012, Abdo 2013). Today, the great majority of countries in the MENA 
region, as well as many in Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, and a few in Europe, South 
Asia, and South East Asia, are largely Muslim (Pew Research Center 2009a, 2009b). 
Significant Muslim minorities, comprising at least 10 percent of the total population, are to be 
found in numerous additional countries in these same regions and in Latin America, where 
they usually coexist with either Christians or Hindus. Around 80 percent of the global Muslim 
population is Sunni and 15 percent Shiite. Shia Islam represents the majority of the Muslim 
population in Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iran, and Iraq, more than a third in Kuwait, Lebanon, and 
Yemen, and at least 5 percent in Afghanistan, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and other countries (Pew Research 
Center 2009a, 2009b). 
 Saudi Arabia, with the Salafist stream of Sunni Islam as its state religion whose 
doctrines are anti-Shiite, is on the forefront to espouse a united Sunni bloc against the “axis of 
resistance” led by the Shia-affiliated governments of Iran, Syria, and the Shia political party 
Hezbollah in Lebanon (Clark 2012). Moreover, Saudi Arabia is believed to use development 
assistance to countries in the region to demonstrate to Shia-affiliated governments that it is the 
leading nation in the Islamic world (Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011). The Arab Spring, ongoing 
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since late 2010 in several countries of the MENA region, clearly reflects the polarization of 
Islamic societies between Sunnis and Shiites. As an example, the government of Bahrain, 
officially affiliated to the Sunni Islam, has received military support from the Jordanian and 
Saudi Arabian Sunni regimes to block the revolutionary wave of protests backed by its Shia 
population (Al Jazeera 2011, Itani 2013). In contrast, the main actors of the Syrian civil war 
are, on the one side, the Syrian government, Iran and Hezbollah aid forces, all of them Shia-
affiliated, and on the other side, the Syrian opposition and militant groups supported by the 
governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, all of which are linked to Sunni Islam (Sanger 2012, 
DeYoung 2012, Dehghan 2012). 
 There is plenty of evidence to suggest that Saudi Arabia favors Sunni populations in 
terms of development cooperation. Ousman (2012), for example, identifies that IsDB 
resources for education that are aimed to increase school enrolment, are preferably allocated 
within communities in which the youth follows Salafi principles associated with anti-Shiite 
tenets. Likewise, Al-Yahya and Fustier (2011) and Burke (2012) agree that the surge in Saudi 
Arabia’s development aid to Yemen in the previous decade through the IsDB and other 
agencies was in response to the escalation of the armed conflict between the Yemeni 
government, Sunni-affiliated groups, and Shiite rebel groups in a region bordering the Saudi 
Kingdom. Cooper (2007) reports that in a desperate bid to keep the Hezbollah-led coalition 
from obtaining power in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia allocated IsDB resources worth US$ 250 
million to the newly elected Prime Minister Fouad Siniora from the Sunni faction in 2005. Al 
Arabiya (2013) sustains that funding to Egypt from the IsDB significantly increased in 2012 
in order to strengthen the Sunni led government of Mohammed Morsi. Moreover, Deegan 
(1995) states that Saudi Arabia exerted influence over the IsDB in 1983 to pressure the 
government of Sudan to declare the country a Sunni based Islamic state in its constitution in 
return for development assistance. This anecdotal evidence supports the proposition that IsDB 
lending mirrors the political interests of Saudi Arabia in the Islamic world; namely, Sunni 
countries receive comparatively more development assistance from the Bank. We thus 
propose:  
Hypothesis 1: Being a Sunni country increases the probability of receiving a higher 
amount of development aid from the IsDB.        
 Internal divisions of Muslim societies, however, play a less relevant role in the 
presence of strong social frictions with non-Islamic communities. “Islamic solidarity” prevails 
across the different branches of Islam during such periods of conflict in which different 
Islamic denominations tend to form political coalitions to confront common opponents in 
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multi religious countries (Abdo 2013). The Lebanese Civil War, lasting from 1975 to 1990, is 
a notable example of how Sunni and Shia populations interact in the face of tensions with 
other religions. Lebanon is a country shared by Christians, Sunni and Shia Muslims, and 
during the Civil War both Muslim populations cooperated with each other to confront the 
common Christian adversary. Together they formed the Lebanese National Resistance Front, 
a militia seeking to overthrow the Christian-dominated government (Ghorbani et al. 2014). 
Additional evidence suggests that Saudi led development agencies provide assistance in 
response to tensions with non-Muslims. Robles (2007), for example, reports that the IsDB 
provided US$16 million to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) rebel group, which 
controls the Mindanao province in the Philippines, whose population is largely comprised of 
Muslims of different denominations. The MNLF is a political organization founded in 1969 
that promotes the independence of their region from the Philippines alleging that the 
government economically discriminates against Muslims. Similarly, the Royal Thai Embassy 
(2012) reports the funding of educational projects by the IsDB among Muslim communities in 
the province of Pattani in Thailand, in which local rebel groups struggle for regional 
autonomy. Al-Yahya and Fustier (2011) describes another example, indicating that the Saudi 
government makes substantial contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees, from which individuals affiliated to different Islamic denominations 
receive assistance. Therefore, Islamic solidarity is likely to dominate in the presence of 
conflict with other religious groups, and this leads us to the following: 
Hypothesis 2: The politics of the Sunni-Shia divide do not influence IsDB aid 
allocation decisions in the presence of religious tensions with non-Muslim religious 
communities. 
 
I.4. Data and Methods 
 
We analyze a panel dataset consisting of 56 member countries covering the years from 1976 
to 2007.8 Our model estimates the allocation of resources by the IsDB as a function of factors 
capturing donor and recipient characteristics. The dependent variable measures IsDB aid 
commitments to country i in period t expressed in logarithmic form  and in year 2000 constant 
                                                        
8 Palestinian Administrated Areas is an active member of the IsDB, however, it cannot be included in 
the empirical analysis given the unavailability of data for our control variables.  
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US dollars.9 Note that our panel is unbalanced given different membership dates of recipient 
countries and missing observations. From a possible maximum of 32, the average number of 
years per member country for which information on commitments is available is around 16, 
ranging from 2 (Brunei) to 29 (Senegal). We consider 4-year averages for our dependent 
variable in order to balance the panel, reducing it to 8 periods: 1976-1979, 1980-1983, 1984-
1987, 1988-1991, 1992-1995, 1996-1999, 2000-2003, and, 2004-2007. Under this structure, 
the average number of periods per member country is greater than 6 and for almost half of the 
recipients there is full information. Another distinguishing feature of our dependent variable is 
that it includes zero observations. The clustering in this lower limit responds to the fact that 
IsDB aid commitments to certain countries for several years was simply zero. Analyzing such 
a model with an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator would violate several assumptions, 
such as zero mean errors, thereby resulting in biased estimates (Neumayer 2002, 2003). This 
feature makes it necessary to use a nonlinear estimation method; therefore we follow Beck 
and Katz (1995) and adopt a Tobit maximum likelihood estimator with heteroskedasticity 
consistent robust standard errors. The following equations are estimated: 
 
 Loanit = β0 + βRRit + βXXit + γt + εit    (1)  
Loanit = β0 + βRTRit*Tit + βTTit + βXXit + μi + γt + εit  (2)   
 
Loanit is the dependent variable, Rit is a matrix containing different variables accounting for 
religion based characteristics of member country i in period t, Tit is an indicator measuring 
religious tensions, and Xit is a matrix of control variables. The intercept is referred to as β0, the 
remaining βs are the vectors of coefficients of the corresponding matrices, μi and γt denote 
country and time fixed effects respectively, and εit is the error term. Note that we include 
country fixed effects only in (2), which includes the interaction term, because the variables in 
Rit are often time invariant. The usage of two way fixed effects in (1) will not only be 
collinear with time invariant regressors but will also generate biased estimates with largely 
time invariant regressors (Beck 2001). Additionally, the coefficients in the β vectors cannot 
be interpreted directly in the nonlinear Tobit model. We thus compute the marginal effects of 
the explanatory variables on either  (    > |   ),  (    > |   ,     > 0) or  (   |   ).
10 We 
                                                        
9 A value of one is added to the dependent variable before its logarithmic transformation, in order to 
keep zero observations.  
10 For our model, yit corresponds to the dependent variable Loanit and xit for any variable in Rit, Tit or 
Xit.  
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calculate the marginal effects at the mean of the respective covariates and report these in the 
regression output tables.11  
 In order to test our first hypothesis, we introduce four different discrete measures 
capturing the religion-based characteristics of recipients. The first two measures consider the 
religious affiliation of the population. Here, a variable receives the value of one if the majority 
of the population in a member country is Sunni and zero otherwise. The other variable is one 
if the majority of the population in a member country is Shiite and zero otherwise. The 
baseline and omitted category receives the value of one if the majority of the population in a 
member country is non-Muslim and zero otherwise.12 The information to construct these 
variables comes from the religious population statistics published by the Pew Research 
Center. Please note that during our period of analysis demographic changes based on religious 
affiliation have not been pronounced in any of the recipients, therefore none of the 
population-based variables change over time. The following two measures consider the 
religious affiliation of the head of government. We decided to include this characteristic in 
our analysis given that in some countries, such as in Bahrain and Syria, the religious 
affiliation of the majority of the population and that of the head of government does not 
coincide. Likewise, a variable takes the value of one if the religious affiliation of the head of 
the state is Sunni and zero otherwise, and the other variable is one if the religious affiliation of 
the head of the state is Shia and zero otherwise. In this case, the baseline and omitted category 
receives the value of one if religious affiliation of the head of the state is different to Muslim 
and zero otherwise.13 In order to construct these variables, we consulted the profiles of the 
head of governments available in the CIA World Factbook and Encyclopedia Britannica. For 
most of the member countries, these variables do not change over time. In our sample, 
                                                        
11 Regarding the time dummy variables, marginal effects are calculated at a specific period rather than 
at the mean value. We take the most recent 2004-2007 period for this purpose, but the results remain 
similar if any other period is taken instead.  
12 All IsDB member countries fall exclusively into one of these three categories, except for Lebanon 
and Oman. None of Lebanon’s main population groups, Christians, Shiites and Sunnis, make up at 
least 50 percent of the total population. We code this country in the baseline category, or as a non-
Muslim majority populated country, given that the largest of the three groups is by far the Christians 
(Pew Research Center 2009a, 2009b). Oman’s population is largely Ibadi-affiliated, another Islam 
denomination. We coded it in the second category, along with the Shia majority populated countries, 
given that it is a Muslim majority populated country affiliated to a denomination different to that of 
Saudi Arabia’s. 
13 As for the population-based variables, Oman does not fall in any of these three categories. The 
religious affiliation of the head of the state is Ibadi Islam, and it is coded under the second category, 
along the Shia regime countries.   
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changes of regime based on religion are found in few cases, such as in Iraq in 2003, and in 
Lebanon in 1988 and 1990.  
Figure I.3 presents the distribution of IsDB loan commitments according to the 
religious affiliation of the recipients' populations. As can be seen, the average Sunni majority 
populated member country obtained US$ 13 million each year from the Bank during the 
1976-2007 period. The same figure for Shia and non-Muslim majority populated countries is 
US$ 9.8 million and US$ 8.5 million respectively. Figure I.4 reports similar statistics taking 
into account the religious affiliation of the head of government. Differences between the three 
groups follow the same pattern but are less pronounced: member countries in which the head 
of government is Sunni-affiliated received on average US$12.8 million every year from the 
Bank, while those in which the head is Shia and non-Muslim affiliated received US$ 10.5 
million and US$ 8.8 million respectively. These numbers reveal the expected pattern from our 
first hypothesis. The statistical significance of these categories are reported and discussed in 
the next section.          
 The term Tit in (2) is included to test our second hypothesis. Here we interact a 
measurement of religious tensions with the two dummy variables signaling if a member is a 
Shia country according to its population and head of government. We take the Religious 
Tensions Index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which takes a minimum 
value of 0 for cases of highest religious tensions and a maximum value of 6 for cases of 
absence of religious tensions. The indicator only captures tensions between different religions 
and not within groups belonging to different Islamic denominations. The Index is only 
available since 1985; therefore we lose the first two periods in our panel when adding the 
interaction term.  
 We add a second dimension in Figure I.5 to present the distribution of resources. It 
shows the allocation of IsDB loan commitments considering the religious affiliation of the 
population as well as the level of religious tensions in the recipient country. Darker bars 
denote periods of higher religious tension, or years in which the Index takes a value between 0 
and 3. Lighter bars denote for periods of lower religious tension, or years in which the Index 
takes a value between 3 and 6. As the figure shows, Sunni and non-Muslim majority 
populated countries receive fewer resources from the Bank in periods of higher religious 
tension, US$ 13 million vs. US$ 12.5 million and US$ 9 million vs. US$ 6.8 million 
respectively, on average every year and per member country over the 1985-2007 period. The 
opposite occurs in Shia majority populated countries: these receive larger IsDB loan 
commitments in periods of higher religious tension, US$ 9.7 million vs. US$ 10.4 million on 
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average during the same time period. Note that the greatest contrast in terms of religious 
tension is found in non-Muslim majority populated countries. Similarly, Figure I.6 presents 
the distribution of IsDB loan commitments according to the religious affiliation of the head of 
government and the level of religious tension. The numbers resemble that of the previous 
figure, however variation between periods of higher and lower religious tensions are less 
pronounced, in absolute as well as in percentage terms. These patterns suggest that our second 
hypothesis is not rejected and Shia member countries seem to be supported during periods of 
conflict with other religions. In the next section we test whether these differences are 
statistically significant.  
 We follow the literature on aid allocation by RDBs (Kilby 2006, 2011a, Hernandez 
2013), Arab donors (Neumayer 2003, 2004) and other non-DAC donors (Fuchs and 
Vadlamannati 2013) in selecting our control variables. To reflect recipient needs, we include 
the total population and GDP per capita in current prices in member countries, both in log 
form. Total population is expected to be positively associated with loan commitments as this 
variable accounts for country size. The effect of GDP per capita should be negative given that 
richer countries are less likely to need aid resources to develop. Ideally, GDP per capita would 
be given in constant prices to avoid any time trend distortions, however, employing such 
measurement would reduce our dataset considerably due to data availability. The inclusion of 
time fixed effects facilitates to overcome this issue. We include measures of institutional 
quality and political stability in member countries to account for merit as a motive for the 
supply of aid. The first measurement is a democracy dummy variable taken from Cheibub et 
al. (2010) based on the distinction between regimes where executive and legislative offices 
are designated via elections and those where they are not. If elections are contested in a 
member country for a given year the variable takes the value of one in that observation, and 
zero otherwise.14 The second measure addresses the incidence of a civil war as found in 
Gleditsch et al. (2002). The dummy variable takes the value of one if there is an armed 
conflict between the state and an organized group causing at least 25 deaths in a single year in 
a member country, and zero otherwise. Moreover, we include two variables controlling for 
Saudi strategic interests in member countries, namely Saudi Arabian bilateral aid in constant 
prices and logarithmic form, and merchandise trade relative to GDP. Bilateral aid allocation 
by Saudi Arabia is a proxy for its political interests, as bilateral aid is often regarded as a 
                                                        
14 For more detailed description and methodology, see Cheibub et al. (2010). 
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reward for political allies (Kilby 2006, 2011a).15 Merchandise trade relative to GDP accounts 
for trade openness in recipient countries and also for commercial interests with members of 
the Bank. Merchandise trade is preferred over total trade due to data availability reasons. We 
expect these two variables to be positively correlated with IsDB loan commitments. Finally, 
we include three additional variables as loan demand factors. Obtained from De Soysa and 
Binningsbo (2012), the first of these factors is the value of oil production in a member country 
for a given year. Many of the member countries are rich in oil and the greater a country's oil 
production the lower the likelihood that it will be dependent on development assistance. The 
remaining two measures control for international reserves as a share of GDP and for debt 
crises following the dichotomous variable in Laeven and Valencia (2008). We expect these 
last two variables to take a negative and a positive sign respectively. We provide details on 
definitions and data sources in Appendix I.2, and descriptive statistics in Appendix I.3.  
 
I.5. Empirical Results 
 
Tables I.1, I.2, and I.3 present our main findings. Table I.1 shows the outcome from our data 
analysis for equation (1), testing for our first hypothesis. Here we introduce all variables that 
describe the religious affiliation of the population and that of the head of government 
described in section 4. Results for equation (2) including our interaction with the Religious 
Tensions Index and testing of our second hypothesis are displayed in Tables I.2 and I.3. Table 
I.2 presents this analysis based on population characteristics, while Table I.3 presents it based 
on information on the head of government. All models are initially estimated using all control 
variables whereas a short form of the model is always shown in contiguous columns. The 
short form models control only for recipient needs, namely population and GDP per capita. 
The three tables report the marginal effects at the mean of the respective covariates, while 
subsequent graphs exhibit the evaluation of the marginal effects at different levels to address 
the interaction term in (2). Note that the dataset in Table I.1 is one third larger than that of 
Tables I.2 and I.3 because the Religious Tensions Index is only available from 1985 onwards. 
Values in parentheses refer to p-values. 
 Column 1 in Table I.1 reports results from the regression adding the Sunni and Shia 
majority population variables, taking non-Muslim populated countries as a baseline category. 
                                                        
15 As Saudi Arabia is a recipient country itself, observations for this country consist of the largest 
bilateral allocation made by Saudi Arabia in each year. The exclusion of this variable in the analysis 
does not affect the results.     
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Column 3 contains the Sunni and Shia regime variables, taking non-Muslim regime countries 
as a baseline category. Population and head of government characteristics are included in 
separate specifications because of the high level of correlation between them.16 As can be 
seen in column 1, both Sunni and Shia majority populated countries receive significantly 
more resources, at conventional levels, from the IsDB than non-Muslim majority populated 
countries. The interpretation of the marginal effects reveals that being a Sunni majority 
populated country increases the flow of resources from the Bank by 69 percent, relative to 
non-Muslim majority populated countries, while the figure for being a Shia majority 
populated country is 126 percent. A Wald test comparing both marginal effects confirms, 
however, that their difference is not statistically significantly different from zero.17 Column 3 
indicates that the IsDB allocates significantly larger loans to Sunni regime countries, at the 5 
percent level, relative to non-Muslim regime countries, but not to Shia regime countries at 
conventional significance levels. In fact, the marginal effects suggest that countries in which 
the head of government is affiliated to the Sunni branch of Islam obtain on average 78 percent 
larger commitments relative to those not affiliated to any Islamic denomination. Results 
remain stable in terms of sign, size, and significance levels when employing the short form, as 
shown in columns 2 and 4. It is important to note that population and GDP per capita, in the 
complete and short forms respectively, are the only statistically significant control variables at 
conventional levels, both taking the expected sign. These initial findings lend support to our 
first hypothesis that the IsDB favors member countries whose heads of state are Sunni Islam 
affiliated. Population characteristics show, however, that both Sunni and Shia countries are 
favored relative to the non-Muslim. The following analysis reveals to what extent these 
results are conditional on religious tensions.    
 Data analysis for equation (2), in which the Shia majority population dummy is 
interacted with the Religious Tensions Index, is presented in Table I.2. The models in 
columns 1 and 2 exclude country fixed effects, while those in columns 3 and 4 include them. 
The table displays marginal effects. Figures for the Shia majority populated variable are 
evaluated at the mean value of the Religious Tensions Index.18 The Sunni majority population 
variable remains significant at the 1 percent level for both models without country fixed 
                                                        
16 Correlation between the Sunni majority population and Sunni regime dummy variables is higher 
than 0.7, and higher than 0.5 between the Shia majority population and Shia regime dummy variables.   
17 The Wald test implemented evaluates the null hypothesis H0: β1 = β2. The F-statistic obtained in the 
test is equal to 0.78 with a corresponding p-value of 0.38.  
18 Tables I.2, I.3 and I.4 display the marginal effect of the respective interacted variable on IsDB loan 
commitments and evaluated at the mean value of the Religious Tension Index. Figures I.7, I.8, I.9 and 
I.10 display the marginal effect evaluated at other different values of the Religious Tensions Index.  
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effects, and is significant at the 10 percent level for the short form model with country fixed 
effects. It is highly likely that the lower p-values for this variable in both models including 
country fixed effects are a consequence of this being time invariant. Similarly, the Shia 
majority population variable is significant at the 5 percent significance level across all 
specifications, except one. As noted earlier, the marginal effect is evaluated at the mean value 
of the Index. The Religious Tensions Index enters all regressions with a negative sign, but 
fails to be significant at conventional levels throughout. The direction and relevance of the 
interaction term in equation (2) is exhibited in Figures I.7 and I.8. Here we evaluate the 
marginal effect of the Shia majority population variable at different points along the range of 
the Religious Tensions Index.19 Figure I.7 refers to the model excluding country fixed effects 
in column 1 and Figure I.8 to that including them in column 3. The continuous lines 
correspond to average values for every point while dashed lines project 90 percent confidence 
interval boundaries. As can be seen in Figure I.7, the marginal effect of the Shia majority 
population variable on IsDB loan commitments is positive and significant at conventional 
levels only for lower values of the Religious Tensions Index (i.e. for higher levels of religious 
tensions). The marginal effect turns out to be insignificant at conventional levels after the 
Index takes a value of around 4. Figure I.8 confirms that this effect is robust after controlling 
for country fixed effects, but only until an Index level of around 2.5, as the marginal effects of 
the Shia population dummy variable remain significant at conventional levels just until this 
point. A little less than 25 percent of all observations in our data set fall between levels of 0 
and 2.5 in the Index. The effect of the interaction term remains similar in terms of size and 
significance levels when employing the short form model in columns 2 and 4.20 This 
empirical evidence supports our second hypothesis: Shia majority populated member 
countries, relative to non-Muslim countries, receive more IsDB resources only when they 
experience high levels of religious tensions with other non-Muslim religious groups.  
Results for equation (2), including information on the religious affiliation of the head 
of government in member countries, are presented in Table I.3. Similarly to the previous 
analysis, the table reports marginal effects, columns 1 and 2 present specifications excluding 
country fixed effects, while columns 3 and 4 including them. The Shia regime variable is 
                                                        
19 When the model is nonlinear, as is the case here, the interaction effect cannot be evaluated simply 
by looking at the sign, magnitude, or statistical significance of the coefficient on the interaction term. 
Instead, the interaction effect requires computing the marginal effects of the first variable in the 
interaction term evaluated at different points of the other variable in the interaction term (Ai and 
Norton 2003).   
20 For simplicity, these results are not shown but are available upon request.  
22 
 
interacted with the Religious Tensions Index in all model specifications. Figures in the Shia 
regime (dummy) row correspond to the marginal effect evaluated at the mean value of the 
Religious Tensions Index. As observed in the table, a major difference between this table and 
the analysis on population characteristics is that the Shia regime variable fails to be significant 
at conventional levels in all model specifications but one. Figures I.9 and I.10, depicting the 
marginal effect of the Shia regime variable at different levels of the Religious Tensions Index, 
reveal another difference. As can be seen in Figure I.9, the effect of the Shia regime variable 
is only significant at conventional levels for a short range of the Index in the model excluding 
fixed effects. This is, however, not robust to the addition of fixed effects, as shown in Figure 
I.10. These results hold with the short form model. Interestingly, even when religious tensions 
are present, those countries with a Shia-affiliated head of government do not obtain larger 
loans from the IsDB than non-Muslim countries. Our second hypothesis is therefore rejected 
when taking into account the profile of the head of government in member countries. Thus, it 
is never advantageous in terms of IsDB allocation to be a Shia regime. Religious tensions 
between Shiites and non-Muslims seem to be a concern for the IsDB when the population of a 
member country is largely Shia, but not when its head of government is Shia-affiliated. 
We replicate our models reported in Tables I.1 to I.3 with an OLS estimator and relax 
some assumptions in our dataset. Our main findings are not altered when implementing the 
regression with OLS in every case, suggesting that our results are robust to the choice of 
estimator. Moreover, we use different combinations of the set of control variables. Leaving 
recipient needs as fixed controls, we first include merit-based variables, then Saudi Arabian 
interests, and finally loan demand factors separately. We observe that the effect of our key 
explanatory variables remains unchanged; therefore our analysis is robust to the selection of 
control variables. Due to brevity, we do not report these last two robustness tests, but these are 
available upon request. 
In order to identify the relative advantage for Saudi Arabia to exert influence in its 
vicinity based on religious affinity through the IsDB compared to the World Bank, we replace 
our dependent variable with aid commitments from the latter organization. If the previously 
identified politics of the Sunni-Shia divide are inherent to the Saudi led financial institution, 
then the World Bank’s aid commitments must not be influenced by any of our main variables 
of interest. Using exactly the same model setting, we regress World Bank aid commitments, 
expressed in logarithmic form and in year 2000 constant US dollars, against our variables of 
interest. We analyze, as before, allocations to the 56 member countries over the 1976-2007 
period, employing 4 year averages. The results are reported in Table I.4. Columns 1 and 3 
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refer to equation (1), while columns 2 and 4 to equation (2) after adding the Religious 
Tensions Index. The four model specifications include all control variables and exclude 
country fixed effects. The table shows marginal effects at the mean of the respective 
covariates. As in the previous analysis, the figures for the Shia majority population variable in 
column 2 and the Shia regime variable in column 4 exhibit their marginal effect on World 
Bank aid commitments evaluated at the mean value of the Religious Tension Index. As can be 
seen in the table, none of our variables capturing population and head of government 
characteristics according to religious belief are significant at conventional levels. Even the 
population-based variables enter the equations with a negative sign, as shown in columns 1 
and 2. The Religious Tensions Index fails to be significant at conventional levels as well. The 
marginal effects of the Shia majority population and Shia regime dummies are not significant 
at the mean value of the Religious Tensions Index, as can be seen in the table, or when 
evaluated at any point along the Index. The latter results are not shown for simplicity, but are 
available upon request. Interestingly, besides Population and GDP per capita, unlike for the 
IsDB, other control variables turn out to be significant at conventional levels. Particularly 
relevant is the incidence of civil war, which is negative and significant at least at the 5 percent 
level across all regressions. These findings suggest that World Bank lending patterns do not 
reflect religiously-motivated political dynamics in the Arab region and its periphery, and 
support our hypothesis that these are inherent to the IsDB due to the dominance of Saudi 
Arabia in its organization.  
 
I.6. Conclusions 
 
The ability of major global players to control IFIs has been suggested to ensure their 
engagement in international cooperation as well as the survival of these organizations. An 
affordable alternative for regional powers to exert influence over their vicinity is to assume 
the leadership of an RDB in contrast to strengthening its participation in a global IFI. In this 
chapter we find evidence of the advantages Saudi Arabia might meet in this respect to 
position its interests in the Arab region and its periphery. In particular, we observe that Saudi 
Arabia uses the IsDB to achieve regional hegemony founded on religious affinity. We also 
find that it does not achieve the same ends with its participation in the World Bank, where it is 
arguably challenging to coordinate common strategies with other large shareholders for whom 
religion is not essential for political alliances.  
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 The analysis of aid allocation by the IsDB to its 56 members during the 1976-2007 
period reveals a bias towards Sunni countries, and towards Shia countries in exceptional 
occasions, while non-Muslim countries are the least favored. These lending patterns closely 
mirror the political stance of Saudi Arabia in the Islamic world. Specifically, the IsDB 
delivers on average 78 percent more resources to member countries in which the head of 
government is Sunni-affiliated. Member countries with Shia majority populations experience 
significant increases in lending from the Bank only when religious tensions with non-Muslim 
communities are high. Interestingly, along with country size, religious affiliation is the core 
driver of IsDB aid commitments. In contrast, World Bank allocation decisions are not 
influenced by the religious characteristics of the same group of recipient countries during the 
same time frame: merit and loan demand factors explain its lending. We thereby recognize the 
incentives for Saudi Arabia to found and financially lead a RDB in its region of influence.  
 Lending patterns of IFIs are a result of the interplay of influences of a handful of large 
shareholders. Saudi Arabia pursues its political agenda in the Islamic world without the 
intervention of G7 countries through the IsDB, creating a set of advantaged and 
disadvantaged member countries within the institution. Despite being the third largest 
shareholder of the Bank, Iran belongs to the latter group and its interests are probably 
underrepresented in allocation decisions. Not surprisingly, Iran together with two other 
countries in the region, founded in 1985 the Economic Cooperation Organization, an IFI 
serving eleven countries which are also members of the IsDB. Since then, its operations have 
been expanding in terms or resources and membership. The development aid activity will 
very likely witness the proliferation of specialized development agencies under the control of 
rising developing countries in the near future. This trend will only cease with the willingness 
of powerful countries to democratize IFIs.   
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Figure I.1: IsDB Commitments, Total by Year 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows loan commitments approved by the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) in each year for 
the 1976-2007 period. Figures are given in millions of constant US dollars (base year 2000). Source: IsDB, 
OECD. 
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Figure I.2: IsDB Commitments in 1976-2007, Total by Borrowing Member 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows loan commitments approved by the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) to each 
borrowing member over the 1976-2007 period. Figures are given in millions of constant US dollars (base year 
2000). Source: IsDB, OECD. 
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Figure I.3: IsDB Commitments in 1976-2007, Average by Religious Affiliation of Population 
in Borrowing Member 
 
 
Notes: “Sunni Population” identifies borrowing members where at least 50 percent of the population is affiliated 
to Sunni Islam, “Shia Population” identifies borrowing members where at least 50 percent of the population is 
affiliated to Shia Islam or any other Islam denomination different to Sunni Islam, and “Other Population” 
identifies borrowing members where at least 50 percent of the population is affiliated to a religion other than 
Islam. Figures are given in millions of constant US dollars (base year 2000). Source: IsDB, OECD, Pew 
Research Center. 
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Figure I.4: IsDB Commitments in 1976-2007, Average by Religious Affiliation of Head of 
Government in Borrowing Member 
 
 
Notes: “Sunni Regime” identifies borrowing members whose head of government is affiliated to Sunni Islam, 
“Shia Population” identifies borrowing members whose head of government is affiliated to Shia Islam or any 
other Islam denomination different to Sunni Islam, and “Other Population” identifies borrowing members whose 
head of government is affiliated to a religion other than Islam. Figures are given in millions of constant US 
dollars (base year 2000). Source: IsDB, OECD, CIA World Fact Book, Encyclopedia Britannica. 
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Figure I.5: IsDB Commitments in 1976-2007, Average by Religious Affiliation of Population 
in Borrowing Member and Religious Tensions 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows loan commitments approved by the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) to each 
borrowing member whose population is of a certain religious affiliation and confronting a determined level of 
religious tensions, on average every year over the 1976-2007 period. “Sunni Population” identifies borrowing 
members where at least 50 percent of the population is affiliated to Sunni Islam, “Shia Population” identifies 
borrowing members where at least 50 percent of the population is affiliated to Shia Islam or any other Islam 
denomination different to Sunni Islam, and “Other Population” identifies borrowing members where at least 50 
percent of the population is affiliated to a religion different to Islam. Dark bars denote for borrowing members 
experiencing high religious tensions in a given year (Religious Tensions Index between 0 and 3), light bars 
denote for borrowing members experiencing low religious tensions in a given year (Religious Tensions Index 
between 3 and 6). Figures are given in millions of constant US dollars (base year 2000). Source: IsDB, OECD, 
Pew Research Center, ICRG. 
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Figure I.6: IsDB Commitments in 1976-2007, Average by Religious Affiliation of Head of 
Government in Borrowing Member and Religious Tensions 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows loan commitments approved by the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) to each 
borrowing member whose head of government is of a certain religious affiliation and confronting a determined 
level of religious tensions, on average every year over the 1976-2007 period. “Sunni Regime” identifies 
borrowing members in which the head of stat is affiliated to Sunni Islam, “Shia Regime” identifies borrowing 
members in which the head of government is affiliated to Shia Islam or any other Islam denomination different 
to Sunni Islam, and “Other Population” identifies borrowing members in which the head of the state is affiliated 
to a religion different to Islam. Dark bars denote for borrowing members experiencing high religious tensions in 
a given year (Religious Tensions Index between 0 and 3), light bars denote for borrowing members experiencing 
low religious tensions in a given year (Religious Tensions Index between 3 and 6). Figures are given in millions 
of constant US dollars (base year 2000). Source: IsDB, OECD, Pew Research Center, ICRG. 
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Table I.1: IsDB Commitments and Religious affiliation of Population and of Head of 
Government in Borrowing Member, Tobit, 1976-2007 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Population (log) 0.244*** 0.163*** 0.223*** 0.165*** 
(0.0053) (0.001) (0.0098) (0.0008) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.0959 -0.172** -0.118 -0.163** 
(0.4028) (0.0303) (0.2988) (0.0303) 
Democracy (dummy) -0.256 -0.268 
(0.3541) (0.3364) 
Civil war (dummy) 0.0227 0.0585 
(0.9031) (0.7451) 
Saudi Arabia aid (log) -0.00643 -0.00973 
(0.7298) (0.6053) 
Trade to GDP 0.00284 0.00376 
(0.3986) (0.2669) 
Oil production (log) -0.0162 -0.0109 
(0.1929) (0.4002) 
Int. Reserves to GDP -0.00914 -0.0112 
(0.2248) (0.1233) 
Debt crisis (dummy) 0.246 0.203 
(0.7925) (0.8269) 
Sunni population (dummy) 0.523** 0.538** 
(0.0247) (0.0169) 
Shia population (dummy) 0.816* 0.714* 
(0.0548) (0.0562) 
Sunni regime (dummy) 0.584** 0.541** 
(0.0164) (0.0262) 
Shia regime (dummy) 0.536 0.472 
      (0.1255) (0.1494) 
Observations 306 327 306 327 
Country fixed effects No No No No 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan commitments approved by the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) to 
borrowing member i in period t, denominated in constant US dollars (base year 2000) and in logarithmic scale. 
Marginal effects are reported. P-values are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table I.2: IsDB Commitments, Religious Affiliation of Population in Borrowing Member and 
Religious Tensions, Tobit, 1976-2007 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Population (log) 0.221* 0.0899 2.068 2.354 
(0.0839) (0.2644) (0.2227) (0.1409) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.132 -0.269*** -0.308 -0.561* 
(0.3625) (0.0019) (0.3796) (0.0786) 
Democracy (dummy) -0.326 0.363 
(0.3134) (0.1898) 
Civil war (dummy) -0.0273 -0.128 
(0.9205) (0.6536) 
Saudi Arabia aid (log) -0.00871 0.0240 
(0.7150) (0.2803) 
Trade to GDP 0.000694 0.0128 
(0.8656) (0.1828) 
Oil production (log) -0.0269 0.00891 
(0.1405) (0.7009) 
Int. Reserves to GDP -0.00659 0.00412 
(0.4212) (0.6583) 
Debt crisis (dummy) 1.259 -0.684 
(0.4063) (0.6863) 
Sunni population (dummy) 0.905*** 0.882*** 0.279 1.409* 
(0.0020) (0.0014) (0.7785) (0.0848) 
Shia population (dummy) 1.533*** 1.036** 5.130 7.676** 
(0.0040) (0.0156) (0.1947) (0.0373) 
Religious Tensions -0.0497 -0.0146 -0.0680 -0.0681 
  (0.5839) (0.8509) (0.5659) (0.5480) 
Observations 207 215 207 215 
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan commitments approved by the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) to 
borrowing member i in period t, denominated in constant US dollars (base year 2000) and in logarithmic scale. 
Specifications 3 and 4 control for country fixed effects. Marginal effects are reported. Shia population (dummy) 
is interacted with Religious Tensions. Marginal effect of Shia population (dummy) at the mean value of 
Religious Tensions is reported. P-values are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table I.3: IsDB Commitments, Religious Affiliation of Head of Government in Borrowing 
Member and Religious Tensions, Tobit, 1976-2007 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Population (log) 0.168 0.111 2.084 2.633 
(0.1743) (0.1533) (0.2189) (0.1068) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.214 -0.264*** -0.127 -0.251 
(0.1825) (0.0016) (0.7481) (0.5283) 
Democracy (dummy) -0.375 0.428 
(0.2594) (0.1275) 
Civil war (dummy) 0.149 -0.0447 
(0.5608) (0.8822) 
Saudi Arabia aid (log) -0.0116 0.0339 
(0.6310) (0.1623) 
Trade to GDP 0.00419 0.0129 
(0.3156) (0.2070) 
Oil production (log) -0.0161 0.0163 
(0.4255) (0.4943) 
Int. Reserves to GDP -0.0114 0.00266 
(0.1727) (0.8290) 
Debt crisis (dummy) 0.876 -0.859 
(0.5794) (0.6095) 
Sunni regime (dummy) 1.041*** 0.929*** -0.783 -1.391 
(0.0011) (0.0033) (0.7907) (0.4326) 
Shia regime (dummy) 0.769 0.811** 2.495 1.890 
(0.1328) (0.0471) (0.4674) (0.4101) 
Religious Tensions 0.0383 0.0250 0.0342 0.0277 
  (0.6793) (0.7471) (0.7897) (0.8238) 
Observations 207 215 207 215 
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan commitments approved by the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) to 
borrowing member i in period t, denominated in constant US dollars (base year 2000) and in logarithmic scale. 
Specifications 3 and 4 control for country fixed effects. Marginal effects are reported. Shia regime (dummy) is 
interacted with Religious Tensions. The marginal effect of Shia regime (dummy) at the mean value of Religious 
Tensions is reported. P-values are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table I.4: World Bank Commitments, Religious Affiliation of Population and of Head of 
Government in Borrowing Members, Tobit, 1976-2007 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Population (log) 2.587*** 3.342*** 2.627*** 3.389*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
GDP per capita (log) -2.808*** -2.050*** -2.896*** -2.029** 
(0.0000) (0.0037) (0.0000) (0.0110) 
Democracy (dummy) 1.173 1.809 1.264 1.816 
(0.2165) (0.1089) (0.1867) (0.1150) 
Civil war (dummy) -4.631*** -3.145** -5.062*** -3.270** 
(0.0001) (0.0293) (0.0000) (0.0265) 
Saudi Arabia aid (log) 0.277** 0.206 0.282** 0.200 
(0.0143) (0.1688) (0.0138) (0.1880) 
Trade to GDP -0.0172 -0.0441* -0.0210 -0.0473* 
(0.3254) (0.0766) (0.2223) (0.0500) 
Oil production (log) -0.0845 -0.131 -0.0915 -0.146 
(0.1657) (0.1342) (0.1669) (0.1491) 
Int. Reserves to GDP -0.0791** -0.0487 -0.0832** -0.0490 
(0.0176) (0.2339) (0.0165) (0.2391) 
Debt crisis (dummy) 7.976* 10.16 8.850** 11.79 
(0.0701) (0.1788) (0.0461) (0.1198) 
Sunni population (dummy) -0.0711 -0.627 
(0.9293) (0.5704) 
Shia population. (dummy) -3.095 -2.126 
(0.1466) (0.8783) 
Sunni regime(dummy) 0.419 0.185 
(0.6059) (0.8807) 
Shia regime (dummy) -0.437 7.448 
(0.8134) (0.4772) 
Religious Tensions 0.778* 0.883** 
    (0.0737) (0.0482) 
Observations 359 236 359 236 
Country fixed effects No No No No 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan commitments approved by the World Bank to borrowing member i in 
period t, denominated in constant US dollars (base year 2000) and in logarithmic scale. Marginal effects are 
reported. Shia population (dummy) and Shia regime (dummy) are interacted with Religious Tensions in 
specifications (2) and (4) respectively. In these cases, the marginal effect of Shia population (dummy) and Shia 
regime (dummy) at the mean value of Religious Tensions are reported. P-values are shown in parentheses. *** p 
< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Figure I.7: Conditional Marginal Effects of Shia Population on IsDB Commitments, Country 
Fixed Effects Excluded, 90 percent Confidence Interval 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows the marginal effects of Shia population (dummy) on IsDB loan commitments (log). 
Marginal effects are conditional on different values of Religious Tensions. Dashed lines denote the upper and 
lower boundaries of the 90 percent confidence interval. Model specification excludes country fixed effects and 
includes all control variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2
0
2
4
6
8
M
a
rg
in
a
l 
E
ff
e
ct
 o
f 
S
h
ia
 p
o
p
. 
(d
u
m
m
y
)
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
Rel. Tensions
36 
 
Figure I.8: Conditional Marginal Effects of Shia Population on IsDB Commitments, Country 
Fixed Effects Included, 90 percent Confidence Interval 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows the marginal effects of Shia population (dummy) on IsDB loan commitments (log). 
Marginal effects are conditional on different values of Religious Tensions. Dashed lines denote the upper and 
lower boundaries of the 90 percent confidence interval. Model specification includes country fixed effects and 
all control variables. 
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Figure I.9: Conditional Marginal Effects of Shia Regime on IsDB Commitments, Country 
Fixed Effects Excluded, 90 percent Confidence Interval 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows the marginal effects of Shia population (dummy) on IsDB loan commitments (log). 
Marginal effects are conditional on different values of Religious Tensions. Dashed lines denote the upper and 
lower boundaries of the 90 percent confidence interval. Model specification excludes country fixed effects and 
includes all control variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
M
a
rg
in
a
l E
ff
e
ct
 o
f 
S
h
ia
 r
e
g
. 
(d
u
m
m
y)
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
Rel. Tensions
38 
 
Figure I.10: Conditional Marginal Effects of Shia Regime on IsDB Commitments, Country 
Fixed Effects Included, 90 percent Confidence Interval 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows the marginal effects of Shia population (dummy) on IsDB loan commitments (log). 
Marginal effects are conditional on different values of Religious Tensions. Dashed lines denote for upper and 
lower boundaries of the 90 percent confidence interval. Model specification includes country fixed effects and 
all control variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-5
0
5
1
0
M
a
rg
in
a
l E
ff
e
ct
 o
f 
S
h
ia
 r
e
g
. 
(d
u
m
m
y)
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
Rel. Tensions
39 
 
 
Chapter II: 
Does Inclusion Guarantee Institutional Autonomy? 
The Case of the Inter-American Development Bank 
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II.1. Introduction 
 
Discontent with the substantial influence of major global players in International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) has raised a call to restructure these organizations. Large decision power 
imbalances among stakeholders have been partly blamed for the failure of multilateral aid in 
promoting development (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2013, 
Rajan and Subramanian 2008). It has been suggested that greater involvement of borrowing 
members in the lending allocation process limits the exposure of development resources to 
large donor interests, although no consensus has been reached on how such eventual reforms 
can create more independent IFIs (e.g., Bird and Rowlands 2006 vs. Copelovitch 2010). This 
debate naturally raises the question whether a larger representation of borrowers in the 
governance of IFIs does truly translate into “fairer” lending practices as some critics of the 
current aid architecture may recommend.21 Even though fully democratic IFIs are virtually 
nonexistent, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) provides an example of a major IFI 
not dominated by non-borrowers, and its configuration may well provide a hint to answer this 
question. By analyzing IDB lending patterns, this chapter investigates the extent to which 
major donor influence is limited in the governance of IFIs with considerable borrowing 
member participation.  
 Taken as a whole, these studies point to the conclusion that major stakeholder 
overrepresentation in the governance of IFIs facilitates the canalization of their own political 
and economic interests in developing countries in the form of multilateral aid allocation. In 
terms of policy implications, however, two alternate positions are revealed. The first group 
calls for changes within the structure of IFIs with a redistribution of vote shares and greater 
independence of the boards of directors to hinder loan allocation decisions coinciding with 
major donor foreign policy objectives (Bird and Rowlands 2006, Buira 2005). The second 
group suggests that the replacement of large donor votes with those of other countries will not 
necessarily result in more technocratic or independent IFIs, but rather, will simply substitute 
their interests with those of other large countries (Copelovitch 2010). Moreover, these studies 
often sustain that political manipulation guarantees the survival of IFIs (Dreher et al. 2009b).  
 In line with this argumentation, the larger historical participation of borrowing 
members in the governance of the IDB, compared to similar IFIs, provides a good framework 
                                                        
21 See Bird and Rowlands (2006) and Linn et al. (2008) for a recent discussion on reform proposals to 
IFIs. 
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with which to evaluate the extent to which the influence of major stakeholders is limited 
under more inclusive institutional structures. The IDB is the largest RDB and main source of 
development finance for the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region.22 Unlike the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), for instance, borrowing members of the IDB 
hold the majority of the voting shares and have always appointed the President as well as a 
very large proportion of the Executive Directors.23 Nevertheless, it has been alleged that US 
political and commercial interests influence IDB allocation decisions. As an example, a $58 
billion loan to Nicaragua in 1985, at the time led by a leftist government, was claimed to be 
kept from coming to a vote as a result of a letter being sent by the then US Secretary of State 
George Schultz to the IDB president Antonio Ortiz (Babb 2009). As another example, the 
sharp decline in IDB lending during the 1980s has been attributed to strong disagreements 
between the same US presidency administration and large IDB borrowing members over 
further capital increases from the Bank. This ultimately resulted in the resignation of the then 
IDB president, Ortiz (Babb 2009, Humphrey and Michaelowa 2010). Moreover, limited US 
informal influence over the Bank, or weak control over rates of disbursements after loan 
approval, has been suggested to be a result of strong US formal influence over the lending 
decisions (Bland and Kilby 2012).24 However, empirical research on the role of US interests 
in the LAC region on IDB loan allocation, considering the influence of large borrowing 
countries and possible overlap among their preferences, is scarce.25 This study fills this gap 
and thus contributes to the debate over the restructuring of IFIs.  
 The aim of this chapter is to evaluate how sensitive IDB loan commitments to 
borrowing members are to the influence of the US and other large donors. To do so, it makes 
use of panel data on IDB loan commitments during the 1970-2007 period, distinguishing the 
effects of explanatory variables across aid sectors and time. The key explanatory variables 
                                                        
22 Please refer to Figures II.1 and II.2. 
23 Borrowing members of the IDB hold 51 percent of the voting share, this figure is 39 percent and 46 
percent for the World Bank and ADB respectively. Nationals of borrowing countries in the IDB take 
up 9 of the total 14 executive director positions, while in the World Bank they fill less than half (10 of 
24) and only half (6 of 12) of the ADB director positions. More details on the structure of the IDB are 
provided in the next section. 
24 Bland and Kilby (2012) investigate whether IDB loans disburse faster when the borrowing country 
is geopolitically or economically important for the US. The authors use panel data techniques to 
analyze the impact of US interest on loan disbursements controlling for prior commitments. This 
methodology seeks to assess donor informal influence after loan approval. The study, however, does 
not find evidence of such influence. The authors claim that these results are a consequence of greater 
degree of US formal control, or prior to loan disbursements, although they do not directly evaluate it.  
25 To the best of my knowledge there does not exist any study considering the impact of borrowing 
countries’ interests on IDB lending decisions.  
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include the interests of large borrowers, the interests of the US and the differences between 
the preferences of these parties. Section II.2 describes how the IDB is structured and its 
participation in the LAC region. Section II.3 develops the hypotheses to be tested, while 
section II.4 introduces the data and the estimation strategy. Section II.5 shows the main 
results, while conclusions are presented in section II.6.  
 
II.2. The Inter-American Development Bank 
 
The creation of an organization to promote economic and social development in the LAC 
region had been already suggested during the First International Conference of American 
States back in 1890. The first concrete proposal to found such an institution came from the 
then Brazilian President, Kubitschek, in 1959, which was approved shortly afterwards by the 
Organization of American States. This process culminated with the drafting of the Agreement 
Establishing the IDB during that same year, making the IDB the first RDB in the World.  
 Initially composed of 19 LAC countries and the US, the IDB focused mainly on 
poverty reduction- and social-programs to address concerns that the region was susceptible to 
the spread of communism. During the following decades Bank membership expanded through 
the Americas and, since 1976, countries outside the LAC region have been accepted as 
members. Korea and China were the most recent additions, joining in 2005 and 2009 
respectively. Today the Bank consists of 48 members: 26 borrower and 22 non-borrower 
members. Borrowing countries are restricted to the LAC region. These hold 51 percent of the 
voting share, with Argentina and Brazil holding the largest shares with 11 percent each, 
followed by Mexico with 7 percent. Non-borrowing countries therefore hold 49 percent of the 
voting share, with the US alone capturing 30 percent of this share, while Japan and Canada 
hold 5 percent and 4 percent respectively. Borrower members are grouped into 2 categories of 
higher and lower income according to their GDP per capita in 1997; 65 percent of the total 
lending volume went to the lower income group in this year (IDB 2011). 
 IDB loan commitments over time compared with development aid flows from other 
sources to the LAC region are depicted in Figure II.1. As observed, the IDB has traditionally 
been a leading institution on development finance in the LAC region. The IDB allocated $7.4 
billion per year on average over the 1970-2007 period, while the same figure for the World 
Bank (restricted to the LAC region) is around $8.1 billion. Difference in commitment levels 
between both institutions is considerable in the second half of the 1980s, in favor of the World 
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Bank, and in the second half of the first decade of the 2000s, in favor of the IDB. The first 
difference is explained by a sharp decline in IDB lending, associated with disagreements 
between the US presidential administration and large borrowing members in 1986 on the 
Bank’s seventh general capital increase and on a proposition to alter its voting rules (Babb 
2009). Capital increases were agreed in 1989 under the then new IDB president Enrique 
Iglesias, in exchange for devoting 25 percent of disbursements to policy-based lending, while 
the proposition by the US on the alteration of the voting rules was dropped (Babb 2009); 
commitment levels follow afterwards their trend before the then capital increase negotiations 
started. The second difference is, in contrast, due to a large decrease in World Bank lending to 
the LAC region, which might indicate preference towards the IDB during economic booming 
periods (Humphrey and Michaelowa 2010). Such a preference for the IDB might be justified 
by discontent on policy stipulations coming along with World Bank loans, leading countries 
to seek alternative creditors, which are easier to find when borrowing countries’ economies 
are in good shape (Humphrey and Michaelowa 2010). Except for these two short periods, 
lending by both institutions to the LAC region remains at similar levels.  
 Note that the yearly average of IDB loan commitments is more than four times larger 
than that of US bilateral aid flows to the LAC region over the 1970-2007 period. The latter 
figure is around $1.7 billion and does not even surpass IDB commitments levels following the 
late 1980s plummet. Figure II.2 relates IDB loan commitments with loan commitments from 
other main RDBs over the same period. Except for a couple of years, the IDB has approved 
larger loans than its counterparts over the whole period. During this period, the IDB was 
consequently the largest RDB in terms of aid allocation, well above the ADB, the second 
largest RDB, which committed $4.3 billion in development aid on average every year. 
 Moving to the governance of the IDB, it was modeled after the World Bank, and is 
therefore similarly structured in a number of ways. First, a Board of Governors is the highest 
level of authority in the hierarchy of the Bank. Each member country appoints one governor, 
whose voting power is proportional to the capital in the Bank contributed by his or her 
country. The IDB’s governors are ultimately responsible for overseeing the Bank’s activities 
and administration, although in practice they delegate most of those responsibilities to a 
Board of Executive Directors. This Board is composed of 14 executive directors representing 
the 48 member countries and also includes 14 alternates, who have full power to act in the 
absence of their principals. They are in charge of approving loan and guarantee proposals, 
policies, country strategies, the administrative budget, setting interest rates, and making 
decisions on borrowings and other financial matters. Representatives from Canada and the US 
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are permanently appointed in the Board of Executive Directors, while the remaining 12 
executive directors need to be elected by the Board of Governors following pre-established 
country group rules. Additionally, as in the World Bank, resources are largely available to 
borrowers via a hard window, the Bank’s Ordinary Capital (OC), and a soft window, the Fund 
for Special Operations (FSO). Similarly to the World Bank’s International Development 
Association (IDA), the FSO is used to provide concessional loans to the poorest countries in 
the region (Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and to a lesser extent Guatemala 
and Paraguay), whose assets are made up of contributions from IDB member countries.  
 The IDB differs substantially from the World Bank and other IFIs, especially in 
terms of borrowing member representation. As pointed out before, regional borrowers hold 
the majority of the votes, with 51 percent of the share, while the World Bank and the ADB are 
clearly donor-predominant institutions, where borrowers are assigned the less-than-majority 
shares of 39 percent and 46 percent respectively (ADB 2011, IDB 2011, World Bank 2012b). 
The IDB arrangement is advantageous in protecting borrowing member interests, as decisions 
met at the Board of Executives often require a simple voting majority, including decisions 
regarding loan and guarantees approval (IDB 1959). For instance, the US always needs the 
support of at least one borrowing country executive to block undesired loans. It also means 
that projects pursued by the large borrowers Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are difficult to 
obstruct. Note that these three countries hold all together as many as votes as the US. During 
the Bank’s seventh general capital increase in 1986, the US proposed an approval threshold of 
65 percent for loans and guarantees, which would have allowed the US to easily block 
undesired loans, e.g., with the support of another non-borrower like Canada (Babb 2009). The 
proposition received strong opposition from large borrowing members and was finally 
dropped, instead a compromise was accepted to give executive directors the power to delay 
loan disbursements that they did not approve (Babb 2009).  
 Additionally, the IDB president is elected by its Board of Governors, and has 
historically been a national of a borrowing country. This is in contrast to the World Bank and 
the ADB whose respective presidents are always American and Japanese citizens. 
Nevertheless, the IDB’s executive vice president is always appointed by the American 
government. Nationals of borrowing countries in the IDB also constitute 9 of the total 14 
executive directors, while this proportion in the ADB is half (6 of 12) and in the World Bank 
is less than half (10 of 24).  
 Finally, IDB concessional lending (FSO) has been historically very low compared to 
other IFIs. It comprised only 4 percent of total IDB disbursements in 2011, while this figure 
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was 38 percent for the World Bank (IDA) and 18 percent for the ADB (Asian Development 
Fund – ADF) for the same year (ADB 2011, IDB 2011, World Bank 2011).26 Concessional 
lending is arguably more subject to donor interests. Since most of concessional funds come 
from non-borrowing member contributions, the space for these to pursue their own political 
agendas might be greater if concessional lending is relatively high. In the case of the IDB’s 
FSO, unlike its counterparts at the World Bank and the ADB, the US has a special 
arrangement in which it can veto any of the FSO’s allocation decisions, thus giving it 
substantial control over IDB concessional lending. Therefore the small figure for the IDB is 
likely to limit major stakeholder influence. This particularity has resulted from the ability of 
big borrowers to resist transfer of net income from OC lending to the IDB’s soft window, 
reflecting strong influence of borrowing members in the governance of the Bank (Birdsall 
2003). 
 These characteristics in the structure and organization of the IDB differ from those of 
similar IFIs in terms of borrower representation, and might limit US control over lending 
decisions. The influence of large borrowing member interests and their relationship with the 
US are crucial on how this inclusive structure of the IDB can lead to greater institutional 
autonomy. Given this evidence, a set of hypotheses are developed in the following section.  
  
II.3. The Argument 
 
The debate on how to establish independent IFIs, in which lending is oriented primarily 
towards recipient-country need, can be divided into two lines of argument. While both parties 
agree that inefficient allocation results from the overrepresentation of major stakeholders, 
they hold different views of how IFIs’ governance can be improved. The first line of 
argument maintains that lending free of political and economic interests can be achieved 
through the redistribution of voting shares, a loan supply which is less dependent on 
members’ capital contributions and more reliant on international financial markets, greater 
independence of the boards of directors, and election cycles which avoid overlapping with the 
local political cycles of major stakeholders (Bird and Rowlands 2006, Buira 2005, Linn et al. 
2008). Those on the other side of the debate consider political manipulation to be an inherent 
feature of IFIs such that impartial lending is virtually impossible to achieve (Copelovitch 
                                                        
26 Concessional lending proportional to total disbursements is 9 percent for the IDB in the 1961-2011 
period and 24 percent for the ADB in the 1966-2011 period. 
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2010, Dreher et al. 2009b). This scenario is based on the view that more democratic 
institutions will simply substitute some stakeholders’ interests with those of some other 
countries.  
 With its borrower-oriented organizational structure, the IDB represents a good 
example with which to evaluate the validity of the claims of both sides in the debate. In 
contrast with similar multilateral organizations, borrowing members have a substantial say in 
the governance of the Bank, which has allowed them to effectively protect their own interests. 
Evidence suggests that the weight of large borrowers in lending and administrative decisions 
is crucial. Therefore, allocation patterns might not respond immediately to political and 
economic interests of the Bank’s largest donor, the US. The relationship that the US has with 
the IDB’s largest borrowing members, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico is critical in assessing 
the extent to which US influence is constrained. As mentioned in the previous section, US 
political agenda is rather difficult to achieve without the support of these three countries. 
Copelovitch (2010) provides a straightforward framework to understand the interaction 
between the US, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, and its effect on IDB allocations. Under this 
setting, preference intensity and preference heterogeneity among these four countries is a key 
factor of lending variation. Preference intensity refers to the collective interest held by all four 
of the largest shareholders in a borrowing country. The impact of preference intensity on 
lending is simple: when the four leading members have a strong interest in lending to a 
particular borrower, for instance a big commercial partner or a key political ally, IDB loans 
should clearly reflect their economic and political interests. On the other hand, when 
preferences of the four leading members concerning a country are weak, IDB loans should 
instead reflect the Bank’s technocratic interests.  
 Preference heterogeneity denotes the degree in which the interests of the major 
stakeholders towards a specific country are different. This might have two possible outcomes 
on IDB lending patterns which could potentially reveal whether or not the four leading 
members are acting under a cooperative scheme. The first possible outcome, which would 
indicate that there is no cooperative scheme between the four lending members, is that greater 
preference heterogeneity would lead to a distributional conflict within the Board of 
Executives; each member backing different policies when their interests diverge. For 
example, it might be the case that the US strongly supports the development of a project in a 
country with which it has firm political ties, while Brazil opposes it given divergences with 
the government of this same country. A reduction in the loan size is then expected to be the 
price demanded by Brazil in exchange for setting aside its concerns regarding political 
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differences with the third country and supporting US interests. Under this scenario, greater 
preference heterogeneity would be reflected in smaller loan approvals for the borrowing 
country, offsetting the impact of preference intensity. Or in the example, the outstanding 
position of Brazil with respect to US preferences would prevent the realization, at least 
partially, of additional lending for the specific borrower which would have potentially been 
achieved given the relatively high support of the group of four leading members as a whole. 
Clearly, in such an organization, political influence from the US or any of the other three 
large members is likely to be constrained, creating scope for the IDB to increase its autonomy.  
 Alternatively, under a cooperative scheme, the four largest shareholders support the 
same policies even when interests diverge. In this case, rather than creating a distributional 
conflict within the Board of Executives, greater preference heterogeneity might create 
opportunities for “logrolling” among the IDB’s four largest shareholders. When governments 
of these four countries disagree over the size of a specific loan, they might support the request 
of the most interested counterpart in order to receive a similar treatment for their own 
preferred loans. A hypothetical setup might be the approval of a larger than proposed loan for 
a country that is an important commercial partner for the US but of relative economic 
insignificance for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. This chain of favors system is plausible 
because this group of countries has to repeatedly interact with each other over time and may 
find it useful to perform inter-temporal bargains in exchange for future reciprocity. As a 
consequence, a borrowing country will receive larger loans as preference heterogeneity 
increases, complementing the effects of preference intensity. Imagining this in the 
hypothetical setup, the outstanding position of US preferences in the group of four main 
shareholders would further drive the effect of additional lending to the specific borrower 
initially derived from the relatively high support of the group as a whole, led by US 
preferences. In this case, the structure of the IDB allows the US to pursue its own political 
agenda. As for the case of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, they are expected to benefit from 
disproportionately large amounts of the Bank’s resources as their own local conditions are 
obviously their topmost priority. 
 Furthermore, preference heterogeneity is expected to be conditional on preference 
intensity, as suggested by Copelovitch (2010). In other words, there is an interaction effect 
between both variables. Copelovitch predicts that preference heterogeneity will have stronger 
effects when there is higher preference intensity towards a borrowing country. The reasoning 
behind this anticipation is that when large shareholders have a strong collective interest in a 
particular borrower, it is expected that institutional autonomy is limited as the principal 
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shareholders exert great influence over lending decisions. Control over the allocation of aid is 
therefore less likely to occur if collective interest is weak. This is expected to be true for both 
distributional conflict and logrolling opportunities scenarios. However, this assumption 
cannot be held for the IDB in case of a distributional conflict. Unlike in Copelovitch’s (2010) 
analysis for the World Bank, here large stakeholders are also borrowing countries, and the 
expected effect of preference intensity in the IDB might differ quite considerably in the first 
scenario. If preference heterogeneity leads to a distributional conflict, large borrowers are less 
likely to experience important loan size decreases as their privileged position in the Board of 
Executives as large shareholders enables them to offset this adverse effect. Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico obviously display high preference intensity towards their own local conditions 
and when dealing with their own cases are all unlikely to accept significant loan reductions. 
Therefore, minor borrowers, or countries of low preference intensity for the four decisive 
shareholders, as they are smaller commercial partners and of less political relevance, are 
expected to be most affected in cases of distributional conflict. In contrast, when preference 
heterogeneity between the US, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico creates logrolling opportunities, 
predictions over lending trends are not substantially different from those predicted by 
Copelovitch (2010). Large borrowing members, as large shareholders of the Bank, participate 
directly in the logrolling opportunities and are subsequently more likely to observe stronger 
loan size increases under preference heterogeneity. Consequently both large borrowers and 
countries with high preference intensity for the four decisive shareholders are expected to be 
most affected when logrolling opportunities are created. Given this line of argument, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
 Hypothesis 1: IDB lending is exposed to US interests only under a cooperative 
scheme with the Bank’s largest borrowers. If, in contrast, preference heterogeneity leads to a 
distributional conflict, IDB lending is weakly exposed to US interests as scope for 
institutional autonomy is created.  
 Additionally, there are factors other than the structural and governance 
characteristics of the Bank that might explain the prevalence of donor influence in allocation 
decisions. For example, the US and recipient countries might prefer to exert control over aid 
diverted only into certain sectors. If development aid is perceived as a reward to compensate 
political allies or as an instrument to promote exports in the LAC region, then projects that 
create political capital, enforce economic relations with the US and generate large rents 
should be more exposed to donor influence. These projects are more likely to impact recipient 
countries’ economic conditions in the short run, such as employment and income. On the 
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other hand, projects which are the Bank’s main official priorities, such as those focusing on 
poverty alleviation and inequality reduction, should be less affected by political and economic 
interests. Such projects target structural socioeconomic deficiencies in recipient countries and 
tend to impact the state of the economy in recipient countries gradually over long periods of 
time.   
 In order to distinguish short-run from long-run impact projects the methodology in 
Clemens et al. (2012) is followed. That study classifies development aid sectors, depending 
on the expected time that it will take for their impacts to be realized; i.e. either short-term or 
long-term. After replicating a number of previous works on aid effectiveness, the study finds 
that development aid turns out to be more effective in promoting growth when considering 
only those flows diverted into short-term impact sectors. Short-run impact sectors include 
transport and storage, communications, energy generation and supply, financial services and 
businesses, agriculture (agronomy, forestry and fishing) and production (industry, mineral 
resources and mining, construction and trade). Long-run impact sectors comprise education, 
health and population policies, water supply and sanitation, social infrastructure and multi-
sector aid (women’s rights, environment protection and tourism). Commodity aid and 
emergency assistance are not included in either category and classified as “other.” This 
classification is appropriate because it distinguishes sectors that impact economic activity in 
the short-run from those that do not, and are arguably more likely to be subject to political 
influence.   
 Finally, donor influence may vary over time, as donors’ interests change and they 
gain or lose the power to influence decisions. More specifically, several empirical studies 
have pointed out that in the Cold War period development aid was heavily influenced by 
donor interests in the developing world (Dreher et al. 2009a). The World Bank publicly 
admits that “(…) during the Cold War years aid was politically motivated. Now however aid 
is being delivered to countries most in need, and to those who show they are determined to 
use it well.”27 Taking these two factors into account, the following hypotheses have been 
formulated:  
 Hypothesis 2: IDB lending to short-run impact sectors is more exposed to US 
interests than lending to long-run impact sectors.  
 Hypothesis 3: IDB lending during the Cold War period was more exposed to US 
interests than in the period afterwards. 
                                                        
27 World Bank, Frequently Asked Questions (www.worldbank.org last accessed 01.06.2015) 
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II.4 Data and Methods 
 
The data set includes all loan committed by the IDB to every borrowing member during the 
1970 to 2007 period.28 Given different membership entrance dates of bank members, the 
panel is unbalanced, containing 943 observations distributed among 26 countries.29 There are 
no missing values after the year of entry of every member.30 Figure II.3 describes the 
historical distribution of IDB allocations over borrowing members. As can be seen, lending is 
largely concentrated among the largest stakeholders: Brazil received on average 19 percent of 
the Bank’s yearly loan commitments, while Argentina received 14 percent and Mexico 13 
percent. These figures, in absolute numbers, are $1.1 billion, $870 million and $713 million 
respectively. There is, however, a large variability of these proportions over the 1970-2007 
period. Brazil received 48 percent of total IDB commitments in 1999 or nearly $5 billion, 
largely explained by the granting of two large loans of $2.3 billion and $1.2 billion. These two 
loans correspond to programs to maintain levels of social spending and credit supply to the 
private sector respectively to offset the global financial crisis. In contrast, Brazil received less 
than 1 percent of total loans committed by the IDB in 1988 or only $11 million. Similarly, 38 
percent of total loan allocations in 1998 or $4.5 billion were granted to Argentina, mainly 
driven by a $2.6 billion loan (the largest ever granted by the IDB). It consists of a structural 
adjustment program to guarantee macroeconomic stability driven by fears of spillover effects 
following the Asian and Russian financial crisis. Conversely, in 1990 this same country 
obtained less than $1 million, representing less than 1 percent of total IDB funds for that year. 
Variability in loans committed to Argentina and Brazil reflect the large decrease in overall 
lending for the 1987-1990 period and the outstanding allocation levels for the 1998-2000 
period.31 In contrast, there was less variance in the loan commitments received by Mexico 
over the entire period. The smallest share of total IDB loan commitments received by Mexico 
                                                        
28 The period of analysis is restricted from 1970 to 2007 due to data availability (IDB Annual Report 
various years, OECD 2012). IDB projects including more than one borrowing member simultaneously 
are not included in this analysis. These represent, however, only 3 percent of all resources committed 
for the 1970-2007 period. 
29 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela joined the IDB in 1959; Trinidad and Tobago in 1967; Barbados and Jamaica in 1969; 
Guyana in 1976; The Bahamas in 1977; Suriname in 1980; Belize in 1992. 
30 Zero values have been double checked with IDB reports directly.  
31 Chile, Panama and Peru also experienced significant drops in commitments levels during the 1987-
1990 period, as no new IDB loans were approved to each of these countries in 1987, 1988-1990 and 
1989 respectively. Conversely, commitment levels are exceptional for Colombia during the 1998-2000 
period, as it received more than $1 billion in IDB loans in that year.  
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occurred in 1998, when it received 3 percent or almost $400 million. The largest share it 
received was around 32 percent or nearly $2 billion in 2000, which is less than half the 
highest allocation received by Brazil and Argentina for the entire period. On the other side of 
the loan distribution is the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Suriname and Trinidad 
and Tobago, each of them receiving less than 1 percent of total resources committed by the 
IDB for the 1970-2007 period. However, except for Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago, the share 
of capital that each of these countries contributed to the Bank was also less than 1 percent. 
The large majority of borrowing countries did not receive IDB funding for at least one year 
during the period of analysis. The longest periods that countries went without a loan are 
Venezuela with 11 years, Trinidad and Tobago with 9 years, and Bahamas and Haiti with 6 
years each.    
Figure II.4 provides the evolution of IDB allocations for short-term and long-term 
impact projects separately. The description “other” includes projects which can be classified 
as neither short-term nor long-term impact, such as food aid, emergency aid and 
administrative costs. The graph describes a clear structural break in lending patterns around 
1989, coinciding with the long awaited and controversial agreement on the Bank’s seventh 
general capital increase, and also with the beginning of the end of the Cold War. After 1989 
resources allocated to long-term impact projects quadrupled, jumping from a yearly average 
of $1.1 billion in the pre-agreement period to a yearly average of $4.1 billion in the post 
agreement period. Lending to short-term impact projects, on the other hand, remains stable 
when comparing both periods’ yearly averages ($3.2 billion and $3.1 billion respectively). 
After taking into account the structural break, the graphs also show that the size of short-term 
impact projects in monetary terms is more volatile than that of long-term impact projects. The 
proportional distribution of loan commitments along sectors is presented in Figure II.5, 
displaying numbers for the periods before and after 1989 separately. The jump of allocations 
to long-term impact sectors from one period to the other is largely explained by considerable 
increases in the contributions to social infrastructure and government and civil society 
projects. Other long-term impact sectors that received increased levels of commitments were 
education, health and multi-sector. On the other hand, commitments to several short-term 
impact sectors were redirected into one specific sector: large proportional decreases are 
observed in the agricultural, industrial and energy generation sectors, but these are 
compensated for by a steep surge in funding for the banking and financial services and 
business sectors.  
The following models are proposed to test the different hypotheses:   
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Commit  = α + βCC + βFF + βII
US + µi + γt + εit     (1) 
Commit  = α + βCC + βFF + βII
GR + βHH
GR + βIHI
GR*HGR + µi + γt + εit  (2) 
Commits = α + βCC + βFF + βII
US + βISI
US*S + ωs + µi + γt + εits   (3) 
 
The dependent variable in (1) and (2) is the logged commitments level in constant dollars 
assigned by the IDB to a country i for a given year t.32 In order to test for US control over the 
Bank, as proposed in hypothesis 1, IUS in (1) includes different measures of US interest in the 
LAC region. Variables describing preference intensity and preference heterogeneity are 
comprised in IGR and HGR respectively in (2). In this way it is recognized whether or not the 
four largest shareholders of the Bank are working under a cooperative scheme and its effect 
on lending, as stated in hypothesis 1. This specification also includes an interaction term 
between these last two variables, as preference heterogeneity is expected to be determined by 
preference intensity. Moreover, the model in (3) adds a third dimension to the dataset. The 
dependent variable here is the level of commitments received by country i in year t and s 
sector type. Sectors are classified either as short-term or long-term impact, or as “other” if 
they cannot be included in any of the previous. In this specification, US interests are 
interacted with the sector types to identify different effects across short-term and long-term 
impact sectors, as expected in hypothesis 2. S consists of two dummy variables signaling the 
sector type that projects belong to. To test hypothesis 3 the model in (1) is considered and US 
interests are interacted with a dummy variable identifying the Cold War period. C is a matrix 
of control variables and F contains loan demand and supply factors over all three 
specifications. Variables µ, γ and ω control for country, year and sector type fixed effects 
respectively, and ε is the error term. Given that loan commitments cannot take negative 
values, a zero lower limit Tobit model is implemented in every specification. All regressions 
include standard errors clustered by country to allow for possible autocorrelation within a 
country and avoid spuriously small p-values. 
Moving to the variables of main interest, four measures are introduced to proxy for US 
commercial and political interests in the LAC region: US exports, voting compliance with the 
US in the UN General Assembly, US bilateral aid and temporary membership in the UN 
Security Council. US exports denotes the logged total exports from the US to country i in 
constant dollars for a given year t. This measure accounts for market size, and therefore 
                                                        
32 With the aim to keep zero observations in the commitment level variable, a value of 1 is added 
before the transformation into logarithms.   
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addresses the economic relevance of a country to the US (e.g., Bland and Kilby 2012). Period 
averages for this variable indicate that the US’s largest export market in the LAC region is by 
far Mexico with $43 billion in sales, followed by Brazil and Venezuela with $8.9 billion and 
$5.8 billion respectively. The smallest US trading partners in the LAC region are Belize, 
Guyana and Suriname, each of them accounting for less than $200 million in average yearly 
exports during the period of analysis. Voting compliance with the US reflects the alignment of 
country i with the US in the UN General Assembly. Country i scores a 1 if it follows the US 
on a vote, 0 if it votes in opposition, and 0.5 if any of the two countries either abstained or 
was absent during a voting session. The alignment of country i in year t is its mean score in 
the same year. A country’s behavior at the UN General Assembly discloses affinity with the 
US, and it is a widely used proxy for US political influence (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000, 
Andersen el at. 2006). Highest average values during the period of interest are observed in 
Paraguay (0.34), Guatemala (0.33) and the Dominican Republic (0.33). Lowest compliance 
levels are found for Guyana (0.23), Venezuela (0.24) and Mexico (0.24). US bilateral aid 
refers to the logged total amount of development assistance in constant dollars a country i 
receives from the US in a given year t. The aid allocation literature recognizes US bilateral aid 
as mirroring US geopolitical and commercial interests, and has the advantage of being a 
highly consistent measure across countries and over time (e.g., Fleck and Kilby 2006). 
Colombia, El Salvador and Peru are the three largest beneficiary countries of US aid agencies, 
receiving a yearly average of $225 million, $203 million and $151 million respectively in the 
period of analysis. The recipients of the least amount of US bilateral aid were the Bahamas, 
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, each receiving a yearly average of less than $1 million. 
Temporary membership in the UN Security Council is captured with a dummy variable, 
taking a value of 1 if country i served at the Council in year t, and 0 otherwise. The UN 
Security Council together with the UN General Assembly are arguably the most important 
international bodies in the world, and temporary members have been identified to receive a 
disproportionally large amount of resources from different IFIs during their serving period, 
possibly as a reward for supporting US initiatives in the Council (e.g., Dreher et al. 2009a, 
Dreher et al. 2009b, Kuziemko and Werker 2006, Lim and Vreeland 2013). For this reason, 
temporary membership at the Council might reflect US political preference towards a country. 
In the LAC region, Argentina is the country that has served most frequently during the period 
of analysis, having served on the UNSC during 5 separate periods. It is followed by Brazil 
and Panama, serving 4 times each. In contrast, 10 countries in the LAC region, almost half of 
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the total, have never served at the Council: The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, The Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, Suriname and Uruguay.   
Preference intensity from the four largest shareholders, US, Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico towards a specific country is proxied by two measures. The first proxy consists of the 
average of logged total exports from each of the four main shareholders to a country i in year 
t. Given that Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are also recipient countries, in order to keep 
observations for flows from Argentina to Argentina, from Brazil to Brazil and from Mexico to 
Mexico, the exports value of their largest trading partner in year t is taken instead. In this way 
it is guaranteed that preference intensity towards the country itself receives the highest value 
proportionally to export flows to other countries. The second proxy is the UN General 
Assembly voting compliance average of country i with each of the four main shareholders for 
a given year t. Similarly, voting compliance for the country pairs Argentina-Argentina, Brazil-
Brazil and Mexico-Mexico take a value of 1, which is the upper limit of the variable. 
Construction of a preference intensity measurement based on bilateral aid is not possible 
given insufficient data on Argentinian, Brazilian and Mexican bilateral aid. Temporary 
membership in the UN Security Council is not a bilateral variable and therefore not suitable 
under this framework.  
Preference heterogeneity is proxied by two measurements, following Copelovitch 
(2010): the coefficient of variation of exports and of UN General Assembly voting affinity. 
The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, expressed as a 
percentage, and measures the dispersion of exports and voting affinity along the US, 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico for a borrowing country in a year t.  Highest period average 
values for the coefficient of variation of exports are found in Belize (33.8 percent), Guyana 
(33.7 percent) and Suriname (26.7 percent). This implies that the significance of these 
countries in terms of exports is highly heterogeneous among the four largest shareholders of 
the Bank. For example Belize is a relatively important export market for the US and Mexico, 
while for Argentina and Brazil it is not; Guyana is a relatively important export market for the 
US and Brazil, while for Argentina and Mexico it is not. On the other side are Chile (7.9 
percent), Uruguay (8.1 percent) and Colombia (9.3 percent), implying that these countries are 
of similar levels of importance for the four largest shareholders. As for the coefficient of 
variation of voting affinity, the differences between country averages are not large. Guyana 
stands at the top with 40 percent and Paraguay at the bottom with 31 percent.      
Finally, the influence of other possible explanatory variables is captured with a set of 
controls. Variables in C include logged population and logged GDP per capita to control for 
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country size and income, as well as a democracy index and the inflation rate. The democracy 
index is the average of two measures on political rights and civil liberties and captures 
possible allocation preference for certain forms of government (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 
2000). The inflation rate is calculated using the Consumer Price Index and transformed using 
the formula x/(100+x) to reduce the influence of hyperinflation years. Following Sturm et al. 
(2005), Humphrey and Michaelowa (2010) and Bland and Kilby (2012) F contains variables 
controlling for loan demand and supply factors. Variables in F include government 
expenditures to GDP, current account balance to GDP, GDP per capita growth, investments to 
GDP, international reserves to GDP, international reserves change to GDP, logged checks and 
balances and elections. This last variable is a dummy variable indicating if main elections 
(presidential or parliamentary according to the political system) have been held in a country 
during that year, accounting for political cycles, which have been shown to influence aid 
allocation (e.g., Dreher et al. 2009a). A detailed description and source of all variables in the 
models are provided in Appendix II.1 and summary statistics are shown in Appendix II.2. 
 
II.5. Empirical Results 
 
Table II.1 shows results for specification (1). Regressions in columns 1 to 5 include only the 
set of basic controls in C while those in columns 6 to 10 additionally consider the loan supply 
and demand factors in F. Models in columns 11 to 15 contain only those controls in F or those 
that are robust or significant across every regression in columns 6 to 10. As can be seen, all 
basic controls take the expected sign, however, only GDP per capita and inflation rate are 
significant at conventional levels. These initial results suggest that IDB allocations follow 
recipient needs, as countries receive larger commitments when their income conditions 
deteriorate relative to their mean levels, and also that borrowing members are not obtaining 
disproportionate shares of Bank loans at times of substantial demographic changes. The 
insignificant coefficient for the democracy index across most regressions is an indication that 
shifts in a country’s government regime are neither being punished nor favored by the Bank. 
Lower inflation rates are a main signal of macroeconomic stability, therefore the significant 
and negative coefficient of this variable indicates predilection for more economically 
conservative periods for a particular borrower. Three variables from the loan supply and 
demand factors in F are consistently significant at conventional levels across the five 
regressions: current account balance to GDP, GDP per capita growth and the international 
56 
 
reserves to GDP. These results indicate that countries in periods with relatively larger current 
account surpluses or relatively smaller current account deficits receive significantly more 
resources from the IDB. This can be explained by their relatively lower likelihood to default 
on their repayments, making them less risky candidates for loans. The same argument applies 
for countries growing at faster than average rates, which are granted significantly more loans. 
Larger international reserve stocks are associated with significantly less borrowing/loans 
being received, presumably because borrowing members with excess reserves are less 
financially constrained and therefore are not the main target of the IDB development agenda. 
Turning to the variables capturing US interests, as can be seen at the bottom of Table 
II.1, the coefficient of the variable for US exports fails to be significant at conventional levels 
in all cases. This result indicates that IDB lending patterns do not react to changes in the 
commercial position of the US for a particular country in the LAC region. Similarly, closer 
political ties to the US, as measured by voting compliance at the UN General Assembly, do 
not trigger significant fluctuations in the allocation of resources from the IDB either. The 
coefficient for this variable fails to be significant at conventional levels across every 
regression. In contrast, the coefficient for US bilateral aid is positive and significant at the 10 
percent level across all regressions, making visible the weight of US motives to allocate 
development aid in the Bank’s lending decisions. Lastly, the dummy variable denoting 
temporary membership at the UN Security Council is always insignificant at conventional 
levels, suggesting that the IDB is closed to US pressure to reward supporters at the Council. 
Variables are lagged one period in separate specifications to check for possible estimation 
biases and inconsistences which might have derived from endogeneity. Coefficients remain 
similar for all four variables in terms of size, sign and significance levels.33   
These outcomes diverge from parallel research on other IFIs, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the ADB, where the US’s and other major 
donors’ political and economic interests strongly shape the direction and intensity of 
development aid allocations. Here, IDB allocation decisions do not respond to US commercial 
interests in the LAC region and react only to one of the three proposed measurements of US 
political influence. Most likely, large borrowing members exert substantial influence in the 
governance of the IDB, pushing to finance projects of their own interest and reducing the 
space for US control. Unlike in other IFIs, recipient countries in the IDB have an 
advantageous participation in terms of voting shares, representation on the Board of Executive 
                                                        
33 Results with lagged variables are not shown but available upon request. 
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Directors, and control over concessional lending. These specific features might allow 
borrowers to secure relevant proportions of IDB loans regardless of political or economic 
alignment with the US.  The next analysis seeks to determine whether limited US control 
together with the prominent involvement of the Bank’s largest borrowing countries in the 
governance of the Bank has translated into the establishment of a more technocratic IFI or 
whether it simply serves the interests of a handful of the largest shareholders. 
Results from (2) are exhibited in Table II.2. As before, three alternatives for the 
specification are considered: including basic controls in C, adding loan supply and demand 
factors in F, and taking into account only robust controls in F. The coefficient of variation of 
exports, which proxies for preference heterogeneity, is negative across all regressions and 
significant at conventional levels in two of the three specifications (columns 1, 5 and 9), 
suggesting that changes in commercial interests among the US, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
towards a specific member country is likely to lead to a distributional conflict of IDB of loans. 
As borrowers are penalized with smaller loans when disparities in commercial links to the 
largest shareholders are wider than their mean values, this result also reflects that this group 
of influential countries is not operating under a chain of favors or a cooperative scheme. 
However, as soon as the interaction term is introduced in subsequent columns, the effect of 
the coefficient of variation of exports weakens, turning insignificant at conventional levels in 
all models. Marginal effects are calculated in order to adequately interpret the impact on IDB 
lending under a setting allowing for an interaction effect.34  
Figure II.6 depicts the marginal effect of the coefficient of variation of exports on IDB 
allocation for different levels of average exports and suggests that it is indeed conditional 
upon the size of the exports market.35 As seen, the negative effect of the coefficient of 
variation of exports remains significant only for smaller export markets of the largest 
shareholders up until a certain threshold. After this threshold, the effect turns insignificant at 
conventional levels.36 Observations that fall below this threshold include several years for 
Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua and Suriname, and a limited number of years for 
Bahamas, Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica and Paraguay. Table II.3 predicts the 
                                                        
34 When the model is nonlinear, as in the case here, the interaction effect cannot be evaluated simply 
by looking at the sign, magnitude, or statistical significance of the coefficient on the interaction term. 
Instead, the interaction effect requires computing the marginal effects of the first variable in the 
interaction term evaluated at different points of the other variable in the interaction term (Ai and 
Norton 2003).   
35 Marginal effects in Figure II.6 are calculated using all control variables at mean values. 
36 The threshold corresponds to an average export value of around $35 million, equivalent to 10.5 in 
the scale in Figure II.6.  
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percentage change in IDB lending derived from a one standard deviation increase in the 
coefficient of variation of exports, evaluated at different levels of exports average from the 
largest four shareholders.37 As can be seen, the predicted percentage change in IDB lending 
lies between -42 percent and -30 percent, significant at conventional levels, if the exports 
average from major shareholders is below $10 million, and between -30 percent and -24 
percent, significant at conventional levels, if exports average from major shareholders reaches 
between $10 million and $35 million. The impact on IDB lending fails to be significant at 
conventional levels if exports average from major shareholders surpasses the latter figure. 
Smaller export markets are also among the smallest shareholders in the Bank and their weight 
in lending decisions is probably not sufficiently decisive to offset the adverse effect of 
distributional conflicts between the largest shareholders. On the other hand, countries with 
larger export markets, which are the larger borrowing members in the IDB, are less likely to 
have restrictions placed on their own borrowing, suggesting that they have more power to 
resist the influences of other large shareholders. This is especially evident for Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico.  
The coefficient of variation of voting compliance with the largest four shareholders 
fails to be significant at conventional levels for all regressions (columns 3, 7 and 11). 
Similarly, the interaction terms also remains insignificant in every model (subsequent 
columns). The marginal effect of the coefficient of variation of voting compliance on IDB 
allocation remains insignificant at conventional levels for different averages of voting 
compliance, as can be seen in Figure II.7.38 Therefore, stronger political alliances with the US, 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico do not significantly increase IDB lending, nor do changes in a 
borrower’s political support towards the largest shareholders determine the allocation of 
loans. This outcome might be explained by the fact that political support to this group of 
prominent countries is not very heterogeneous in the LAC region. As described in the 
previous section, voting compliance averages do not vary substantially across countries, 
probably because Argentina, Brazil and Mexico usually represent the interests of LAC 
countries worldwide and are also represent the smaller countries in the international political 
arena. Thus, rather than recognizing allies or enemies, these three countries consider the LAC 
region as being largely homogenous in political terms. In contrast, dissimilarities in the 
economic relevance of regional countries are broader, given different country sizes, 
                                                        
37 The percentage change from a one standard deviation (sd) increase is calculated through the formula 
(expme-1)*sd*100, where me are the marginal effects. 
38 Marginal effects in Figure II.7 are calculated using all control variables at mean values. 
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geographical positions, development stages, natural resources abundances or market 
complementarities.      
Table II.5a shows results for (3) which observes the effect of US interests on IDB 
lending for short-run and long-run impact projects separately and tests for hypothesis 2. 
Coefficients for basic controls in C and for loan supply and demand factors in F are similar to 
those in (1) in terms of signs and significance. The only major difference is the coefficient for 
the current account balance to GDP which now turns insignificant at conventional levels. 
Marginal effects for the key explanatory variables are exhibited in Table II.5b, in order to 
adequately interpret the interaction terms. The columns in Tables II.5a and II.5b relate to the 
same model specifications. As can be observed in Table II.5b, US exports fails to be 
significant at conventional levels for both lending to short-term and long-term impact 
projects, indicating that IDB allocations do not follow changes in the commercial position of 
the US for a specific country regardless of which sector funds are diverted to. On the other 
hand, US political interest variables react often to lending for short-term impact projects and 
hardly respond to lending for long-term impact projects. Marginal effects for US bilateral aid 
are robustly significant for short-term impact projects, while for long-term impact project, 
they fail to be significant at conventional levels in most specifications. In addition, the UN 
Security Council membership dummy also becomes significant for lending to short-term 
impact projects along almost all regressions, while remaining insignificant for lending to 
long-term impact projects at conventional levels. Marginal effects for US voting compliance 
at the UN General Assembly stay largely insignificant, except for the case of lending to short-
term impact projects only when basic controls in C are employed. These results indicate that 
US influence over IDB lending decisions is limited but not completely absent. Loans for 
sectors that create political capital and generate large rents in the short-run are subjected to 
greater political pressure and hence more likely to be delivered when political ties to the US 
are stronger. Examples of these sectors are energy generation and supply, financial services 
and businesses, and production (industry, mineral resources and mining, construction and 
trade), which are highly profitable and have large impacts on employment creation. 
Finally, results for (1) after adding an interaction term between the variables of interest 
and the Cold War dummy are presented in Table II.6a to test hypothesis 3. As before, Table 
II.6b exhibits marginal effects to adequately evaluate the impact of US interests during and 
after the Cold War separately. Once more, US exports fail to be significant at conventional 
levels in either case. Interestingly, the positive and significant effect of US bilateral aid 
obtained initially only prevails during the Cold War period, as this variable always becomes 
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insignificant at conventional levels for the period after the Cold War. The other two variables 
proxying for US political influence are persistently insignificant during both periods. These 
results indicate that the apparent politically driven lending once achieved by the US during 
the Cold War, disappears thereafter, most probably as a consequence of a reorientation in the 
Bank’s lending. After the seventh general capital increase in 1989, social infrastructure or 
long-term impact sector lending becomes the priority of the IDB, identified to be less 
influenced by US political interests. 
 
II.6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter analyzes loans committed by the IDB during the 1970-2007 period, and 
investigates whether the US exerts influence over the Bank to pursue its own geo-strategic 
and commercial interests. Empirical results suggest that US control over IDB allocation 
decisions is limited, as overall lending decisions do not robustly respond to US political and 
economic interests in the LAC region. This uncommon outcome is most likely a consequence 
of the more equitable representation of borrowing countries in the Bank compared to other 
IFIs in terms of voting shares, staff appointed on the Boards of Governors and of Executive 
Directors, and control over concessional lending. In particular, the position of Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico in the governance of the Bank serves to limit the scope for US control over 
lending decisions. Preference heterogeneity among the US and these three borrowing 
members towards other borrowers is shown to lead to a conflict in the distribution of IDB 
loans, providing an opportunity for the creation of a more autonomous organization. 
Nevertheless, US political influence is seen to be significant in cases of IDB lending to 
sectors that create political capital and potentially generate large rents in the short-run. In 
effect, US control is found to be more constrained after the end of Cold War, as the Bank 
focused on lending towards sectors targeting poverty alleviation and socioeconomic 
deficiencies following the long awaited and controversial seventh capital increase in 1989. 
Overall, IDB lending is not fully immune to US political and economic interests in the 
LAC region, but this influence appears to be limited. This singular feature, as a result of the 
Bank’s distinct structure among large IFIs, suggests that providing borrowing countries with 
greater representation within lending institutions does not necessarily translate into a 
substitution of control over lending but might, in fact, allow for more independent allocation 
decisions. It is crucial, however, that control mechanisms and incentives for participants 
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within IFIs are established so that the interests of larger members do not collectively eclipse 
the interests of smaller ones. Political manipulation is thus not inherent to multilateral lending 
and can be avoided if donors and beneficiaries are provided with similar opportunities to 
design the lending agenda and governance directives. The findings of this study favor the 
move to increase the autonomy and efficiency of IFI’s through more equitable representation 
and therefore support recent initiatives to increment quotas in favor of emerging economies.  
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Figure II.1: IFIs Commitments to LAC region, Total by Year 
Notes: The graph shows loan commitments approved to countries in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) 
region by the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Development Bank of Latin America 
(CAF), US development assistance agencies and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) in each year for the 
1970-2007 period. Figures are given in US constant dollars (base year 2000) and scaled to millions. Source: 
IDB, OECD.  
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Figure II.2: RDBs Commitments, Total by Year 
Notes: The graph shows loan commitments approved by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and African 
Development Bank (AfDB) in each year for the 1970-2007 period. Figures are given in US constant dollars 
(base year 2000) and scaled to millions. Source: IDB, OECD. 
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Figure II.3: IDB Commitments, Share in Total by Borrowing Member and Year 
Notes: The graph shows the share received by Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and remaining borrowing countries in 
loan commitments approved by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in each year for the 1970-2007 
period. Figures are given in percentage points. Source: IDB, OECD.   
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Figure II.4: IDB Commitments, Total by Sector Type and Year 
Notes: The graph shows loan commitments approved by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in short-
term impact sectors, long-term impact sectors, and other sectors in each year for the 1970-2007 period. Short-
term impact sectors comprise transport and storage, communications, energy generation and supply, financial 
services and businesses, agriculture (agronomy, forestry and fishing) and production (industry, mineral resources 
and mining, construction and trade); long-term impact sectors comprise education, health and population 
policies, water supply and sanitation, government, social infrastructure and multisector (women’s rights, 
environment protection and tourism); other sectors comprise commodity aid and emergency assistance. Figures 
are given in US constant dollars (base year 2000) and scaled to millions. Source: IDB, OECD. 
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Figure II.5: IDB Commitments, Share in Total by Sector and Period  
Notes: The graph shows the share of loan commitments approved by the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) delivered to each sector in the 1970-1989, 1990-2007 and 1970-2007 periods. Figures are given in 
percentage points. Source: IDB, OECD.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
O
th
er
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
s
H
ea
lt
h
Ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t
W
at
er
 S
u
p
p
ly
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
So
ci
al
 In
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 S
er
vi
ce
s
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
re
M
u
lt
is
ec
to
r
Tr
an
sp
o
rt
En
er
gy
 G
e
n
er
at
io
n
1970-1989 1990-2007 1970-2007
67 
 
Table II.1: IDB Commitments and US Interests, Tobit, 1970-2007 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Population (log) -0.480 0.579 1.479 0.425 0.844 1.898 1.408 3.351 1.513 3.531 1.210 0.683 2.350 0.752 2.663 
 
(3.384) (2.887) (2.912) (2.965) (3.154) (4.973) (4.570) (4.899) (4.670) (5.030) (3.470) (3.249) (3.468) (3.270) (3.620) 
GDP cap. (log) -3.629*** -3.243** -2.919** -3.257** -3.183*** -2.920*** -3.048*** -2.503** -3.039*** -2.405*** -2.963** -3.120** -2.713** -3.115** -2.588** 
 
(1.259) (1.290) (1.229) (1.295) (1.120) (1.016) (1.122) (0.994) (1.113) (0.926) (1.223) (1.316) (1.195) (1.302) (1.138) 
Pol. & civil rights -0.0392 -0.0593 -0.0782 -0.0545 -0.0682 -0.475 -0.460 -0.494* -0.469 -0.483* -0.288 -0.274 -0.281 -0.275 -0.285 
 
(0.338) (0.335) (0.286) (0.333) (0.289) (0.325) (0.325) (0.289) (0.336) (0.268) (0.365) (0.376) (0.331) (0.374) (0.319) 
Inflation rate -3.925*** -4.176*** -4.416** -4.400*** -4.049*** -3.447* -3.393** -3.502* -3.309* -3.799** -3.060** -3.027** -2.956** -2.898** -3.305*** 
 
(1.469) (1.445) (1.739) (1.656) (1.522) (1.778) (1.688) (1.804) (1.851) (1.594) (1.343) (1.187) (1.471) (1.364) (1.270) 
Gov. exp. / GDP 0.0278 0.0310 0.0259 0.0330 0.0160 
      
(0.0762) (0.0781) (0.0767) (0.0744) (0.0856) 
     
Current acc. /GDP 0.0828*** 0.0829*** 0.0741** 0.0821*** 0.0766** 0.0583* 0.0587* 0.0544 0.0584* 0.0561 
      
(0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0329) (0.0270) (0.0315) (0.0346) (0.0342) (0.0362) (0.0343) (0.0362) 
GDP cap. growth 0.184** 0.183** 0.170*** 0.182** 0.171*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.168*** 0.179*** 0.171*** 
      
(0.0744) (0.0741) (0.0632) (0.0739) (0.0631) (0.0652) (0.0654) (0.0583) (0.0644) (0.0593) 
Investments / GDP 0.0363 0.0366 0.0272 0.0356 0.0297 
      
(0.0506) (0.0508) (0.0502) (0.0512) (0.0492) 
     
Int. res. / GDP -0.165*** -0.167*** -0.159** -0.167*** -0.156** -0.162*** -0.164*** -0.158*** -0.164*** -0.156*** 
      
(0.0576) (0.0583) (0.0635) (0.0577) (0.0632) (0.0534) (0.0541) (0.0575) (0.0537) (0.0573) 
Int. res. ch / GDP -3.164 -3.683 -3.070 -3.536 -2.973 
      
(8.997) (8.908) (8.811) (9.099) (8.504) 
     
Elections -0.445 -0.434 -0.428 -0.445 -0.409 
      
(0.514) (0.504) (0.515) (0.519) (0.510) 
     
Checks t-1 (log) -0.617 -0.602 -0.679 -0.634 -0.603 
      
(0.565) (0.547) (0.562) (0.568) (0.542) 
     
US exports (log) 0.672 0.495 -0.243 -0.232 -0.286 -0.271 
 
(1.005) 
   
(0.897) (0.881) 
   
(0.776) (0.859) 
   
(0.787) 
US UNGA votes 3.313 0.733 -1.330 -2.629 -2.077 -3.620 
  
(5.825) 
  
(5.911) 
 
(5.441) 
  
(5.770) 
 
(5.599) 
  
(5.955) 
US aid (log) 0.172** 0.166* 0.173* 0.176* 0.150* 0.155* 
   
(0.0841) 
 
(0.0881) 
  
(0.0991) 
 
(0.101) 
  
(0.0892) 
 
(0.0921) 
UNSC memb. -0.188 -0.126 -0.0212 0.177 0.0595 0.176 
 
      (0.729) (0.681)       (0.498) (0.471)       (0.469) (0.441) 
Constant 44.66 33.77 13.92 36.94 19.03 16.19 21.83 -17.78 19.90 -17.88 29.18 35.15 1.069 33.69 -0.729 
 
(50.98) (47.56) (48.58) (49.01) (48.10) (76.60) (73.34) (81.65) (75.26) (80.48) (53.89) (53.64) (58.35) (54.13) (57.88) 
Country fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 879 879 879 879 879 758 758 758 758 758 797 797 797 797 797 
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan commitments in US constant dollars (base year 2000) approved by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to borrowing country i in year t in logarithmic scale. Standard errors are 
clustered by country, reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table II.2: IDB Commitments and Major Shareholder Preference Heterogeneity, Tobit, 1970-2007 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Population (log) 0.422 0.429 0.716 0.802 5.263 6.235 1.959 2.012 4.112 4.893 1.011 1.079 
 
(3.158) (3.206) (2.873) (2.879) (4.417) (4.717) (4.663) (4.633) (2.822) (3.166) (3.161) (3.084) 
GDP cap. (log) -3.423** -3.423** -3.288** -3.266** -2.316** -2.187** -3.044*** -3.039*** -2.397* -2.311* -3.135** -3.131** 
 
(1.363) (1.363) (1.309) (1.291) (1.003) (1.028) (1.086) (1.080) (1.252) (1.260) (1.283) (1.282) 
Pol. & civil rights -0.0295 -0.0289 -0.0816 -0.0970 -0.443 -0.421 -0.541* -0.547** -0.242 -0.215 -0.338 -0.347 
 
(0.338) (0.335) (0.300) (0.293) (0.324) (0.328) (0.289) (0.276) (0.360) (0.365) (0.340) (0.340) 
Inflation rate -4.269*** -4.271*** -4.214*** -4.189*** -3.769** -4.067** -3.403** -3.399** -3.408** -3.618*** -3.033*** -3.025*** 
 
(1.532) (1.536) (1.424) (1.436) (1.821) (1.723) (1.649) (1.648) (1.411) (1.336) (1.147) (1.148) 
Gov. exp. / GDP 0.0212 0.0217 0.0315 0.0310 
     
(0.0817) (0.0793) (0.0785) (0.0784) 
    
Current acc. /GDP 0.0811*** 0.0840*** 0.0797*** 0.0792*** 0.0613* 0.0630* 0.0583* 0.0579* 
     
(0.0273) (0.0269) (0.0254) (0.0246) (0.0342) (0.0351) (0.0338) (0.0338) 
GDP cap. growth 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.181** 0.180** 0.180*** 0.182*** 0.179*** 0.177*** 
     
(0.0704) (0.0707) (0.0726) (0.0713) (0.0611) (0.0625) (0.0644) (0.0640) 
Investments / GDP 0.0322 0.0335 0.0337 0.0332 
     
(0.0481) (0.0447) (0.0511) (0.0511) 
    
Int. res. / GDP -0.176*** -0.185*** -0.167*** -0.167*** -0.169*** -0.175*** -0.162*** -0.161*** 
     
(0.0516) (0.0522) (0.0579) (0.0578) (0.0474) (0.0501) (0.0529) (0.0527) 
Int. res. ch / GDP -4.341 -5.189 -4.491 -4.466 
     
(9.169) (9.005) (8.705) (8.711) 
    
Elections -0.396 -0.388 -0.431 -0.435 
     
(0.494) (0.492) (0.502) (0.496) 
    
Checks t-1 (log) -0.672 -0.791 -0.655 -0.644 
     
(0.546) (0.522) (0.532) (0.570) 
    
Exports average (log) 0.283 0.280 
  
-0.912 -1.280** 
  
-0.929 -1.216* 
  
 
(0.906) (0.811) 
  
(0.597) (0.611) 
  
(0.655) (0.625) 
  
Exports coeff. var. -0.0264 -0.0293 
  
-0.166** -0.498 
  
-0.189** -0.451 
  
 
(0.103) (0.176) 
  
(0.0809) (0.329) 
  
(0.0833) (0.315) 
  
Exports average * coeff. var. 0.000346 
  
0.0354 
  
0.0282 
  
  
(0.0206) 
   
(0.0298) 
   
(0.0295) 
  
UNGA votes average 
  
-10.60 3.555 
  
-17.90 -9.789 
  
-19.34 -8.755 
   
(19.91) (37.39) 
  
(15.33) (49.65) 
  
(14.78) (46.87) 
UNGA votes coeff. var. 
  
-0.0358 0.293 
  
0.0207 0.196 
  
0.0304 0.262 
   
(0.0759) (0.825) 
  
(0.0713) (0.988) 
  
(0.0724) (0.878) 
UNGA votes average * coeff var. 
  
-0.453 
  
-0.240 
  
-0.316 
    
(1.132) 
   
(1.369) 
   
(1.238) 
Constant 34.20 34.10 41.77 29.87 -34.76 -48.55 24.65 17.75 -14.21 -25.46 42.18 33.24 
  (49.84) (51.32) (47.29) (55.02) (67.32) (71.98) (70.72) (77.77) (42.43) (48.65) (52.05) (54.44) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 874 874 877 877 753 753 756 756 792 792 795 795 
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan commitments in US constant dollars (base year 2000) approved by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to borrowing country i in year t in logarithmic scale. Standard errors are 
clustered by country, reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Figure II.6: Conditional Marginal Effects of Coefficient of Variation of Exports on IDB 
Commitments, 90 percent Confidence Interval  
 
Notes: The graph shows on the right y-axis the marginal effects of the major shareholder exports coefficient of 
variation on IDB loan commitments (log). Marginal effects are conditional on major shareholder exports average 
(log). Dashed lines denote upper and lower boundaries of the 90 percent confidence interval. The graph also 
shows on the left y-axis the histogram of major shareholder exports average (log).  
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Table II.3: Predicted Percentage Change of Coefficient of Variation of Exports on IDB 
Commitments 
Values of Exports 
average (log) 
Predicted  percent 
change in IDB comm 
 
 
7.24 -41.53 * 
7.74 -38.79 * 
8.24 -36.00 * 
8.75 -33.16 ** 
9.25 -30.27 ** 
9.75 -27.33 * 
10.26 -24.33 * 
10.76 -21.28 
11.26 -18.18 
11.77 -15.02 
12.27 -11.80 
12.77 -8.52 
13.27 -5.19 
13.78 -1.79 
14.28 1.66 
14.78 5.18 
15.29 8.76 
15.79 12.41 
16.29 16.12 
16.80 19.90 
Notes: Predicted change from a one standard deviation (sd) increase is calculated though (eme-1)*sd*100, me 
denotes marginal effects.*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Figure II.7: Conditional Marginal Effects of Coefficient of Variation of Votes on IDB 
Commitments, 90 percent Confidence Interval 
 
Notes: The graph shows on the right y-axis the marginal effects of the major shareholder UNGA votes 
coefficient of variation on IDB loan commitments (log). Marginal effects are conditional on major shareholder 
UNGA votes average. Dashed lines denote upper and lower boundaries of the 90 percent confidence interval. 
The graph also shows on the left y-axis the histogram of major shareholder UNGA votes average. 
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Table II.4: Predicted Percentage Change of Coefficient of Variation of Votes on IDB 
Commitments 
Values of UNGA 
votes average 
Predicted  percent 
change in IDB comm 
0.6487 0.1023 
0.6584 0.0964 
0.6680 0.0905 
0.6776 0.0846 
0.6872 0.0788 
0.6968 0.0729 
0.7064 0.0671 
0.7160 0.0612 
0.7257 0.0554 
0.7353 0.0496 
0.7449 0.0438 
0.7545 0.0381 
0.7641 0.0323 
0.7737 0.0266 
0.7833 0.0208 
0.7930 0.0151 
0.8026 0.0094 
0.8122 0.0037 
0.8218 -0.0020 
0.8314 -0.0076 
Notes: Predicted change from a one standard deviation (sd) increase is calculated though (eme-1)*sd*100, me 
denotes marginal effects.*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table II.5a: IDB Commitments, US Interests and Sector Type, Tobit, 1970-2007 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Population (log) -1.470 0.742 1.572 0.221 0.654 3.714 4.830 6.472 4.485 6.060 1.387 1.845 3.699 1.807 3.275 
 
(4.541) (4.143) (4.113) (4.306) (4.116) (5.613) (5.518) (5.620) (5.611) (5.516) (4.827) (4.741) (4.871) (4.808) (4.759) 
GDP cap. (log) -3.768** -2.972** -2.652* -3.091** -3.153** -3.126** -2.874** -2.346* -2.933** -2.586** -3.299** -3.133** -2.684* -3.193** -2.861** 
 
(1.556) (1.487) (1.421) (1.544) (1.354) (1.341) (1.354) (1.258) (1.381) (1.231) (1.571) (1.547) (1.430) (1.571) (1.447) 
Pol. & civil rights -0.192 -0.241 -0.256 -0.219 -0.232 -0.616 -0.659* -0.650* -0.620 -0.635* -0.334 -0.341 -0.349 -0.335 -0.312 
 
(0.335) (0.331) (0.276) (0.331) (0.289) (0.399) (0.373) (0.354) (0.399) (0.348) (0.374) (0.369) (0.327) (0.376) (0.333) 
Inflation rate -6.570*** -6.593*** -7.261*** -7.348*** -6.170*** -5.300** -5.162** -5.588** -5.499** -5.191** -5.272*** -5.132** -5.284*** -5.334*** -5.104** 
 
(2.104) (2.213) (2.368) (2.479) (2.167) (2.270) (2.307) (2.246) (2.309) (2.330) (1.989) (2.015) (1.984) (2.054) (2.039) 
Gov. exp. / GDP -0.0109 -0.00819 -0.0282 -0.0159 -0.0171 
      
(0.0982) (0.103) (0.0984) (0.103) (0.0976) 
     
Current acc. /GDP 0.0663 0.0626 0.0569 0.0659 0.0562 0.0642 0.0623 0.0584 0.0653 0.0621 
      
(0.0451) (0.0438) (0.0514) (0.0441) (0.0484) (0.0481) (0.0476) (0.0522) (0.0477) (0.0501) 
GDP cap. growth 0.243** 0.244** 0.231*** 0.244** 0.227*** 0.251*** 0.250*** 0.240*** 0.252*** 0.236*** 
      
(0.0964) (0.0971) (0.0870) (0.0963) (0.0875) (0.0855) (0.0870) (0.0800) (0.0851) (0.0825) 
Investments / GDP 0.00636 0.00357 0.000685 0.00748 -0.00672 
      
(0.0499) (0.0480) (0.0479) (0.0492) (0.0485) 
     
Int. res. / GDP -0.217*** -0.217*** -0.207*** -0.218*** -0.210*** -0.200*** -0.201*** -0.192*** -0.201*** -0.195*** 
      
(0.0663) (0.0663) (0.0745) (0.0670) (0.0717) (0.0609) (0.0614) (0.0672) (0.0615) (0.0659) 
Int. res. ch / GDP -12.19 -11.50 -11.65 -12.86 -11.49 
      
(11.81) (11.69) (11.75) (11.84) (11.39) 
     
Elections -0.263 -0.324 -0.264 -0.266 -0.304 
      
(0.738) (0.712) (0.730) (0.738) (0.708) 
     
Checks t-1 (log) -0.798 -0.935 -0.828 -0.758 -0.986 
      
(0.845) (0.794) (0.840) (0.835) (0.791) 
     
US exports (log) 0.254 0.00518 -0.617 -0.525 -0.777 -0.697 
 
(0.937) 
   
(0.844) (0.773) 
   
(0.739) (0.792) 
   
(0.748) 
US exports (log) * Short 1.385* 1.343* 1.343* 1.220* 1.406** 1.299* 
 
(0.739) 
   
(0.729) (0.685) 
   
(0.691) (0.688) 
   
(0.689) 
US exports (log) * Long 0.973* 0.981* 1.004* 1.031* 0.951* 0.942* 
 
(0.568) 
   
(0.529) (0.570) 
   
(0.542) (0.572) 
   
(0.536) 
US UNGA votes 2.665 -2.303 -4.884 -7.895 -6.100 -9.648 
  
(10.86) 
  
(10.19) 
 
(11.03) 
  
(11.10) 
 
(11.56) 
  
(11.74) 
US UNGA votes * Short 14.10** 16.07** 11.63 13.55* 11.27 13.27 
  
(6.504) 
  
(6.602) 
 
(8.216) 
  
(8.138) 
 
(8.189) 
  
(8.124) 
US UNGA votes * Long 9.846 11.46* 13.13 15.09* 13.57 15.35* 
  
(6.698) 
  
(6.805) 
 
(8.225) 
  
(8.317) 
 
(8.473) 
  
(8.514) 
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Table II.5a (cont): IDB Commitments, US Interests and Sector Type, Tobit, 1970-2007 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
US aid (logs) 0.305 0.299 0.261 0.289 0.223 0.254 
   
(0.209) 
 
(0.197) 
  
(0.254) 
 
(0.239) 
  
(0.193) 
 
(0.187) 
US aid (log) * Short -0.0656 -0.0962 -0.0160 -0.0506 -0.0126 -0.0539 
   
(0.225) 
 
(0.211) 
  
(0.286) 
 
(0.274) 
  
(0.228) 
 
(0.217) 
US aid (log) * Long -0.0846 -0.101 -0.120 -0.154 -0.0618 -0.0964 
   
(0.199) 
 
(0.195) 
  
(0.276) 
 
(0.268) 
  
(0.206) 
 
(0.207) 
UNSC memb. -5.203* -4.732 -5.238* -4.718 -5.124* -4.771 
    
(2.939) (3.009) 
   
(2.953) (3.039) 
   
(2.994) (3.096) 
UNSC memb. * Short 7.278** 6.592** 7.375** 6.860** 7.357** 6.807** 
    
(3.231) (3.262) 
   
(3.045) (3.174) 
   
(3.042) (3.168) 
UNSC memb. * Long 4.773 4.367 4.947 4.547 5.070 4.874 
        (3.479) (3.461)       (3.378) (3.308)       (3.424) (3.395) 
Constant 36.91 -0.0291 -22.18 8.924 -2.150 -36.64 -63.30 -101.3 -58.97 -82.99 5.305 -12.07 -52.79 -12.84 -32.29 
  (75.91) (70.07) (68.94) (73.02) (67.27) (93.84) (93.13) (95.56) (94.25) (92.21) (82.41) (81.53) (83.80) (82.86) (80.23) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,637 2,637 2,637 2,637 2,637 2,274 2,274 2,274 2,274 2,274 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan commitments in US constant dollars (base year 2000) approved by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to borrowing country i in year t delivered to sector s in logarithmic scale. 
Standard errors are clustered by country, reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
75 
 
Table II.5b: IDB Commitments, US Interests and Sector Type, Marginal Effects, Tobit, 1970-2007 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
US exports (log) at Short 1.639 1.348 0.725 0.695 0.629 0.602 
  
(1.157) 
   
(0.988) (0.808) 
   
(0.738) (0.801) 
   
(0.728) 
at Long 1.227 0.987 0.387 0.506 0.174 0.245 
  
(1.122) 
   
(0.952) (0.775) 
   
(0.676) (0.824) 
   
(0.737) 
US UNGA votes  at Short 16.77** 13.77* 6.750 5.658 5.174 3.618 
   
(7.523) 
  
(7.121) 
 
(7.565) 
  
(7.770) 
 
(7.417) 
  
(7.686) 
at Long 12.51 9.156 8.248 7.191 7.466 5.702 
   
(8.296) 
  
(8.146) 
 
(8.906) 
  
(9.054) 
 
(8.517) 
  
(8.779) 
US aid (log) at Short 0.240* 0.203 0.245** 0.238* 0.211* 0.200 
    
(0.126) 
 
(0.128) 
  
(0.117) 
 
(0.125) 
  
(0.126) 
 
(0.132) 
at Long 0.221* 0.198* 0.141 0.135 0.162 0.158 
    
(0.116) 
 
(0.116) 
  
(0.137) 
 
(0.139) 
  
(0.120) 
 
(0.123) 
UNSC memb. at Short 2.076* 1.860 2.137** 2.142* 2.233** 2.036* 
     
(1.195) (1.210) 
   
(1.075) (1.181) 
   
(1.074) (1.199) 
at Long -0.430 -0.366 -0.291 -0.172 -0.0544 0.103 
          (1.396) (1.318)       (1.282) (1.232)       (1.293) (1.254) 
Matrix C Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Matrix F No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
Matrix F (robust)   No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixef effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   2,637 2,637 2,637 2,637 2,637 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,274 2,274 2,274 2,274 2,274 
Notes: Marginal effects reported and only exhibited for the variables of interest. The dependent variable is the loan commitments in US constant dollars (base year 2000) approved by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to 
borrowing country i in year t delivered to sector s in logarithmic scale. Matrix C stands for basic controls, Matrix F for loan supply and demand factors, and Matrix F (robust) for robust loan supply and demand factors. Standard errors 
are clustered by country, reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table II.6a: IDB Commitments, US Interests and Period, Tobit, 1970-2007 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Population (log) -1.419 1.220 3.659 0.410 2.266 0.244 1.488 6.605 1.489 3.818 -0.0898 0.985 5.266 0.738 3.686 
 (3.070) (3.190) (3.446) (2.935) (3.323) (4.036) (4.934) (5.595) (4.601) (4.661) (3.065) (3.439) (4.130) (3.230) (3.526) 
GDP cap. (log) -3.879*** -3.162** -2.746** -3.247** -3.291*** -3.353*** -3.039*** -2.064** -3.028*** -2.613*** -3.283** -3.079** -2.372** -3.105** -2.728** 
 (1.478) (1.233) (1.116) (1.288) (1.224) (1.239) (1.083) (0.890) (1.103) (0.964) (1.460) (1.275) (1.078) (1.286) (1.182) 
Pol. & civil rights -0.0829 -0.0936 -0.0652 -0.0526 -0.0948 -0.541* -0.465* -0.440 -0.476 -0.444* -0.337 -0.293 -0.245 -0.278 -0.287 
 (0.305) (0.304) (0.279) (0.335) (0.261) (0.286) (0.280) (0.285) (0.323) (0.229) (0.332) (0.340) (0.324) (0.367) (0.283) 
Inflation rate -3.890*** -4.167*** -4.482** -4.367*** -3.995** -3.421* -3.386** -3.655** -3.220* -4.010** -2.975** -3.012** -3.037* -2.845** -3.256** 
 (1.498) (1.400) (1.818) (1.672) (1.647) (1.828) (1.713) (1.814) (1.919) (1.849) (1.426) (1.169) (1.560) (1.414) (1.541) 
Gov. exp. / GDP      0.0110 0.0314 0.0242 0.0338 -0.00962      
      (0.0835) (0.0765) (0.0791) (0.0739) (0.0903)      
Current acc. /GDP      0.0845*** 0.0828*** 0.0843*** 0.0812*** 0.0898*** 0.0589* 0.0588* 0.0649** 0.0570* 0.0675** 
      (0.0255) (0.0262) (0.0289) (0.0267) (0.0252) (0.0351) (0.0342) (0.0301) (0.0330) (0.0289) 
GDP cap. growth      0.182** 0.183** 0.178*** 0.184** 0.178*** 0.182*** 0.180*** 0.171*** 0.180*** 0.177*** 
      (0.0730) (0.0739) (0.0575) (0.0747) (0.0568) (0.0651) (0.0649) (0.0537) (0.0647) (0.0548) 
Investments / GDP      0.0399 0.0366 0.0194 0.0369 0.0273      
      (0.0491) (0.0511) (0.0523) (0.0498) (0.0507)      
Int. res. / GDP      -0.164*** -0.167*** -0.121* -0.169*** -0.115* -0.162*** -0.164*** -0.129** -0.166*** -0.125** 
      (0.0567) (0.0579) (0.0647) (0.0566) (0.0628) (0.0530) (0.0537) (0.0560) (0.0536) (0.0552) 
Int. res. ch / GDP      -2.558 -3.696 -1.938 -3.212 -1.096      
      (9.165) (8.836) (9.202) (9.229) (8.968)      
Elections      -0.459 -0.434 -0.425 -0.448 -0.409      
      (0.513) (0.504) (0.503) (0.516) (0.503)      
Checks (logs)      -0.699 -0.601 -0.355 -0.661 -0.353      
      (0.564) (0.553) (0.508) (0.576) (0.523)      
US exports (log) 0.901    0.883 0.108    0.321 0.00901    0.261 
 (0.987)    (0.833) (0.821)    (0.697) (0.859)    (0.746) 
US exports (log) * Cold 
war -0.289    -0.232 -0.480    -0.591 -0.355    -0.428 
 (0.412)    (0.397) (0.448)    (0.381) (0.407)    (0.361) 
US UNGA votes  -0.665   -1.908  -1.618   -0.830  -3.390   -3.901 
  (6.014)   (6.500)  (5.305)   (5.499)  (5.755)   (6.263) 
US UNGA votes * Cold 
war  7.620   3.014  0.692   -7.886  3.102   -1.996 
  (9.845)   (9.749)  (10.05)   (11.52)  (9.433)   (10.97) 
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Table II.6a (cont): IDB Commitments, US Interests and Period, Tobit, 1970-2007 
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan commitments in US constant dollars (base year 2000) approved by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to borrowing country i in year t in logarithmic scale. Standard errors are 
clustered by country, reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
US aid (log)   -0.0407  -0.0647   -0.0363  -0.0423   -0.0385  -0.0447 
   (0.0615)  (0.0670)   (0.0650)  (0.0705)   (0.0657)  (0.0709) 
US aid (log) * Cold war   0.250***  0.263***   0.269***  0.288***   0.233***  0.247*** 
   (0.0580)  (0.0610)   (0.0915)  (0.0922)   (0.0770)  (0.0809) 
UNSC memb.    0.223 0.106    0.535 0.329    0.449 0.248 
    (0.564) (0.534)    (0.705) (0.571)    (0.666) (0.557) 
UNSC memb. * Cold 
war    -0.784 -0.557    -1.286 -0.476    -0.880 -0.298 
        (1.762) (1.503)       (1.811) (1.353)       (1.787) (1.386) 
Constant 59.58 22.74 -21.29 37.08 -6.146 43.35 20.44 -74.95 20.29 -27.04 49.84 29.86 -49.41 33.88 -22.65 
  (50.37) (52.20) (56.68) (48.75) (56.48) (64.48) (79.40) (93.60) (74.28) (79.94) (51.90) (56.56) (68.97) (53.62) (61.84) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 879 879 879 879 879 758 758 758 758 758 797 797 797 797 797 
78 
 
Table II.6b: IDB Commitments, US Interests and Period, Marginal Effects, Tobit, 1970-2007 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
US exports (log) at Cold war 0.612    0.651 -0.372    -0.269 -0.346    -0.167 
  (1.056)    (0.900) (0.944)    (0.874) (0.911)    (0.871) 
 at Post war 0.901    0.883 0.108    0.321 0.00901    0.261 
  (0.987)    (0.833) (0.821)    (0.697) (0.859)    (0.746) 
US UNGA votes at Cold war  6.955   1.106  -0.926   -8.716  -0.288   -5.897 
   (8.687)   (8.535)  (9.537)   (10.98)  (8.986)   (10.13) 
 at Post war  -0.665   -1.908  -1.618   -0.830  -3.390   -3.901 
   (6.014)   (6.500)  (5.305)   (5.499)  (5.755)   (6.263) 
US aid (log) at Cold war   0.209**  0.198**   0.232**  0.245**   0.195**  0.203** 
    (0.0875)  (0.0909)   (0.108)  (0.107)   (0.0960)  (0.0984) 
 at Post war   -0.0407  -0.0647   -0.0363  -0.0423   -0.0385  -0.0447 
    (0.0615)  (0.0670)   (0.0650)  (0.0705)   (0.0657)  (0.0709) 
UNSC memb. at Cold war    -0.561 -0.450    -0.751 -0.148    -0.431 -0.0499 
     (1.484) (1.287)    (1.346) (1.098)    (1.320) (1.075) 
 at Post war    0.223 0.106    0.535 0.329    0.449 0.248 
          (0.564) (0.534)       (0.705) (0.571)       (0.666) (0.557) 
Matrix C  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Matrix F  No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
Matrix F (robust)   No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   879 879 879 879 879 758 758 758 758 758 797 797 797 797 797 
Notes: Marginal effects reported and only exhibited for the variables of interest. The dependent variable is the loan commitments in US constant dollars (base year 2000) approved by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to 
borrowing country i in year t in logarithmic scale. Matrix C stands for basic controls, Matrix F for loan supply and demand factors, and Matrix F (robust) for robust loan supply and demand factors. Standard errors are clustered by 
country, reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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III.1. Introduction 
 
Development aid provided by donor countries outside the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is often 
perceived as an alternative of last resort for developing countries financing poverty reduction 
programs (Kurlantzick 2006, Downs 2011). Furthermore, non-DAC donor participation in 
worldwide development activities has been regarded as a main challenge to achieving sustainable 
indebtedness levels and consistent growth policies (Dahle Huse and Muyakwa 2008). This group 
of “new” donors includes important contributors such as China, allegedly the second largest 
donor in Africa in the 2000-2010 period, and Saudi Arabia, reported to be the largest donor 
worldwide in terms of aid effort in the 1970-1995 period (Neumayer 2003, Strange et al. 
forthcoming). The potential threat rests on the argument that the operations of new donors are 
frequently not coordinated with those of DAC donors. For example, recipient countries unwilling 
to adhere to the requirements of the DAC might find in the new donors a source of otherwise 
unattainable funding.  
The DAC could plausibly counteract the adverse effects of additional incoming resources 
from new donors by calling for reform in their beneficiary countries. These eventual reforms 
could be promoted through conditions attached to loans delivered via organizations in which 
DAC donors are influential, namely the Bretton Woods Institutions (Dreher and Jensen 2007, 
Bresslein and Schmaljohann 2013). For example, credit conditions might set specific economic 
targets if development aid from new donors is causing debt overhang in a borrowing country. On 
the other hand, DAC donors may be forced to offer loans with fewer conditions to “stay in the 
business” and attract recipients who are faced with an increasing number of options in how to 
finance their development programs. Through its analysis of World Bank conditionality, this 
chapter seeks to identify how a DAC-led organization reacts to the presence of new donors. It 
also compares this response to that of DAC donors engaging in development bilaterally in order 
to better understand the particularities, if any, in the institutional and state-level reaction to new 
donors. Specifically, the study measures the impact of aid from a wide range of new donors on 
World Bank conditionality, and contrasts it with the impact on DAC donors. The analysis is 
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restricted to African recipients due to data constraints.39 The assessment focuses on World Bank 
conditions because it is the leading International Financial Institution (IFI) in Africa and therefore 
the main vehicle through which DAC donors can demand reforms. 
A number of studies highlight the fact that at the time of committing a loan, new donors 
do not request policy change to the governments of recipient countries (e.g., Villanger 2007, 
Strange et al. 2013). New donors may avoid getting involved in the domestic agendas of their 
beneficiaries due to political support or large economic rents derived from the proposed projects 
(Bräutigam 2009). In addition, it is more comfortable for recipient countries to obtain credits that 
do not require reforms to be implemented. This choice of recipient countries by non-DAC donors 
is quite common. As the empirical analysis by Mwase (2011) finds, BRIC countries allocate aid 
to developing countries with weak institutions and governance which the Bretton Woods 
institutions perceive as risky to finance. There are different views on how DAC-led organizations 
are reacting to the increasing activities of the new donors. Some suggest that these institutions 
have indeed called for more coordination with the new donors. Berger et al. (2011) report the 
willingness of both sides to agree on potential reforms to turn aid more effective and sustainable. 
Conversely, others claim that new donors have been reluctant to work from a common front and 
act rather independently when it comes to negotiate with recipient countries on financing options 
for development projects. Several cases are reported in Kurlantzick (2006) and Naim (2007) in 
which different countries turned down loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank in favor of resources from the Chinese government because the prior demanded 
government reform to guarantee disbursements while the latter did not. Pehnelt (2007) even 
points out that the engagement of China enables African governments to reject demands by the 
IMF and the World to enhance transparency, implementing anti-corruption strategies and 
furthering their democratization efforts.  
This study is the first to link World Bank conditions with the activities of new donors. 
Empirical results based on a panel consisting of 54 African countries over the 1980-2013 period 
indicate that the design of World Bank conditionality is influenced by the presence of new 
donors. In particular, the World Bank delivers loans with significantly fewer conditions to 
recipient countries which are assisted by China. Less stringent conditionality is also observed in 
                                                        
39 Data on Chinese aid commitments is only available for Africa. Section 3 introduces the dataset 
employed.  
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better off borrowers that are in addition funded by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, but this 
effect vanishes after the start of the new millennium. In contrast, World Bank conditionality is 
rarely affected by aid inflows from DAC donors, and when it is, conditionality is revised 
upwards. These findings suggest that new donors might be perceived as an attractive financial 
option to which the World Bank reacts by offering credits less restrictively in order to remain 
competitive in the loan-giving market. The remaining of the chapter is structured as follows: 
Section III.2 presents an overview of World Bank conditionality and how lending from new 
donors might influence it, section III.3 describes the dataset and estimation employed, section 
III.4 analyzes results obtained, and finally conclusions are derived in section III.5.  
 
III.2. World Bank Conditionality and New Donors 
 
The World Bank was created at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. Credit conditions have 
been requested since its creation, however they were not explicitly stipulated to be part of the 
loan negotiation process during its first decades of operation (Dreher 2004). Conditionality only 
became a critical matter in World Bank lending practices in the early 1980s following the 
introduction of structural adjustment programs. These programs are designed for countries 
experiencing economic crises and aim to achieve long term or accelerated growth by 
restructuring their economy and reducing government intervention. In order to guarantee the 
release of funds or to improve the concessional terms of credit, recipients are required to 
implement specific policies. The rising demand for structural adjustment programs, mainly 
focusing on resolving short-term economic imbalances, is largely responsible for the growth in 
the amount of loans delivered with attached conditions throughout the 1980s (World Bank 2005, 
2014). Before the advent of structural adjustment programs the World Bank lacked the leverage 
to negotiate agreements with recipient country governments. The demand for these programs 
from the developing world allowed the Bank to prescribe detailed policies attached to the loans it 
gave helping conditionality to proliferate (Dreher 2004). In addition, the fact that some of the 
largest shareholders of the World Bank received credits up until the mid-1970s might also 
explain the upsurge of conditions of the 1980s. It is plausible that these countries made use of 
their influential position as shareholders to prevent the spread of loan conditions while they were 
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receiving funds from the Bank (Dreher 2004). The average number of conditions per World Bank 
project remained stable during the 1990s, but has been steadily decreasing since the beginning of 
the last decade (World Bank 2014). Today conditions are mostly means to induce mid-term 
institutional changes, which might explain the downward trend (Word Bank 2005). This decrease 
may also possibly reflect the demand for World Bank resources in the market. The availability of 
other attractive financial options, for example, could pressure the World Bank to offer credits 
with fewer conditions to remain competitive (Dreher 2004). The World Bank has tended to react 
to this excess in supply by offering loans with fewer conditions (Kapur et al. 1997). The 
increasing participation of the new donors in the financing of development projects can provide 
within this framework an alternative explanation about the change of the World Bank’s position 
towards its conditionality in the last decade. This chapter starts from this framework to develop 
its hypotheses.   
 Conditions primarily serve two purposes: to enhance aid effectiveness and safeguard 
resources. They encourage recipient countries to take short term measures to solve 
macroeconomic imbalances and to introduce policies to establish the foundations for long term 
growth. Conditions should promote a safer economic and political environment in the recipient 
country that concurrently allows for efficient project implementation. In addition, conditionality 
is meant to ensure the solvency of the recipient country to enable it to repay its loans and 
consequently protect the World Bank's resources. Amongst other macroeconomic changes, 
stabilization programs typically involve reducing budget deficits by increasing taxes and/or 
decreasing government spending, restructuring foreign debts, reducing the balance of payments 
deficit through currency devaluation, or using monetary policy to finance government deficits 
(World Bank 2014). Moreover, long term adjustment policies usually recommend the 
privatization of state-owned companies, measures to improve governance and fight corruption, 
and market liberalization (World Bank 2014). World Bank conditions can be either prior actions 
or benchmarks. Prior actions are critical policy and institutional arrangements that a country 
agrees to take before the Board approves a loan. In cases where the loan is disbursed in several 
tranches, some of them may need to be met only after Board approval and satisfied before a 
specific tranche is released. If they are not fulfilled, the tranche may be released only if the Board 
agrees to waive the conditions (World Bank 2005). Benchmarks, on the other hand, are not 
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conditions in a literal sense, as non-compliance does not necessarily imply a freeze in 
disbursements. They can be seen as implementation progress markers of the program that reflect 
improvements towards significant policy or institutional change (World Bank 2005).  
 The supply of conditions is traditionally perceived as the product of the negotiation 
between three actors: The World Bank, the recipient country and influential shareholders. 
McLean and Schneider (2014) provide a detailed outline on the dynamics of this process. Under 
this view, the Bank and the borrower’s government have a common long term goal, namely 
fostering economic development in the recipient country, but the interests of both parties may 
diverge in the short term. This is because, while the World Bank has the fundamental interest to 
use conditionality as an instrument to ensure the effectiveness of its projects, the recipient 
government might turn to the World Bank for financial assistance to remain in office and 
implement a set of preferred policies while in power. The negotiation process reveals whether 
there is a divergence of interests and powerful members can intervene here to resolve any issues. 
When powerful members have an interest in the recipient, they are likely to support these 
countries in the negotiation process and aid them in achieving the level of conditionality that they 
propose. When powerful members decide not to intervene, the World Bank chooses its preferred 
level of conditionality given a sufficient bargaining power. Therefore, as McLean and Schneider 
(2014) point out, the supply of conditions can be considered as the result of a bidding competition 
between what the World Bank believes is necessary to ensure the success of the project and what 
it is able to implement conditional on the bargaining power of borrowers in the negotiation 
process and the intervention of influential shareholders to protect their own interests. In this 
situation, the borrower still has the option of not accepting the conditions, and therefore of 
rejecting the credit, if it assigns higher value to a scenario without the financial assistance of the 
World Bank. Nevertheless, borrowers might have outside financial options and that this fact can 
shape the supply of World Bank conditions is often ignored in the literature. For example, the 
availability of alternative resources can strengthen the bargaining power of the recipient country 
and change the likelihood that influential shareholders will intervene in the negotiation process. 
The influential shareholder and the outside option could even engage in a “race to the bottom” in 
terms of conditions offered if the borrower is of strategic importance to both of them. New 
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donors represent these outside options and their expanding activities can potentially influence the 
outcome of the negation process between the World Bank and recipient countries.  
 Empirical studies on World Bank conditionality are scarce because data did not become 
fully available until recently. Most of them focus on the effects of compliance with conditions 
and on the influence of major shareholder interests in the design of conditionality. Svensson 
(2003) analyzes around 200 World Bank structural adjustment programs and observes that the 
disbursement of loans is not linked to complying with conditions: in other words, disbursement 
decisions are independent of reform efforts in recipient countries. Looking at these results, the 
author proposes that the implementation of conditions be incentivized and that a stricter system to 
punish non-compliance be enacted in order to channel aid to environments where it could be 
effective. Kilby (2009) provides an insight as to why borrowers might not comply with World 
Bank conditions. The study finds evidence that poor macroeconomic performance and non-
compliance with conditions only lead to lower loan disbursements if the borrower is not a 
political ally of the US. Therefore, if the recipient is of strategic interest to the US, they might not 
have sufficient incentive or the necessity to comply with conditions. Within this same line of 
argumentation, McLean and Schneider (2014) suggest that the interest of major shareholders in 
the recipient country does not affect the supply of World Bank conditions. The reason for this is 
that large shareholders still have the option in a later stage to influence the decision of disbursing 
a loan in situations of non-compliance by recipient countries that are of their interest. On the 
other hand Bresslein and Schmaljohann (2013) find that the commercial interests of influential 
shareholders of the World Bank affect the supply of trade liberalization conditions. They show 
that Germany exerts control to introduce more conditions to promote trade, while the United 
States makes use of its influence to request fewer conditions as a protectionist measure. In 
contrast, and empirical analysis of how the supply of World Bank conditions is affected by aid 
from new donors has not yet been attempted; this is the gap in the literature this chapter wants to 
fill.  
 The rise of new donors has been acknowledged in the literature. There are no 
comprehensive official figures for Chinese development assistance, but estimates situate China 
between the second and sixth largest single donor to Africa in the 2000-2010 period, depending 
on the definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA) employed to measure aid flows 
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(Strange et al. forthcoming). Saudi Arabia has been reported as the largest donor worldwide in 
terms of aid effort in the 1970-1995 period, while the aid to GNI ratio was also exceptionally 
high for Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates in the 1970s and 1980s, peaking at 8.5 percent and 
12 percent respectively (Neumayer 2003). Nearly one third of all aid during the 1970s was 
delivered by Arab donors, and although their aid effort has been diminishing over time, it still 
exceeds the average among DAC donors (Rouis 2010). Moreover, India is considered, together 
with China, as one of the two “heavyweights” among the new donors and its activities are rapidly 
expanding (Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013).  
Information on conditionality at the project level on aid from new donors is not publicly 
available. However, several studies have reported it to be either lax or even absent from their 
credits. In the case of China, this is likely due to its principle of non-interference stipulated in its 
“Eight Principles of Foreign Economic and Technological Assistance” in 1963, proposing that 
Chinese aid allocation should be independent of regime type or governance quality in the 
borrower country. In addition, China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid in 2011 specifies that China 
does not use aid to intervene in the internal affairs of recipient countries or to seek political 
privileges. Strange et al. (2013) cite numerous examples of Chinese aid delivered with few or no 
conditions. There is less evidence on aid conditionality from Arab donors, but it has also been 
seen as following the non-interference principle. Arab donors limit advice on policy matters to 
situations where they are asked for guidance and do not explicitly link access to credit to reform 
targets (Rouis 2010). Democracy and governance issues are not part of the Arab aid dialogue, but 
the execution of projects is closely monitored to prevent corruption (Villanger 2007). Indian aid 
is expected to come with few conditions attached as most of it is in the form of technical 
assistance (Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013). This low or no conditionality approach is to a great 
extent risk free for new donors because they tend to resort to other means, instead of credit 
conditions, to secure credit repayments. They often demand borrowers to award investment 
contracts to companies from their own countries or accept natural resources as collateral for their 
loans rather than insisting on fiscal rectitude (Bräutigam 2009, The Economist 2015). Chinese aid 
in Africa, for example, is often seen as securing the flow of natural resources to China (Foster et 
al. 2008, Berthelemy 2011).  
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Assuming that aid from new donors is usually delivered with few or no conditions, the 
World Bank could react to their presence in two different ways. First, it could propose a larger 
number of conditions to address the potential macroeconomic effects that the availability of 
inexpensive lending might cause, or, second, it could ask for less reform to remain competitive in 
the international loan market. Which of the two effects prevails depends mainly on the extent to 
which the supply of development resources meets the needs of the recipient country. In the first 
case, new donors are not per se a financial alternative to the World Bank because the latter does 
not completely satisfy the borrower's demand for aid. Recipient countries will therefore use both 
credit sources to finance different development projects. Here, the World Bank can revise its 
conditionality upwards to adjust for the effect of the activities of new donors on the recipient's 
economy. If new donors are considered a threat to debt sustainability, it is expected that the Bank 
will request stricter reforms. A loan negotiation between China and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC) in 2008 can illustrate this scenario. The deal granted a mineral concession to a 
consortium of Chinese companies in exchange for infrastructure development. It was worth $9.2 
billion or at least 90 percent of the DRC’s GDP, raising concerns about the DRC's debt 
sustainability which, at the time, constituted 93 percent of its GDP and 502 percent of its 
government revenue (Jansson 2011). If the deal had been signed, the DRC would have been 
disqualified from a large scale debt relief from the World Bank, the IMF and DAC donors. 
Finally, the government of the DRC ended the negotiation by reducing the size of the loan to $3 
billion and annulling the requirement to provide mining assets as loan collateral in order to meet 
the eligibility conditions for the debt relief initiative (Manson 2010).  
In the second case, the additional aid offered by the new donors causes an excess in the 
supply of development resources and therefore recipient countries can choose from different 
options to finance a project. The recipient selects the most attractive alternative and the World 
Bank might have to offer a competitive level of conditionality and concessionality if it is 
interested in keeping its presence in the country in question. Even though no evidence is available 
on the revision of credit conditionality as a consequence of an excess in the supply of 
development resources, there are substantial examples of World Bank loans being rejected in 
favor of more appealing financial options offered by new donors. Kurlantzick (2006) and Naim 
(2007) report several such cases. One of them involves a series of decisions taken by the Angolan 
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government to finance the rebuilding of its country after the end of the civil war in 2002. Right 
before the end of war, the IMF together with the World Bank planned to provide financing and 
assistance for the reconstruction activities with conditions of market liberalization, transparency 
improvements, and the termination of accepting oil as collateral for short-term loans. Although 
market liberalization polices were gradually implemented, improvements in transparency were 
insignificant. Before Angola adjusted to these demands, China proposed it an oil collateral loan 
worth $2 billion with a concessional interest rate of 1.5 percent over the Libor, repayable over 17 
years with a 5-year grace period. The credit was agreed in 2003 and disbursement began in 2004. 
By 2010 total Chinese aid commitments to Angola were around $14.5 billion. The Angolan 
government refused the structural adjustment program and accepted the alternative from the new 
donor. Another example involves the rejection of an already agreed-upon loan between the 
government of Egypt and the IMF and the World Bank to cover a large budget shortfall resulting 
from Egypt’s economic collapse after President Hosni Mubarak was removed from office in 
2011. The credit was worth $3 billion and its main conditions were greater transparency in public 
finances and a better-targeted subsidy system. Right after the rejection of this credit, the 
governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia offered Egypt a $1 billion grant completely free of 
conditions for budgetary support. Egypt opted for the Arad donors' proposal, as it was more 
attractive for the new Egyptian government to remain in power and solve its budget imbalances. 
We expect that the World Bank would react to lending from DAC donors as it did in the 
first case with the new donors. DAC donors are not expected to offer a recipient country an 
alternative credit for a project if another deal has been already reached with the World Bank to 
finance the same project. Some of the DAC donors are among the most influential members in 
the World Bank and therefore the two sides are unlikely to engage in a race to the bottom via 
conditionality. It is then improbable that the World Bank will find itself in a situation where there 
is an excess supply of development resources due to DAC donor activities. In cases where both 
the World Bank and DAC donors are lending to the same country, the Bank is expected to revise 
its conditionality upwards only in cases DAC loans could threaten the borrower's macroeconomic 
stability. Given this reasoning we test the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  The World Bank will revise its conditionality downwards if the presence 
of new donors creates an excess supply of development resources in the recipient country and 
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upwards if it does not. The World Bank will revise its conditionality upwards with the presence 
of DAC donors.    
In addition, the bargaining power of the recipient country should influence the extent to 
which the World Bank revises its conditionality with the presence of other donors. As previously 
mentioned, the supply of conditions is the outcome of a negotiation process between the World 
Bank and the recipient country. The presence of other donors is expected to affect the supply of 
conditions because having numerous financial options increases competition and therefore the 
chances that the World Bank will offer a level of conditionality closer to that desired by the 
recipient country. The greater the bargaining power of the recipient country, the more likely it is 
that they will achieve more favorable outcomes with the presence of alternative donors. 
Bargaining power is usually measured with GDP per capita, hence middle income countries are 
expected to have more bargaining power than low middle income countries (Dreher 2004). 
Assuming that recipient countries prefer loans with fewer conditions, the following hypothesis 
has been developed: 
Hypothesis 2: If the World Bank revises its conditionality upwards, the increase should be 
larger for low income borrowers, and if it is revised downwards the decrease should be larger for 
middle income countries. 
 
III.3. Data and Methods 
 
The data analysis of this study is based on a panel consisting of 54 African countries over the 
1980-2013 period. The model estimates World Bank conditions as a function of aid delivered by 
new and DAC donors and other recipient country characteristics to test hypotheses 1 and 2. The 
dependent variable measures the average number of World Bank conditions per project 
committed to country i in year t. The number of conditions is a proxy for loan stringency given 
that it is not possible to quantify and compare the severity of a single condition in an objective 
way. With this approach exactly the same weight is assigned to each condition attached to a loan. 
This proxy has been repeatedly used in studies on conditionality.40 The dependent variable is 
                                                        
40 See for example Dreher and Jensen (2007) and Bresslein and Schmaljohann (2013).   
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constructed using the Development Action Database from the World Bank, which contains 
information on all conditions negotiated for every loan the World Bank has supplied since 1980. 
Figure III.1 depicts the average number of World Bank conditions negotiated per project 
with countries in Africa for the 1980-2013 period. As can be seen, World Bank conditionality is 
largely variable over the period of analysis. From an average number of conditions per loan of 
6.5 in 1980, it increases sharply through the 1980s, reaching a maximum of 36.5 in 1988. It 
remains equal to or above 20 for almost every year until 2007, and drops significantly afterwards 
taking a value of 7.6 in 2013. As mentioned above, the upward trend coincides with the Bank’s 
creation of adjustment lending programs in the early 1980s, and the latter downward trend might 
be a consequence of changes in the scope of conditionality and the excess supply of development 
resources. The distribution of conditions amongst African countries over the 1980-2013 period is 
shown in Figure III.2. Algeria and the Republic of the Congo stand out having on average 48 and 
39.7 conditions respectively for every loan they obtained from the World Bank. Algeria regularly 
received financial assistance during the 1990s, from which a loan from the World Bank’s 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) approved in 1995 worth $150 
million and including 77 conditions excels. This credit was intended to accelerate the 
implementation of economic policy reforms in order to overcome the weakening of oil prices, the 
drying up of external financing and rising inflationary pressures. Highest loan stringency for the 
Republic of the Congo is the result of a $70 million IBRD credit with 51 conditions in 1988. It 
consists of a structural adjustment program aimed at restoring the balance between the public and 
private sector to overcome severe fiscal and economic imbalances and to foster growth of non-oil 
sectors. On the right end of the graph are found Djibouti, Lesotho and Seychelles, each with less 
than 8 conditions per project on average. The lowest loan stringency in these three countries 
correspond to projects financed jointly by the IBRD and the World Bank’s International 
Development Association (IDA), not exceeding $20 million each, approved between 2008 and 
2013, and containing at most 6 conditions. Moreover, the database does not provide any 
information on conditionality for World Bank projects in the following countries: Angola, 
Botswana, Eritrea, Libya, South Africa, South Sudan and Swaziland. Given that some of these 
countries received resources from the World Bank during the 1980-2013 period, while others did 
not, these observations cannot be assumed to be zero and are therefore taken as missing values.   
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The kernel distribution for the average number of World Bank conditions per project is 
presented in Figure III.3. Highest densities are observed when conditions are on average between 
10 and 20. Additionally, only a small proportion of loans contain more than 40 conditions and the 
distribution reaches a maximum of 97. For this reason, the graph is clearly skewed to the left. 
This characteristic and the fact that the number of conditions is by nature count data, makes a 
negative binomial the estimation of choice. A negative binomial is preferred to a poisson, 
because this estimator relaxes the assumption that the mean and variance of the distribution must 
be equal, which is not the case here (refer to Appendix III.2). Further tests implemented, that 
analyze the fit of the model by looking at its residuals, confirm that a negative binomial is 
preferable to other estimators addressing over dispersion.41 The following equations summarize 
the empirical strategy employed: 
 
AvConditionsit = β0 + β1AvFieldit + β2WBCommit + βXXit-1 + βjDonorjit-1 + μj + γt + εit  (1)  
AvConditionsit = β0 + β1AvFieldit + β2WBCommit + βXXit-1 + βj[Donorjit-1*LowIncomeit-1]   
                            + μj + γt + εit             (2) 
     
The equation in (1) tests for hypothesis 1, where AvConditionsit is the average number of 
conditions per World Bank project a country i receives in year t. The average is rounded to the 
closest integer to keep the observations as count data. The key explanatory variable Donorjit-1 is 
the loan commitments made by donor j to country i bilaterally in period t-1. It is expressed in 
logarithmic form to minimize its variance and lagged one period to address possible 
endogeneity.42 Both new and DAC donors are considered. The first group includes new donors 
with significant activities in Africa and for which information on their aid allocation was 
available at the time of completing this study. These are China, India, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates.43 The data is retrieved from the AidData Project and the length of the 
series differs for every donor. While data for the Arab donors are usually available from the 
1970s or earlier, for China and India they are only available since 2000 and 2005 respectively. 
                                                        
41 These tests are not shown here but are available upon request. 
42 A value of 1 is added before the logarithmic transformation to keep the zero observations. 
43 Brazil is also a new donor with significant activities in Africa. These are, however, mostly concentrated 
in four countries: Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe. 
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Except for China, the information on the size and distribution of the loans originate from official 
records. The estimate for Chinese aid is based on media reports.44 Given that there is no complete 
information regarding the concessional terms of every project financed by the Chinese 
government, the AidData Project produces different estimations of Chinese “aid”. This study 
makes use of the most conservative statistic, denoted as strictly ODA, which is the closest to the 
DAC's definition of ODA (Strange et al. 2013).45 The second group consists of the five largest 
DAC donors in Africa, namely France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. The series are official records and obtained from the OECD, and they are available 
beginning in the 1960s for each of the five donors. The equation in (2) tests for hypothesis 2 and 
includes an interaction term between aid commitments from every donor and LowIncomeit-1, a 
dummy variable signaling if recipient country i belongs to the list of low income countries of the 
World Bank in year t-1.46 It allows us to evaluate the impact on conditions for both income 
groups separately.    
Figure III.4 shows the average value of the loans delivered bilaterally by each donor for 
the 1980-2012 period, and compares them to the World Bank equivalent. It reveals that, with the 
exception of China, the main five DAC donors still have a comparatively larger presence in 
Africa than the new donors. It also confirms the emergence of China as a relevant player in the 
aid architecture in Africa.47 The United States is the single largest debtor, having committed close 
to $5.6 billion on average every year in the abovementioned region and time frame, surpassing 
                                                        
44 According to Strange et al. (2013), the AidData Project methodology for gathering and standardizing 
information on Chinese development projects is divided into two stages. During the first state, projects are 
identified through Factiva, a Dow Jones-owned media database. Factiva draws from approximately 28,000 
media sources worldwide in 23 languages. Most of these sources are newspapers, radio and television 
transcripts. In the second stage, targeted searches are conducted for projects initially identified during the 
first stage.      
45 AidData Project’s strictly ODA includes technical assistance and scholarships, loans with a large grant 
element, grants with development intent (financial or in-kind), debt relief and military aid with 
development intent. The other main and broader definition, referred to as Official Finance (OF), also 
includes loans with or without a small grant element, grants without development intent (financial or in-
kind) and other lines of credit.  
46 The World Bank defines low-income countries as those with GNI per capita equal to or below a certain 
threshold. This threshold is adjusted over time and in 2013 reached a value of $1,045. Countries are 
classified every year according to the current GNI per capita level.   
47 A broader and less precise estimation of Chinese aid in Strange et al. (2013) suggests financial 
assistance from China to Africa to be on average as high as $7.6 billion per year during the 2000-2012 
period. This figure situates China as the current largest single donor in Africa. This estimation is, 
however, not compatible with the definition of ODA by the DAC. 
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the World Bank's average yearly loan amount by almost $1 billion. France follows close by with 
$4.5 billion each year. The remaining three main DAC donors have allocated on average between 
$1.5 and $2.5 billion in aid each throughout the period of analysis. Chinese funding of 
developments projects in Africa, as previously indicated, is as high as that of the United Kingdom 
or almost $1.5 billion per year. Kuwait and India are the second and third most important new 
donors in Africa respectively, each lending around $500 million a year. Note that the average 
value for China corresponds to the 2000-2012 period while for India it corresponds to 2005-2010. 
And finally, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the smallest of this group of new 
donors, each providing around $200 million per year.   
Statistics on World Bank conditions in relation to bilateral aid from new and DAC donors 
are presented in Figures III.5a and III.5b. Each of the small diagrams represents an individual 
donor. The dataset is plotted taking into account two different dimensions: First, whether or not a 
recipient country was funded by an individual donor in a specific year with an amount that is 
above that same donors’ aid allocation average in Africa during that same year. The resulting 
categories are labeled as “Below” or “Above” the average in the graphs. And second, whether or 
not the recipient country is classified as low income or middle income by the World Bank. These 
two groups of countries are identified as “Middle Income” or “Low Income” in the graphs, and 
an extra category “Total” is added that takes into account all countries. The first bar in the first 
diagram in Figure III.5a, for example, represents the average number of conditions attached to 
each World Bank project for all recipient countries with below the average funding from the new 
donors and considered a middle income country by the World Bank. As can be seen from Figure 
III.5a, World Bank borrowers in Africa are requested to comply on average with fewer conditions 
per project if the supply of loans from new donors is comparatively large.48 This outcome is more 
evident in middle income countries, as those relatively better off in terms of new donors' 
financing receive on average 14.6 conditions per project, while their counterpart receives 24.1. 
As for low income countries, the difference is on average less than 1 condition for every loan. 
The situation is similar when looking at new donors individually. Excluding Saudi Arabia, the 
number of conditions per World Bank project is on average lower if the allocation of aid by any 
                                                        
48 Total new donor aid comprises resources allocated by the five new donors under consideration in this 
study. 
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of the new donors is relatively more generous. Differences are also more pronounced in middle 
income countries, except in India and in the United Arab Emirates.  
In contrast, the opposite relationship is observed in Figure III.5b where funding from 
DAC donors is considered. World Bank conditions are on average more numerous in recipient 
countries that obtain comparatively more resources from all DAC donors.49 The World Bank 
delivers on average 17 conditions to borrowers that receive assistance above the mean value of all 
aid allocations made by the DAC donors in Africa, while this figure is 11.8 for countries that 
receive below the mean value. This holds true for each of the main five DAC donors, however 
this difference is small for the United Kingdom and the United States. Differences are more 
accentuated in middle income countries than low income countries, except for, once again, the 
United Kingdom and the United States.  
Continuing with the description of the equation regression, AvFieldit stands for the 
average number of fields that conditions cover in each of the loans negotiated between the World 
Bank and country i in year t. Fields are simply the different economic sectors that conditions 
target.50 A World Bank project involved in a broader number of fields is more likely to contain, 
ceteris paribus, a larger number of conditions. The variable WBCommit corresponds to the value 
of all loans committed by the World Bank to country i in year t and expressed in logarithmic 
form.51 Larger World Bank credits are expected to have more conditions attached, as it is 
expected that more ambitious projects require greater reform. Matrix X comprises a set of control 
variables that further explain the variability of World Bank conditions. Following  Dreher and 
Jensen (2007) and Bresslein and Schmaljohann (2013), it includes, first, economic conditions in 
recipient countries measured by GDP per capita, GDP growth, the inflation rate, government 
expenditures, international reserves, the investment rate and external debt. Second, it includes the 
interests of the shareholders of the Bank, addressed by the voting alignment in the UN General 
Assembly between recipient countries and the United States. And lastly, it takes account of the 
political conditions of recipient countries, evaluated by a democracy index. All control variables 
                                                        
49 Total DAC aid comprises resources allocated not only by the main 5 DAC donors under consideration 
in this study, but by all 29 DAC donors.   
50 The Development Action Database recognizes 10 different economic sectors that conditions might 
cover: Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry; Public Administration, Law and Justice; Information and 
Communications; Education; Health; Finance; Health and other Social Services; Industry and Trade; 
Energy and Mining; Transportation; and Water, Sanitation and Flood Protection.   
51 A value of 1 is added before the logarithmic transformation to keep the zero observations. 
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in X are lagged one period, as allocation decisions taken by the Board are based on observed 
information from the preceding year. Unconditional country-fixed and time-fixed effects are 
denoted μj and γt respectively, and the error term εit is clustered by recipient country. A 
description of all variables is presented in Appendix III.1 and descriptive statistics in Appendix 
III.2.   
 
III.4. Empirical Results 
 
Empirical results from the negative binomial model in equation (1) and testing for hypothesis 1 
are shown in Tables III.1a and III.1b. These present the effect of each donor's bilateral 
commitments on the average number of World Bank conditions per project in Africa for the 
1980-2013 period. Table III.1a contains outcomes for all new donors under study, namely China, 
Kuwait, India, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The first column in this table 
considers bilateral aid commitments from the five new donors together. The same procedure is 
followed for the DAC donors and its results are shown in Table III.1b. Here the first column 
shows the overall effect of bilateral aid commitments from all 29 DAC donors combined. In both 
tables, model specifications in columns 1 to 7 include all control variables in Matrix X, while 
those in columns 8 to 16 only include statistically significant control variables. Marginal effects 
are reported and evaluated at the mean of each variable. Starting with the results for the first 
variable in the model, marginal effects for the average number of fields covered by the conditions 
in a loan are positive and significant at conventional levels. As expected, a World Bank program 
seeking to impact economic activities in numerous sectors is more likely to contain more 
conditions. This effect remains robust across every model specification. On the other hand, the 
size of a World Bank loan does not determine its level of conditionality, as the marginal effects 
for the World Bank commitments variable never reach significance. It is then broader project 
scopes rather than their magnitude that better predict loan stringency.   
From the variables in Matrix X, the only one whose marginal effect remains significant at 
conventional levels across every regression is external debt. As can be seen in both Tables III.1a 
and III.1b, larger external debts in borrowing African countries result in significantly more World 
Bank conditions in each project negotiated. This result is not surprising. Conditions usually aim 
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to correct fiscal imbalances in recipient countries with higher debt levels, in order to guarantee 
not only sustainable economic growth but also the government’s capacity to repay the loans in 
the future. Other control variables are significant at conventional levels in certain cases but they 
are not robust, such as GDP per capita, GDP growth, the inflation rate, international reserves, the 
investment rate, UN General Assembly voting affinity with the US, and ratings on the democracy 
index.  
 Turning to the results for the main variables of interest in Table III.1a, the marginal effect 
of bilateral aid commitments from each of the new donors enters the equation with a negative 
sign, except for Saudi Arabia. The only new donor whose effect is significant at conventional 
levels, however, is China. The size of the marginal effect indicates that a 1-log-point increase in 
the average an African country typically receives in Chinese aid commitments results in the 
delivery, in relation to its mean, of 16 percent fewer World Bank conditions per project in the 
year after the increase.52 This result does not hold if only statistically significant control variables 
are included in the model specification. However, the negative impact of Chinese aid is robust to 
the choice of control variables when the individual effect of loan commitments allocated by every 
new donor is also addressed, as shown in columns 7 and 14 of Table III.1a.53 In both cases, the 
marginal effects of Chinese loan commitments are almost equal in terms of sign, significance 
levels and size. This outcome shows that fewer World Bank conditions are associated with larger 
aid inflows from China, ceteris paribus holding flows from other new donors constant. The 
presence of China seems to create an excess supply of development resources to which the World 
Bank reacts by offering less stringent loans to reach the borrowers. This holds true except if the 
recipient country obtains aid from Kuwait as well. This is because the marginal effect for Kuwaiti 
bilateral aid commitments is positive and significant at conventional levels in the same model 
specifications comprising all new donors. A means test reveals that the sum of the marginal 
effects for Chinese and Kuwaiti aid is not significantly different from 0.54 Therefore, World Bank 
loan stringency will not be revised downwards if the borrower is being financed by China and 
                                                        
52 The log-point increase is calculated through the formula (expme-1), where me are the marginal effects. 
53 The analysis of the effect for every new donor simultaneously excludes bilateral commitments from 
India to avoid a considerable drop in the sample size. This applies not only to the specifications in 
columns 7 and 14 of Table III.1a, but also for those in Table III.2a.      
54 The two tailed test has as null hypothesis Ho: βj1[China Comm.] + βj3[Kuwait Comm.] = 0. The chi 
square statistic obtained is 0.21 and its corresponding p-value is 0.65 suggesting that the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected at conventional levels.  
97 
 
Kuwait at mean values. Kuwait is perhaps financing projects in different economic sectors in 
which the demand for aid is not completely met. The World Bank may be engaging in a race to 
the bottom in the economic sectors where China is present, and at the same time demanding more 
reform in those where Kuwait is present.    
Results for the DAC donors, presented in columns 1 to 7 in Table III.1b, show that the 
marginal effects take the expected positive sign for each of the variables measuring aid 
commitments. Nevertheless, they all fail to reach significance at conventional levels, except for 
the United Kingdom. But even for the UK, the marginal effects are insignificant in the model 
specification with only statistically significant controls, as shown in columns 8 to 14. These 
outcomes indicate that the negotiation of credit conditions between the World Bank and African 
recipient countries is independent of activities simultaneously carried out by DAC donors. The 
World Bank does not perceive DAC donor resources as a threat to macroeconomic stability in the 
recipient country and therefore does not see a need to revise its conditionality.  
 In order to confirm that results are not greatly determined by the different lengths of the 
aid commitments series from each of the donors, Tables III.2a and III.2b exhibit results from 
replicating the previous strategy but restricting its time frame to 2000-2012. This period is chosen 
to match that of Chinese aid commitments. As can be seen in Table III.2a, results for the new 
donors are similar to those obtained in the analysis for the whole period. As before, the impact of 
Chinese and Kuwaiti aid is negative and positive respectively in the model specification 
addressing lending from all new donors individually, and both of the marginal effects are 
significant at conventional levels. They are also in these two cases robust to the choice of control 
variables, and their sizes comparable to the ones in the assessment with complete series. On the 
other hand, results in Table III.2b reveal a different pattern for the DAC donors. If the analysis is 
restricted to the most recent observations, the World Bank’s level of conditionality for African 
borrowers appears to take account of DAC donor aid inflows. Marginal effects are positive and 
significant at conventional levels for the allocation of aid from France and the United Kingdom, 
and so they are in the further model specifications including statistically significant control 
variables. The effect of being financed by the United Kingdom is smaller than being financed by 
France. A one percent increase in the typical funding from the United Kingdom to an African 
country will result in 21 percent more conditions, in relation to its average, for each World Bank 
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project this same country negotiates the year right after the increase. This same figure is 219 
percent for French aid. This hints to a degree of coordination between the World Bank and some 
of the DAC donors in the design of development projects in Africa. World Bank conditionality 
reflects the potential risks for borrowing countries derived from receiving additional resources 
from the DAC donors. Tougher loan stringency is preferred in these cases to guarantee 
macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability instead of obviating the activities of the DAC 
donors. This effect might be the result of DAC donors' efforts to harmonize their development 
finance activities since the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness in 2005.55 It is probably for this 
reason that the effect only appears in the most recent decade.  
Differences according to the income level of the borrower are presented in Figures III.6a 
and III.6b. The analysis makes use of the equation in (2) and tests hypothesis 2. Separately for 
low and middle income recipient countries in Africa, the graphs plot the marginal effect of each 
of the donors’ bilateral aid commitments on the average number of World Bank conditions 
assigned per project for the 1980-2012 period. Figure III.6a displays results for new donors while 
Figure III.6b for DAC donors. The blue lines highlight the 90 percent confidence interval of the 
marginal effect, and the red lines the zero boundary. Although not shown, marginal effects for the 
control variables are evaluated at the mean. Series are subsequently restricted once again to the 
2000-2012 period and the new estimations are found in Figures III.7a and III.7b. As observed in 
Figure III.6a, the marginal effect of new donors’ aid as a whole is negative and significant at 
conventional levels for middle income countries, while it fails to be significant at conventional 
levels for low income countries. Figure III.7a corroborates that the two effects persist when the 
time frame starts first in 2000. Middle income borrowers receive significantly fewer World Bank 
conditions with increasing aid from new donors. In fact, for a middle income African country, on 
average a one percent increase in the overall aid from new donors will result in at least 65 percent 
fewer conditions, compared to its mean, per project negotiated with the World Bank in the year 
after the increase. The impact is fueled by Kuwait and the United Emirates, as marginal effects 
                                                        
55 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 is a DAC donor initiative to improve the quality of 
aid and its impact on development. It gives a series of specific implementation measures and establishes a 
monitoring system to assess progress and ensure that donors and recipients hold each other accountable 
for their commitments. The Paris Declaration outlines the following five fundamental principles for 
making aid more effective: ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual 
accountability.    
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for aid delivered to middle income countries by these two donors is negative and significant at 
conventional levels. Middle income countries are more likely to have access to numerous 
financial options because of their better repayment capacity and therefore the World Bank might 
face more intense competition to finance development projects in these countries. Nonetheless, 
marginal effects for aid commitments from these two donors become insignificant at 
conventional levels with the restricted times series. It is possible that the interests of Kuwait and 
the United Arab Emirates are becoming more aligned with those of the World Bank and they 
might have been coordinating their activities in Africa since the most recent decade such that 
each of them focuses on different partner countries or projects within a recipient. For instance, 
the United Arab Emirates have expressed an interest in joining the DAC and since 2010 has been 
officially reporting its aid activities to the committee (Smith 2011).  
Moreover, results for Chinese aid are unexpected. Even though the impact of aid 
commitments from China on the average number of World Bank conditions is negative and 
significant at conventional levels, marginal effects turn significant only in low income countries. 
The size of the effect in low income countries is similar to that initially obtained in equation (1), 
or -16 percent. China delivers on average 30 percent more aid to low than to middle income 
countries in Africa, with the World Bank altering its level of conditionality only in response to 
Chinese aid to the first group of countries.56 China’s particular interest in low income countries 
might allow them to have more financial options despite their disadvantage in terms of 
bargaining power and repayment capacity, inducing the World Bank to redesign its programs in 
these countries. The effect of aid from the remaining new donors fails to reach significance at 
conventional levels for both low- and middle-income countries. Lastly, as can be seen in Figures 
III.7a and III.7b, results for DAC donors confirm that World Bank conditionality in Africa is not 
affected by aid inflows from these donors to both types of countries. As in the results for equation 
(1), positive impacts are only observed for aid commitments from France and the United 
Kingdom during the 2000-2012 period. Coordination efforts, as previously discussed, are 
perceived for France in low income countries and for the United Kingdom in middle income 
                                                        
56 China committed on average $47 million in aid to every low income country in Africa each year, while 
the same figure is $36 million for middle income countries.  Moreover, 8 out of the top 10 recipient of 
Chinese aid are classified of low income over almost the whole 2000-2012 period. These countries are 
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Mauritania, Uganda and Zambia. The two remaining 
middle income countries are Egypt and Angola.  
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countries after 2000. These results suggest that the bargaining power of recipient countries, as 
measured by the GDP per capita, cannot be used to predict the extent to which World Bank 
conditionality will be revised for every country. Lastly, equations (1) and (2) were estimated once 
again using a poisson model and all results are confirmed in terms of sign and significance level, 
suggesting that these are not subject to the choice of model. They are not shown but are available 
upon request.   
 
III.5. Conclusions 
 
This study measures the impact of aid from a wide range of new and DAC donors on World Bank 
conditionality by employing panel data techniques on a dataset covering 54 African countries 
over the 1980-2013 period. This question is founded on the increasing participation of new 
donors in the funding of development projects and is part of the debate on how the Bretton 
Woods institutions are adapting their operations to the presence of these new actors. The analysis 
provides a hint to understand the puzzle of why the World Bank is decreasing its conditionality 
apparently in contradiction to its own policy advice of channeling aid to recipient countries with 
good macroeconomic environments to increase its effectiveness.   
The empirical results suggest that when an African country is also assisted by China, the 
World Bank provides fewer conditions attached to its loans. In fact they receive 15 percent fewer 
conditions for every percentage-point increase in Chinese aid. In the past the World Bank has 
often recurred to lending with fewer conditions to cope with excesses in the supply of 
development resources and appears to be responding with the same strategy to the rise of Chinese 
lending activities in Africa after the turn of the new millennium. Contrary to expectations, this 
effect is most apparent in low income borrowers which should have a restricted bargaining power 
at the time of negotiating credits with donors. It is possible that China’s focus on low income 
countries in Africa for development aid activities has allowed them to shift loan negotiations with 
the World Bank closer to their own interests. A similar effect is observed in middle income 
borrowers that receive financial assistance from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. The 
World Bank delivers significantly fewer conditions in these cases but the effect is not robust 
when only the period from 2000-2012 is considered. Although these two donors and the World 
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Bank engaged in a race to the bottom via conditionality in the past, better coordination between 
them has most likely prevented it from occurring in recent years. This would not be surprising as, 
for example, the United Arab Emirates has expressed its interest in joining the DAC and since 
2010 has been officially reporting its aid activities to this committee. In contrast, no influence is 
found from aid allocated by the DAC donors on the number of conditions delivered by the World 
Bank. Exceptions are aid inflows from France and the United Kingdom after 2000. In both cases 
conditionality is revised upwards. In these cases World Bank conditionality can be seen as 
reflecting the potential risks for borrowing countries from receiving additional resources. This 
effect might be a result of the efforts of DAC donors to harmonize their development financing 
activities since the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005.  
These findings suggest that the World Bank reacts to the presence of new and DAC 
donors in opposite ways. The difference relies on how new donors and DAC donors approach 
borrowing governments. While new donors might present counter offers to finance projects 
already in negotiation with the World Bank, DAC donors are unlikely to do likewise. The World 
Bank has lessened its conditionality in response to the increasing competition from China so as to 
maintain the level of its development activities in Africa, as it did in the past with Kuwait and the 
United Arab Emirates. This behavior suggests that aid in Africa is largely driven by donor 
interests and that conditionality is inconsistent and has been used to achieve influence. The rise of 
new donors with divergent interests to those of the DAC might be leading to an aid architecture 
in which reform is ignored and effectiveness is unnecessary.    
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Figure III.1: Number of World Bank Conditions per Project in African Countries, Average by 
Year 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the average number of World Bank conditions delivered per project to recipient countries in 
Africa each year over the 1980-2013 period. Source: World Bank (2014).  
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Figure III.2: Number of World Bank Conditions per Project in 1980-2013, Average by Recipient 
Country 
 
Notes: The figure shows the average number of World Bank conditions delivered per project to each recipient 
country in Africa over the 1980-2013 period. Source: World Bank (2014). 
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Figure III.3: Number of World Bank Conditions per Project in African Countries in 1980-2013, 
Kernel Distribution 
 
Notes: The figure shows the Kernel distribution for the average number of World Bank conditions delivered per 
project to recipient countries in Africa over the 1980-2013 period. Source: World Bank (2014). 
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Figure III.4: Aid Commitments to African Countries in 1980-2012, Average by Donor 
 
The figure shows the average loan commitments approved by the United States, the World Bank, France, Germany, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, China, Kuwait, India, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to recipient countries 
in Africa each year over the 1980-2012 period. Figures are given in US constant dollars (base year 2000) and scaled 
to millions. Source: Tierney et al. (2011), OECD (2014). 
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Figure III.5a: Number of World Bank Conditions per Project to African Countries in 1980-2013, 
Average by New Donors' Aid Commitment Levels and Recipient Country Income Category 
 
Notes: The figure shows the average number of World Bank conditions delivered per project to recipient countries in 
Africa over the 1980-2013 period in relation to new donors' bilateral aid commitments. Each of the small diagrams 
considers an individual donor. “Below” signals each year in which a recipient country received an amount that is 
below the donor’s aid allocation average in Africa during that same year. “Above” signals each year in which a 
recipient country received an amount that is above the aforementioned average. “Middle Income” includes each year 
in which a recipient country is classified as middle-income by the World Bank. “Low Income” includes each year in 
which a recipient country is classified as low-income by the World Bank. “Total” includes every year regardless of 
income. Source: World Bank (2014), Tierney et al. (2011) 
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Figure III.5b: Number of World Bank Conditions per Project in African Countries in 1980-2013, 
Average by DAC Aid Commitments Level and Recipient Country Income Category 
 
Notes: The figure shows the average number of World Bank conditions delivered per project to recipient countries in 
Africa over the 1980-2013 period in relation to DAC donors' bilateral aid commitments. Each of the small diagrams 
considers an individual donor. “Below” signals each year in which a recipient country received an amount that is 
below the donor’s aid allocation average in Africa during that same year. “Above” signals each year in which a 
recipient country received an amount that is above the aforementioned average. “Middle Income” includes each year 
in which a recipient country is classified as middle-income by the World Bank. “Low Income” includes each year in 
which a recipient country is classified as low-income by the World Bank. “Total” includes every year regardless of 
income. World Bank (2014), OECD (2014) 
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Table III.1a: World Bank Conditions and New Donors Aid Commitments, Negative Binominal, 1980-2013  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Av. Fields 1.616*** 1.289** 1.631*** 1.477** 1.613*** 1.641*** 1.018*** 1.822*** 1.517** 1.870*** 1.416** 1.772*** 1.871*** 1.119*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0203) (0.0000) (0.0110) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0053) (0.0000) (0.0182) (0.0000) (0.0233) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0018) 
World Bank Comm. (log) -0.0520 -0.378 -0.0638 -0.212 0.0714 -0.0651 0.122 0.0675 -0.151 0.0601 -0.214 0.191 0.0596 0.171 
 
(0.7516) (0.3012) (0.7151) (0.6751) (0.6052) (0.7058) (0.6591) (0.6765) (0.6922) (0.7300) (0.6511) (0.2009) (0.7325) (0.5670) 
GDP per Capita t-1 (log) -4.628 -15.87** -3.670 10.81 -1.808 -3.495 -13.28* 
 
(0.1045) (0.0209) (0.2395) (0.5303) (0.5453) (0.2611) (0.0828) 
       GDP Growth t-1 0.0875 -0.0809 0.0862 0.144 0.181 0.0870 0.290 
 
(0.4437) (0.7351) (0.4913) (0.6764) (0.2187) (0.4775) (0.4556) 
       CPI Growth t-1 -4.213 -32.97*** -4.551 -36.37* -7.533 -4.466 -28.62 
 
(0.4749) (0.0011) (0.4515) (0.0804) (0.2372) (0.4640) (0.1125) 
       Gov. Expenditures t-1 -0.196 0.147 -0.268 -0.317 -0.158 -0.270 0.0431 
 
(0.1866) (0.4629) (0.1097) (0.1816) (0.3750) (0.1063) (0.8778) 
       Int. Reserves t-1 0.0183* -0.0159 0.0198* 0.0239 0.0223** 0.0194* -0.0518 
 
(0.0835) (0.4610) (0.0581) (0.1673) (0.0268) (0.0654) (0.1223) 
       Investments t-1 0.159** 0.0427 0.174** -0.144 0.130* 0.170* -0.0266 
 
(0.0420) (0.7973) (0.0479) (0.6258) (0.0796) (0.0512) (0.8631) 
       Extern Debt t-1 0.0334*** 0.0253*** 0.0494*** 0.0495*** 0.0367*** 0.0499*** 0.0516*** 0.0285*** 0.0237*** 0.0384*** 0.0442*** 0.0299*** 0.0385** 0.0535*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0029) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0035) (0.0001) (0.0017) (0.0000) (0.0086) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0100) (0.0000) 
UN Voting Aff. US t-1 -5.634 -27.79*** -4.068 -2.205 -11.81 -4.126 -4.366 
 
(0.7247) (0.0021) (0.8156) (0.9279) (0.4664) (0.8122) (0.8177) 
       Democracy Index t-1 0.0719 1.411*** 0.0854 2.042* -0.0637 0.0914 1.130* 
 
(0.7194) (0.0078) (0.6861) (0.0837) (0.7821) (0.6637) (0.0514) 
       New Donors Comm. t-1 (log) -0.0493 -0.0576 
 
(0.5692) 
      
(0.4209) 
      China Comm. t-1 (log) -0.153** -0.150* -0.101 -0.157** 
  
(0.0223) 
    
(0.0732) 
 
(0.2012) 
    
(0.0257) 
Kuwait Comm. t-1 (log) -0.0211 0.212* -0.00382 0.199* 
   
(0.8208) 
   
(0.0882) 
  
(0.9665) 
   
(0.0558) 
India Comm. t-1 (log) -0.0902 -0.0506 
    
(0.3487) 
      
(0.5500) 
   Uni. Arab Emi. Comm. t-1 (log) -0.196 0.0390 -0.156 -0.0760 
     
(0.1124) 
 
(0.6717) 
    
(0.1006) 
 
(0.6033) 
Saudi Arabia Comm. t-1 (log) 0.0230 -0.00653 0.00551 0.0223 
            (0.7772) (0.9489)           (0.9470) (0.8197) 
Observations 336 126 319 108 223 319 87 394 140 374 120 263 374 97 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the average number of World Bank conditions per project delivered to recipient country i in period t, rounded to the closest integer. Marginal effects at the mean value of the variable 
are reported. Standard errors are clustered by recipient country i. P-values are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table III.1b: World Bank Conditions and DAC Aid Commitments, Negative Binominal, 1980-2013 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Av. Fields 1.559*** 1.602*** 1.608*** 1.601*** 1.609*** 1.548*** 1.570*** 1.767*** 1.799*** 1.803*** 1.794*** 1.803*** 1.771*** 1.763*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
World Bank Comm. (log) -0.0914 -0.0603 -0.0577 -0.0612 -0.0697 -0.0443 -0.0376 0.0362 0.0200 0.0625 0.0560 0.0585 0.0616 0.0299 
 
(0.5730) (0.7476) (0.7308) (0.7125) (0.6733) (0.7934) (0.8483) (0.8161) (0.9026) (0.7061) (0.7324) (0.7213) (0.7089) (0.8593) 
GDP per Capita t-1 (log) -4.368 -4.565 -4.619 -4.595 -4.648 -4.384 -4.736 
 
(0.1594) (0.1348) (0.1228) (0.1277) (0.1190) (0.1406) (0.1405) 
       GDP Growth t-1 0.0696 0.0886 0.0959 0.0877 0.0865 0.0727 0.0851 
 
(0.5390) (0.4758) (0.3975) (0.4422) (0.4394) (0.5358) (0.5006) 
       CPI Growth t-1 -2.768 -3.792 -3.148 -3.812 -3.582 -3.543 -3.112 
 
(0.6379) (0.5249) (0.5971) (0.5218) (0.5419) (0.5424) (0.5984) 
       Gov. Expenditures t-1 -0.220 -0.203 -0.195 -0.203 -0.199 -0.199 -0.185 
 
(0.1506) (0.1884) (0.2106) (0.1817) (0.2026) (0.1815) (0.2369) 
       Int. Reserves t-1 0.0168* 0.0188** 0.0182* 0.0187* 0.0197* 0.0195** 0.0212** 
 
(0.0845) (0.0434) (0.0812) (0.0611) (0.0613) (0.0374) (0.0251) 
       Investments t-1 0.147* 0.157** 0.152** 0.156** 0.150* 0.174** 0.164** 
 
(0.0665) (0.0392) (0.0499) (0.0407) (0.0510) (0.0326) (0.0395) 
       Extern Debt t-1 0.0336*** 0.0341*** 0.0346*** 0.0341*** 0.0347*** 0.0342*** 0.0358*** 0.0292*** 0.0302*** 0.0302*** 0.0296*** 0.0293*** 0.0294*** 0.0313*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0026) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0009) 
UN Voting Aff. US t-1 -7.939 -6.794 -7.067 -6.883 -6.592 -7.021 -6.135 
 
(0.6134) (0.6480) (0.6463) (0.6542) (0.6643) (0.6409) (0.6830) 
       Democracy Index t-1 0.0503 0.0782 0.0771 0.0752 0.0849 0.0511 0.0810 
 
(0.8098) (0.6642) (0.7132) (0.7175) (0.6680) (0.7952) (0.6584) 
       DAC Comm. t-1 (log) 1.271 1.098 
 
(0.2319) 
      
(0.2456) 
      United States Comm. t-1 (log) 8.39e-05 -0.207 0.431 0.357 
  
(0.9999) 
    
(0.7738) 
 
(0.2586) 
    
(0.3583) 
France Comm. t-1 (log) 0.439 0.395 0.378 0.326 
   
(0.3153) 
   
(0.3643) 
  
(0.3720) 
   
(0.4448) 
Germany Comm. t-1 (log) 0.0858 -0.173 0.232 0.192 
    
(0.8742) 
  
(0.7445) 
   
(0.4782) 
  
(0.6791) 
Japan Comm. t-1 (log) 0.248 0.322 -0.0227 0.0182 
     
(0.5028) 
 
(0.3442) 
    
(0.9364) 
 
(0.9483) 
United Kingdom Comm. t-1 (log) 0.204* 0.222* 0.149 0.117 
      
(0.0836) (0.0517) 
     
(0.1568) (0.2255) 
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 334 334 394 393 394 394 394 392 391 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the average number of World Bank conditions per project delivered to recipient country i in period t, rounded to the closest integer. Marginal effects at the mean value of the variable 
are reported. Standard errors are clustered by recipient country i. P-values are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table III.2a: World Bank Conditions and New Donors Aid Commitments, Negative Binominal, 2000-2013 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Av. Fields 1.410*** 1.289** 1.532*** 1.477** 1.324*** 1.415*** 1.018*** 1.509*** 1.517** 1.637*** 1.416** 1.336*** 1.548*** 1.119*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0203) (0.0000) (0.0110) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0053) (0.0000) (0.0182) (0.0000) (0.0233) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0018) 
World Bank Comm. (log) -0.100 -0.378 -0.0818 -0.212 0.140 -0.0777 0.122 0.160 -0.151 0.135 -0.214 0.245 0.262 0.171 
 
(0.7764) (0.3012) (0.8327) (0.6751) (0.6278) (0.8445) (0.6591) (0.6394) (0.6922) (0.6988) (0.6511) (0.4168) (0.4722) (0.5670) 
GDP per Capita t-1 (log) -17.79** -15.87** -15.14** 10.81 -17.93*** -15.99** -13.28* 
 
(0.0100) (0.0209) (0.0346) (0.5303) (0.0039) (0.0215) (0.0828) 
       GDP Growth t-1 0.350*** -0.0809 0.359*** 0.144 0.397*** 0.319** 0.290 
 
(0.0016) (0.7351) (0.0029) (0.6764) (0.0001) (0.0307) (0.4556) 
       CPI Growth t-1 -0.976 -32.97*** -3.305 -36.37* -3.896 -4.426 -28.62 
 
(0.9062) (0.0011) (0.6972) (0.0804) (0.6117) (0.6103) (0.1125) 
       Gov. Expenditures t-1 0.00568 0.147 0.0322 -0.317 -0.0320 0.00351 0.0431 
 
(0.9762) (0.4629) (0.8897) (0.1816) (0.8802) (0.9880) (0.8778) 
       Int. Reserves t-1 0.0104 -0.0159 0.00438 0.0239 0.00874 0.00658 -0.0518 
 
(0.4176) (0.4610) (0.8168) (0.1673) (0.5049) (0.7029) (0.1223) 
       Investments t-1 -0.0202 0.0427 -0.0408 -0.144 -0.00465 -0.0466 -0.0266 
 
(0.7872) (0.7973) (0.6386) (0.6258) (0.9450) (0.5710) (0.8631) 
       Extern Debt t-1 0.0311*** 0.0253*** 0.0616*** 0.0495*** 0.0304*** 0.0615*** 0.0516*** 0.0262*** 0.0237*** 0.0413*** 0.0442*** 0.0317*** 0.0408*** 0.0535*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0023) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0024) (0.0000) 
UN Voting Aff. US t-1 -21.03** -27.79*** -18.78* -2.205 -14.12 -18.13 -4.366 
 
(0.0422) (0.0021) (0.0844) (0.9279) (0.2655) (0.1013) (0.8177) 
       Democracy Index t-1 0.198 1.411*** 0.293 2.042* 0.421 0.412 1.130* 
 
(0.7799) (0.0078) (0.7267) (0.0837) (0.4776) (0.6178) (0.0514) 
       New Donors Comm. t-1 (log) 0.0258 0.0341 
 
(0.8116) 
      
(0.6967) 
      China Comm. t-1 (log) -0.153** -0.150* -0.101 -0.157** 
  
(0.0223) 
    
(0.0732) 
 
(0.2012) 
    
(0.0257) 
Kuwait Comm. t-1 (log) 0.118 0.212* 0.153* 0.199* 
   
(0.2872) 
   
(0.0882) 
  
(0.0943) 
   
(0.0558) 
India Comm. t-1 (log) -0.0902 -0.0506 
    
(0.3487) 
      
(0.5500) 
   Uni. Arab Emi. Comm. t-1 (log) -0.0966 0.0390 -0.0669 -0.0760 
     
(0.4161) 
 
(0.6717) 
    
(0.5192) 
 
(0.6033) 
Saudi Arabia Comm. t-1 (log) 0.121 -0.00653 0.0988 0.0223 
      
(0.1601) (0.9489) 
     
(0.1985) (0.8197) 
Observations 183 126 166 108 146 166 87 209 140 189 120 168 189 97 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the average number of World Bank conditions per project delivered to recipient country i in period t, rounded to the closest integer. Marginal effects at the mean value of the variable 
are reported. Standard errors are clustered by recipient country i. P-values are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table III.2b: World Bank Conditions and DAC Aid Commitments, Negative Binominal, 2000-2013 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Av. Fields 1.373*** 1.430*** 1.420*** 1.382*** 1.395*** 1.311*** 1.318*** 1.483*** 1.512*** 1.487*** 1.497*** 1.498*** 1.453*** 1.436*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
World Bank Comm. (log) -0.0673 -0.145 -0.0730 -0.125 -0.132 -0.0479 -0.110 0.196 0.162 0.208 0.161 0.164 0.244 0.305 
 
(0.8529) (0.6922) (0.8284) (0.7287) (0.7202) (0.8986) (0.7733) (0.5712) (0.6300) (0.5314) (0.6350) (0.6436) (0.4750) (0.3682) 
GDP per Capita t-1 (log) -18.25*** -17.62*** -13.95** -18.12*** -18.17*** -17.49*** -11.86* 
 
(0.0036) (0.0074) (0.0210) (0.0049) (0.0046) (0.0062) (0.0702) 
       GDP Growth t-1 0.353*** 0.357*** 0.315*** 0.348*** 0.342*** 0.327*** 0.309** 
 
(0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0100) (0.0043) (0.0061) (0.0071) (0.0174) 
       CPI Growth t-1 0.209 -1.584 1.340 -1.456 -1.703 -1.336 1.502 
 
(0.9810) (0.8349) (0.8777) (0.8498) (0.8257) (0.8602) (0.8298) 
       Gov. Expenditures t-1 0.0404 -0.0130 0.0152 0.00168 0.00857 0.0775 0.0359 
 
(0.8383) (0.9489) (0.9338) (0.9931) (0.9655) (0.6876) (0.8440) 
       Int. Reserves t-1 0.00585 0.00924 0.00491 0.00886 0.00887 0.0116 0.00731 
 
(0.6768) (0.4813) (0.7387) (0.4961) (0.4843) (0.3518) (0.6159) 
       Investments t-1 -0.0314 -0.0226 -0.0377 -0.0104 -0.0160 -0.00592 -0.0100 
 
(0.6803) (0.7622) (0.6237) (0.8881) (0.8252) (0.9387) (0.8940) 
       Extern Debt t-1 0.0312*** 0.0304*** 0.0328*** 0.0304*** 0.0303*** 0.0331*** 0.0342*** 0.0268*** 0.0267*** 0.0283*** 0.0260*** 0.0261*** 0.0266*** 0.0286*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
UN Voting Aff. US t-1 -21.09** -18.78* -18.01* -21.33** -21.05** -20.96** -15.70* 
 
(0.0374) (0.0517) (0.0662) (0.0313) (0.0387) (0.0330) (0.0559) 
       Democracy Index t-1 0.169 0.114 0.0936 0.205 0.224 0.168 -0.0495 
 
(0.8074) (0.8749) (0.8916) (0.7720) (0.7510) (0.8095) (0.9422) 
       DAC Comm. t-1 (log) 1.172 0.899 
 
(0.2327) 
      
(0.3236) 
      United States Comm. t-1 (log) -0.640 -1.089 0.135 0.00359 
  
(0.4846) 
    
(0.1941) 
 
(0.7982) 
    
(0.9953) 
France Comm. t-1 (log) 1.121* 1.159* 1.002* 1.017* 
   
(0.0569) 
   
(0.0575) 
  
(0.0811) 
   
(0.0703) 
Germany Comm. t-1 (log) -0.260 -0.613 -0.0716 -0.416 
    
(0.5845) 
  
(0.1622) 
   
(0.8073) 
  
(0.3948) 
Japan Comm. t-1 (log) -0.0952 -0.0726 0.00632 0.129 
     
(0.7866) 
 
(0.8367) 
    
(0.9825) 
 
(0.6515) 
United Kingdom Comm. t-1 (log) 0.163* 0.190** 0.200** 0.207*** 
      
(0.0614) (0.0230) 
     
(0.0115) (0.0059) 
Observations 183 183 183 183 183 181 181 209 208 209 209 209 207 206 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the average number of World Bank conditions per project delivered to recipient country i in period t, rounded to the closest integer. Marginal effects at the mean value of the variable 
are reported. Standard errors are clustered by recipient country i. P-values are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Figure III.6a: World Bank Conditions and New Donors Aid Commitments by Recipient Country 
Income Category, Negative Binominal, 1980-2013 
 
Notes: The figure shows the marginal effect of aid commitments from new donor j on the average number of World 
Bank conditions delivered. Each figure considers the marginal effect of new donor j for low- and middle-income 
recipient countries separately.  The blue lines highlight the 90 percent confidence interval of the marginal effect, and 
the red lines the zero boundary. New Donors Comm. refers to aid commitments from China, Kuwait, India, the 
United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Although not shown, regressions include all variables in equation (2). 
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Figure III.6b: World Bank Conditions and DAC Aid Commitments by Recipient Country Income 
Category, Negative Binominal, 1980-2013 
 
Notes: The figure shows the marginal effect of aid commitments from DAC donor j on the average number of World 
Bank conditions delivered. Each figure considers the marginal effect of DAC donor j for low- and middle-income 
recipient countries separately.  DAC Comm. refers to aid commitments from all 29 DAC donors. The blue lines 
highlight the 90 percent confidence interval of the marginal effect, and the red lines the zero boundary. Although not 
shown, regressions include all variables in equation (2). 
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Figure 7a: World Bank Conditions and New Donor Aid Commitments by Recipient Country 
Income Category, Negative Binominal, 2000-2013 
 
Notes: The figure shows the marginal effect of aid commitments from new donor j on the average number of World 
Bank conditions delivered. Each figure considers the marginal effect of aid commitments from new donor j for low- 
and middle-income recipient countries separately.  The blue lines highlight the 90 percent confidence interval of the 
marginal effect, and the red lines the zero boundary. New Donors Comm. refers to aid commitments from China, 
Kuwait, India, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Although not shown, regressions include all variables in 
equation (2). 
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Figure 7b: World Bank Conditions and DAC Aid Commitments by Recipient Country Income 
Category, Negative Binominal, 2000-2013 
 
Notes: The figure shows the marginal effect of aid commitments from DAC donor j on the average number of World 
Bank conditions delivered. Each figure considers the marginal effect of aid commitments from DAC donor j for low- 
and middle-income recipient countries separately.  DAC Comm. refers to aid commitments from all 29 DAC donors. 
The blue lines highlight the 90 percent confidence interval of the marginal effect, and the red lines the zero 
boundary. Although not shown, regressions include all variables in equation (2). 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix I.1: List of Countries in Study 
 
Afghanistan Egypt Malaysia Sierra Leone 
Albania Gabon Maldives Somalia 
Algeria Gambia Mali Sudan 
Azerbaijan Guinea Mauritania Suriname 
Bahrain Guinea-Bissau Morocco Syria 
Bangladesh Indonesia Mozambique Tajikistan 
Benin Iran Niger Togo 
Brunei Iraq Nigeria Tunisia 
Burkina Faso Jordan Oman Turkey 
Cameroon Kazakhstan Pakistan Turkmenistan 
Chad Kuwait Palestinian Adm. Areas Uganda 
Comoros Kyrgyz Republic Qatar United Arab Emirates 
Cote d’Ivoire Lebanon Saudi Arabia Uzbekistan 
Djibouti Lybia Senegal Yemen 
Notes: Countries shown in bold are Muslim majority populated.   
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Appendix I.2: Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variables Description Source 
IsDB commitments (log) IsDB loan commitments received by a 
borrowing member in a year in constant dollars. 
IsDB Annual Report (various 
years), OECD (2012). 
WB commitments (log) World Bank loan commitments received by a 
borrowing member in a year in constant dollars. 
OECD (2012). 
Population (log) Total population. World Bank (2012a). 
GDP per capita (log) GDP per capita in current dollars. World Bank (2012a). 
Democracy (dummy) Dummy coded 1 if government is democratic, 
and 0 otherwise.  
Cheibub et al. (2010). 
Civil war (dummy) Dummy coded 1 if recipient undergoes a civil 
war in a year, and 0 otherwise.  
Gleditsch et al. (2002). 
Saudi Arabia aid (log) Saudi Arabia bilateral aid received by a 
borrowing member in a year in constant dollars. 
OECD (2012). 
Trade to GDP Sum of merchandise exports and imports in 
percentage of GDP. 
World Bank (2012a). 
Oil production (log) Value of oil production in constant dollars. De Soysa and Binningsbo 
(2012) 
Int. Reserves to GDP International reserves as a percentage of total 
GDP. 
World Bank (2012a). 
Debt crisis (dummy) Dummy coded 1 if recipient undergoes a debt 
crisis, and 0 otherwise. 
Laeven and Valencia (2012). 
Sunni population 
(dummy) 
Dummy coded 1 if religious affiliation of at least 
50 percent of the population is Sunni Islam, and 
0 otherwise.  
Pew Research Center (2009a, 
2000b). 
Shia population (dummy) Dummy coded 1 if religious affiliation of at least 
50 percent of the population is Shia Islam, and 0 
otherwise. 
Pew Research Center (2009a, 
2009b). 
Other population 
(dummy) 
Dummy coded 1 if religious affiliation of at least 
50 percent of the population is not Islam (any 
sect), and 0 otherwise. 
Pew Research Center (2009a, 
2009b). 
Sunni regime (dummy) Dummy coded 1 if religious affiliation of 
borrowing member government in a year is 
Sunni Islam, and 0 otherwise. 
CIA World Fact Book (2013), 
Encyclopedia Britannica (2012). 
Shia regime (dummy) Dummy coded 1 if religious affiliation of 
borrowing member government in a year is Shia 
Islam, and 0 otherwise. 
CIA World Fact Book (2013), 
Encyclopedia Britannica (2012). 
Other regime (dummy) Dummy coded 1 if religious affiliation of 
borrowing member government in a year is not 
Islam (any sect), and 0 otherwise. 
CIA World Fact Book (2013), 
Encyclopedia Britannica (2012). 
Religious Tensions Religious Tensions Index, from 0 (highest) to 6 
(lowest). 
International Country Risk 
Guide (2012). 
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Appendix I.3: Summary Statistics 
 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dv. Min Max 
IsDB commitments (log) 346 15.25 1.48 6.11 17.58 
WB commitments (log) 448 10.56 8.25 0.00 21.68 
Population (log) 427 15.65 1.64 11.89 19.24 
GDP per capita (log) 398 6.95 1.40 4.68 10.93 
Democracy (dummy) 420 0.13 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Civil war (dummy) 420 0.24 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Saudi Arabia aid (log) 448 2.82 4.39 0.00 19.25 
Trade to GDP 383 58.37 31.38 10.40 213.19 
Oil production (log) 429 12.98 10.35 0.00 25.86 
Int. Reserves to GDP 363 13.84 14.96 0.09 141.46 
Debt crisis  (dummy) 417 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.25 
Sunni populous (dummy) 430 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Shia populous (dummy) 430 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Other populous (dummy) 430 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Sunni regime (dummy) 430 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Shia regime (dummy) 430 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Other regime (dummy) 430 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Religious Tensions 257 3.52 1.41 0.00 6.00 
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Appendix II.1: Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Description Source 
IDB comm (log) IDB loan commitments received by a borrowing 
member in a year in constant dollars. 
IDB Annual Report (various 
years), OECD (2012) 
Population (log) Total population. World Bank (2012a) 
GDP cap. (log) GDP per capita in constant dollars. World Bank (2012a) 
Pol. & civil rights Average of political rights and civil liberties 
indices, from 1 (strongly democratic) to 6 
(strongly autocratic). 
Freedom House (2012) 
CPI growth Inflation rate as measured by the CPI, transformed 
by x/(100+x) 
World Bank (2012a) 
Gov. exp. / GDP Government expenditures in percentage of GDP. World Bank (2012a) 
Current acc. /GDP Sum of net exports of goods, services, net income, 
and net current transfers in percentage of GDP. 
World Bank (2012a) 
GDP cap. growth Growth rate of GDP per capita. World Bank (2012a) 
Investments / GDP Investment share in percentage of GDP per capita. Heston et al. (2006) 
Int. res. / GDP International reserves as a percentage of total 
GDP. 
World Bank (2012a) 
Int. res. ch / GDP Change in international reserves as a percentage 
of total GDP. 
World Bank (2012a) 
Elections Dummy coded 1 if elections (either presidential or 
parliamentary) were held in the year, and 0 
otherwise. 
Beck et al. (2001) 
Checks t-1 (log) Number of checks and balances. Beck et al. (2001) 
US exports (log) US exports to a borrowing member in a year in 
constant dollars. 
UN Comtrade (2012)  
US UNGA votes Voting compliance mean with the US in the 
UNGA by a borrowing member in a year, from 0 
(no compliance) to 1 (full compliance). 
Strezhnev and Voeten 
(2012) 
US aid (log) US bilateral aid received by a borrowing member 
in a year in constant dollars. 
OECD (2012) 
UNSC memb. Dummy coded 1 if a borrowing member is a non-
permanent member of the UNSC in a year, and 0 
otherwise. 
Dreher et al. (2009b) 
Exports average (log) Average of US, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
exports to a borrowing member in a year in 
constant dollars. 
UN Comtrade (2012) 
Exports coeff. var. Coefficient of variation of major shareholder 
exports average, from 0 (full homogeneity) to 100 
(full heterogeneity).  
UN Comtrade (2012) 
UNGA votes average Average of voting compliance mean with the US, 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in the UNGA by a 
borrowing member in a year, from 0 (no 
compliance) to 1 (full compliance). 
Strezhnev and Voeten 
(2012) 
UNGA votes coeff. var. Coefficient of variation of major shareholder 
UNGA voting affinity average, from 0 (full 
homogeneity) to 100 (full heterogeneity). 
Strezhnev and Voeten 
(2012) 
 
128 
 
Appendix II.2: Summary Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
IDB comm (log) 943 16.66 5.33 0.00 22.35 
Population (log) 1,066 15.34 1.70 11.70 19.09 
GDP cap. (log) 1,044 7.55 0.94 5.48 10.00 
Pol. & civil rights 949 2.96 1.47 1.00 7.00 
CPI growth 1,036 0.15 0.19 -0.33 0.99 
Gov. exp. / GDP 988 13.35 5.49 2.98 43.48 
Current acc. /GDP 888 -3.86 7.90 -42.89 53.23 
GDP cap. growth 1,036 1.41 4.62 -28.61 23.37 
Investments / GDP 1,040 22.67 9.78 -9.09 86.33 
Int. res. / GDP 1,035 11.15 8.37 0.77 55.95 
Int. res. ch / GDP 897 -0.01 0.04 -0.19 0.29 
Elections 902 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Checks t-1 (log) 900 1.27 0.41 0.00 2.08 
US exports (log) 988 13.72 1.44 7.83 18.42 
US UNGA votes 995 0.28 0.12 0.05 0.66 
US aid (log) 988 14.36 6.23 0.00 20.87 
UNSC memb. 1,047 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Exports average (log) 981 12.03 2.03 4.94 16.80 
Exports coeff. var. 981 15.54 8.74 1.78 78.45 
UNGA votes average 992 0.75 0.03 0.62 0.83 
UNGA votes coeff. var. 992 36.49 9.10 6.05 53.61 
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Appendix III.1: Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variables Description Source 
Av. Conditions Average number of World Bank conditions per project 
delivered to a recipient country in a year.   
World Bank (2014). 
Av. Fields Average number of fields covered per project delivered to a 
recipient country in a year.  
World Bank (2014). 
World Bank Comm. 
(log) 
World Bank loan commitments received by a recipient 
country in a year in constant dollars. 
OECD (2014) 
GDP per Capita (log) GDP per capita in current dollars. World Bank (2012a) 
GDP Growth Growth rate of GDP per capita. World Bank (2012a) 
CPI Growth Inflation rate as measured by the CPI, transformed by 
x/(100+x) 
World Bank (2012a) 
Gov. Expenditures Government expenditures as a percentage of GDP. World Bank (2012a) 
Int. Reserves International reserves as a percentage of total GDP. World Bank (2012a) 
Investments Investment share as a percentage of GDP per capita. Heston et al. (2006) 
Extern Debt External debt as a percentage of GDP.  World Bank (2012a) 
UN Voting Aff. US Voting compliance mean with the US in the UNGA by a 
recipient country in a year, from 0 (no compliance) to 1 (full 
compliance). 
Strezhnev and 
Voeten (2012) 
Democracy Index Democracy index, from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full 
democracy). 
Marshall and Jaggers 
(2000) 
New Donors Comm (log) Aid loan commitments by China, Kuwait, India, United Arab 
Emirates and Saudi Arabia altogether received by a recipient 
country in a year in constant dollars.   
Tierney et al. (2011) 
China Comm (log) China loan commitments received by a recipient country in a 
year in constant dollars.  
Tierney et al. (2011) 
Kuwait Comm (log) Kuwait loan commitments received by a recipient country in 
a year in constant dollars.   
Tierney et al. (2011) 
India Comm (log) India loan commitments received by a recipient country in a 
year in constant dollars.   
Tierney et al. (2011) 
United Arab Emirates 
Comm (log) 
United Arab Emirates loan commitments received by a 
recipient country in a year in constant dollars.   
Tierney et al. (2011) 
Saudi Arabia Comm 
(log) 
Saudi Arabia loan commitments received by a recipient 
country in a year in constant dollars.   
Tierney et al. (2011) 
DAC Comm (log) Aid loan commitments by all 29 DAC donors altogether 
received by a recipient country in a year in constant dollars.   
OECD (2014) 
United States Comm 
(log) 
US loan commitments received by a recipient country in a 
year in constant dollars.   
OECD (2014) 
France Comm (log) France loan commitments received by a recipient country in 
a year in constant dollars.   
OECD (2014) 
Germany Comm (log) Germany loan commitments received by a recipient country 
in a year in constant dollars.   
OECD (2014) 
Japan Comm (log) Japan loan commitments received by a recipient country in a 
year in constant dollars.   
OECD (2014) 
United Kingdom Comm 
(log) 
United Kingdom loan commitments received by a recipient 
country in a year in constant dollars.   
OECD (2014) 
Low Income Dummy coded 1 if recipient country is classified as low-
income by the World Bank in a year, 0 otherwise. 
World Bank (2012a) 
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Appendix III.2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Av. Conditions 511 16.33 13.94 0.00 97.00 
Av. Fields 423 4.00 1.80 1.00 10.00 
World Bank Comm. (log) 2,368 9.30 9.05 0.00 21.43 
GDP per Capita (log) 2,441 7.28 0.82 4.90 10.00 
GDP Growth 2,309 3.95 7.10 -51.03 106.28 
CPI Growth 1,909 0.10 0.13 -0.21 1.00 
Gov. Expenditures 2,208 15.59 7.23 2.05 69.54 
Int. Reserves 1,827 163.09 3,844.18 -0.17 159,702.50 
Investments 1,899 19.62 10.16 -2.42 113.58 
Extern Debt 1,877 77.70 95.75 0.00 1,380.77 
UN Voting Aff. US 2,470 0.35 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Democracy Index 2,526 -2.54 5.85 -10.00 10.00 
New Donors Comm (log) 2,646 5.87 8.10 0.00 20.79 
China Comm (log) 443 13.08 6.56 0.00 20.79 
Kuwait Comm (log) 2,538 2.94 6.44 0.00 20.43 
India Comm (log) 324 3.75 6.82 0.00 20.24 
United Arab Emirates Comm (log) 1,458 1.76 4.94 0.00 20.00 
Saudi Arabia Comm (log) 1,944 2.18 5.71 0.00 20.47 
DAC Comm (log) 2,106 18.04 4.38 0.00 23.33 
United States Comm (log) 2,232 12.43 7.62 0.00 22.88 
France Comm (log) 2,106 13.10 7.10 0.00 21.62 
Germany Comm (log) 2,106 12.93 6.82 0.00 21.52 
Japan Comm (log) 2,106 11.37 7.59 0.00 21.82 
United Kingdom Comm (log) 2,106 9.16 7.89 0.00 21.87 
Low Income 1,422 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
 
 
 
 
